????大型企業(yè)的內(nèi)部變革必須以大刀闊斧的行動為中心展開,。大企業(yè)的業(yè)務(wù)慣例是為了支持大型的組織機(jī)構(gòu)而設(shè)立的，如果沒有徹底的人事變動,，大企業(yè)往往難以快速轉(zhuǎn)型,。在Myspace，我們也在人事和組織結(jié)構(gòu)上進(jìn)行了一些調(diào)整,。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)每次變動都可以提高決策和產(chǎn)品研發(fā)的效率,。但是這些變動還不夠徹底，無法解決橫亙在我們面前的艱巨任務(wù),。
????千萬不要低估慣性的殺傷力,，它在公司的流程和人員之中藏得很深，哪怕對人員進(jìn)行了重大變動,，也往往無法使效率提高到你所需要的程度,。只有對體系進(jìn)行重大的變革和完全的顛覆，才能刺激整個組織圍繞著新的目標(biāo)努力,，才能使我們看到效率的提升,。緩慢的行為變革只能帶來緩慢的流程變革。與之相對,，重大的行為變革卻會造就徹底的流程變革,。
????單一門戶=單一故障點(diǎn)：許多大型互聯(lián)網(wǎng)公司，比如Myspace和雅虎,，都有一個單一的“品牌”門戶,，也就是只有一個進(jìn)入網(wǎng)站的入口。用戶可以在進(jìn)入這個門戶后發(fā)現(xiàn)多個產(chǎn)品線,。不幸的是,，一個單一的門戶，在消費(fèi)者看來就是一個單一的故障點(diǎn)——哪怕這個門戶后面的產(chǎn)品線很強(qiáng)勁,。
????Myspace改版后,，許多主要的衡量數(shù)據(jù)穩(wěn)定了下來,，產(chǎn)品和用戶參與的某些領(lǐng)域也出現(xiàn)了增長。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)新老用戶行為之間出現(xiàn)了明顯的分裂,。雖然整個網(wǎng)站都出現(xiàn)了這種明確的勢頭,，但由于我們只有一個門戶，所以我們無法輕易地展現(xiàn)這種勢頭,。
????網(wǎng)飛（Netflix）也面臨著同樣的挑戰(zhàn)。老式的DVD租憑業(yè)務(wù)壓制了消費(fèi)者對流媒體業(yè)務(wù)和公司總體的感知勢頭,，因此網(wǎng)飛對兩條業(yè)務(wù)線進(jìn)行了區(qū)分,，并為兩種業(yè)務(wù)分別建立了網(wǎng)站。雖然他們后來撤銷了這個決定,，但是從長期看來,，分別建網(wǎng)站的決定可能是正確的。
????除上述五條建議之外,，還有一些零星的想法,，送給未來的轉(zhuǎn)型期顧問、董事會和高管們：
?????在數(shù)字世界,，建立新品牌要比扭轉(zhuǎn)老品牌的頹勢來得更容易,。
?????一個大型的單一站點(diǎn)或單一門戶如果行之有效，那的確很好,。但最好能有一部分離線收入作為保障,，如果可以的話，最好設(shè)立多個用戶進(jìn)入點(diǎn),。
?????沒有拙劣的員工,，只有拙劣的流程。要想理順流程,，就要進(jìn)行徹底的文化變革,，千萬不要嘗試緩慢的企業(yè)文化改革。
????互聯(lián)網(wǎng)仍然是一個新興的產(chǎn)業(yè),。在更為成熟的企業(yè)里,，展示讓老樹發(fā)新芽的能力，對于長遠(yuǎn)的成功來說至關(guān)重要,。這是我們所有人都必須面對,、也必須解決的問題。在我們著手解決這個問題時,，我相信我們會發(fā)現(xiàn),，在老業(yè)務(wù)之外打造新的業(yè)務(wù)，是實現(xiàn)迅速增長,、吸引更多用戶的最佳途徑,。
????本文作者M(jìn)ichael Jones是一名互聯(lián)網(wǎng)高管,，也是一名資深的企業(yè)家、投資家和顧問,。他居住在洛杉磯,。最近他曾擔(dān)任Myspace的CEO，期間主要負(fù)責(zé)Myspace,、Myspace Music和Myspace Mobile的全球業(yè)務(wù)戰(zhàn)略與運(yùn)營,。任職期間，他負(fù)責(zé)了Myspace的改版,，這次改版也是互聯(lián)網(wǎng)行業(yè)最引人關(guān)注的一次轉(zhuǎn)型之舉,。它穩(wěn)定了長期以來一直走低的用戶訪問量，把運(yùn)營成本削減了近90%,，并且將Myspace由社交網(wǎng)絡(luò)轉(zhuǎn)型成一個社交娛樂門戶網(wǎng)站,。作為一個連續(xù)創(chuàng)業(yè)的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)家，他也曾創(chuàng)立并賣出過許多企業(yè),，包括咨詢公司PBJ Digital,、應(yīng)用平臺Userplane（后被美國在線收購），Tsavo Media和Myspace等,。他現(xiàn)在仍然以投資者,、顧問和董事會成員等身份，積極參與許多早期初創(chuàng)公司的事務(wù),。
????譯者：樸成奎 |
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????Change within large organizations must be centered around drastic actions. Large companies with practices built to support large organizations are difficult to transform quickly without radical personnel changes. At Myspace, we instituted several shifts in personnel and organizational structure. We found that while each change brought greater efficiencies in decision-making and product development, they weren't radical enough to accomplish the enormous task in front of us.
????Do not underestimate how deeply muscle memory is embedded in the company's processes and staff -- so much so that even significant staff changes often do not result in the desired increase in efficiency. It was only through major change, a full disruption to the system, that we were able to galvanize the organization around new goals and begin seeing increased efficiencies. Slow behavioral change creates slow process change. Large behavioral change creates a drastic process change.
????Single front door = single point of failure. Many large Internet businesses, such as Myspace and Yahoo, have a single "brand" front door, in that users have one point of entry into the site. Behind the door, users will find multiple product lines. Unfortunately, a single front door means there is a single point of failure in consumers' minds -- even when the product lines behind it are robust.
????After the Myspace relaunch, we were able to stabilize many of the primary metrics and start to show growth in certain areas of the product and user behavior. We were beginning to see a clear split in old vs. new user behavior. However, because we had a single front door, we couldn't easily demonstrate clearly defined momentum that was applicable across the entire site.
????Netflix (NFLX) faces a similar challenge. Its legacy DVD business was weighing down the perceived momentum of the streaming business and the company overall. So Netflix tried to differentiate the two business lines and create separate websites for each. They've since reversed that decision, but it the long run, separate website may end up being the right answer.
????A few parting thoughts for future turn-around investors, boards and executives:
????? In the digital world, new brands are easier to create than fixing momentum issues with historically large brands.
????? A huge single site / single front door is wonderful when it works, but hedge your strategy with offsite revenue, and if applicable, multiple points of customer entry.
????? There are no bad people, only bad processes. To fix them, create radical cultural change, don't attempt a slow cultural shift.
????The Internet is still an adolescent industry. The ability to show new life in more mature businesses is crucial to long-term success. This is a problem we all must embrace and solve for. And when we do, I believe we will find that building new businesses on top of older businesses of scale is the best formula to rapid growth and audience renewal.
????Michael Jones is an Internet executive, a long-?‐time entrepreneur, investor and advisor located in Los Angeles. Most recently, Mike served as the CEO of Myspace. In this role, Mike oversaw global business strategy and operations for Myspace, Myspace Music, and Myspace Mobile. During his tenure, he was responsible for the relaunch of Myspace, one of the most high-?‐profile turn-?‐around challenges in the industry. This included stabilizing a historically negative traffic and user trend, reducing the operational cost of the business by nearly 90 percent and pivoting the product from its legacy as a social network to a social entertainment destination. A serial Internet entrepreneur, Mike has founded and sold numerous businesses, including agency PBJ Digital, application platform Userplane, which he led from startup to its acquisition by AOL, Tsavo Media and Myspace. Mike continues to be actively involved with early-?‐stage start-?‐ups as an investor, advisor and board member. |
