高德思：我知道很多人都問(wèn)過(guò)你這個(gè)問(wèn)題,。

吉姆·柯林斯：但是對(duì)同樣問(wèn)題的回答也會(huì)有不同的時(shí)候，因?yàn)槲覀兊南敕〞?huì)發(fā)展,。

高德思：讓我們?cè)倩氐絼?chuàng)業(yè)者這個(gè)話題,，特別是中國(guó)的創(chuàng)業(yè)者，中國(guó)有很多創(chuàng)業(yè)者,。

吉姆·柯林斯：這想來(lái)是讓人激動(dòng)的,。

高德思：是挺讓人激動(dòng)的。你書(shū)里面研究的都是大型美國(guó)公司,，大部分是大型上市公司,。我相信你已經(jīng)被這樣的問(wèn)題搞得不耐煩了，但是我還是覺(jué)得有必要問(wèn),，那就是你的研究對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)者來(lái)說(shuō)有什么意義,，他們可以從中學(xué)到什么呢？換句話說(shuō),，這些經(jīng)驗(yàn)教訓(xùn)適用于大型上市公司,，但是否同樣適用于創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)呢？

吉姆·柯林斯：首先,，我的下一本書(shū)將明顯把重點(diǎn)放在那些后來(lái)發(fā)展壯大成卓越公司的創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè),。我們之所以想研究它們，是因?yàn)樗鼈兲菀资墉h(huán)境影響,。因此,，我們?cè)谶@方面還是有很多要表達(dá)的。但是，我現(xiàn)在可以說(shuō)兩點(diǎn),。

首先談?wù)劇痘鶚I(yè)長(zhǎng)青》（Built to Last）而不是《從優(yōu)秀到卓越》（Good to Great）,。（在《基業(yè)長(zhǎng)青》中），我們研究了歷史上最偉大的一些創(chuàng)業(yè)者,。他們都發(fā)展成為了卓越的大公司。首先來(lái)看看這些公司剛起步的時(shí)候,。

研究沃爾瑪時(shí),，我們追溯到了薩姆·沃爾頓僅有一家折扣店的時(shí)期。研究惠普時(shí),，我們回顧了比爾·休利特和大衛(wèi)·帕卡德在帕羅阿爾托的車(chē)庫(kù)里做了什么,。我們有原始的文件，我和杰瑞需要研究這些材料,?；萜障蛭覀冮_(kāi)放了他們的檔案庫(kù)。當(dāng)我們?cè)趯?xiě)《基業(yè)長(zhǎng)青》的時(shí)候就使用了他們的檔案庫(kù),。要知道這是多么令人激動(dòng)的事情,，因?yàn)樵谀抢锟梢钥吹奖葼柡痛笮l(wèi)寫(xiě)給對(duì)方的信。在印著打印字體的發(fā)黃紙頁(yè)上——就像《獨(dú)立宣言》一樣,，我們看到了1937年8月23日公司初創(chuàng)時(shí)的會(huì)議記錄,。這是用打字機(jī)打出來(lái)的，信上面有幾行字方向有點(diǎn)奇怪,，如果你仔細(xì)看看,，上面說(shuō)我們于1937年8月23日下午2點(diǎn)創(chuàng)立了一家電子公司。接著下面就用了正常的字體,，內(nèi)容是我們共同成立了一家廣義上的無(wú)線電技術(shù)工程公司,，我們決定要生產(chǎn)自己的產(chǎn)品，而不是賣(mài)別人的東西,。接下來(lái)就是這句很有意思的話,。“對(duì)我們將設(shè)計(jì),、制造和銷(xiāo)售什么產(chǎn)品的問(wèn)題暫時(shí)不進(jìn)行討論,。”這就是一家偉大公司創(chuàng)立的時(shí)刻,，當(dāng)時(shí)他們自己都不知道要生產(chǎn)什么,。我們看到了他們第一次會(huì)議的真實(shí)記錄。我們看到了惠普的所有原始文件,，比如“我們什么時(shí)候搬出車(chē)庫(kù),，因?yàn)槲⒉t的震蕩器燒壞了。我是說(shuō)，其實(shí)車(chē)庫(kù)也挺好的,?！边€有索尼的早期，那時(shí)他們還做電飯煲,。

比爾·艾倫在波音早期的時(shí)候,，還去做家具生意來(lái)為公司獲得足夠的資金，終于在上世紀(jì)20年代建造了第一架飛機(jī),。約翰·威拉德·萬(wàn)豪早期曾擺了個(gè)艾德熊樂(lè)啤露攤兒,。他當(dāng)時(shí)的想法就是想開(kāi)個(gè)樂(lè)啤露攤兒，不要再呆在猶他州,。因此他去了華盛頓,，擺了個(gè)艾德熊樂(lè)啤露攤兒，這就是萬(wàn)豪國(guó)際集團(tuán)開(kāi)始的地方,。

《基業(yè)長(zhǎng)青》中寫(xiě)了歷史上最偉大的一些創(chuàng)業(yè)者：大衛(wèi)·帕卡德,、盛田昭夫、薩姆·沃爾頓,、約翰·威拉德·萬(wàn)豪和威廉·邁克奈特,。威廉·邁克奈特是3M公司早期輝煌的締造者。通用電氣的托馬斯·愛(ài)迪生和查爾斯·科芬,。雖然已是過(guò)去很久的事,，但是我們還是對(duì)這些大公司的早期發(fā)展很好奇。讓我談?wù)勥@些卓越公司背后的那些企業(yè)家們,。讓我們花個(gè)幾分鐘來(lái)談?wù)勊麄?，他們知道自己是新的一代，并證明了自己是終極的企業(yè)家,。就像亨利·福特,、查爾斯·科芬和大衛(wèi)·帕卡德他們那樣。他們身上凸顯出了一些獨(dú)特的品質(zhì),，我們剛剛也提到過(guò),，但是值得我們反復(fù)強(qiáng)調(diào)。

他們作為公司的創(chuàng)始人,，將一家小公司發(fā)展成為一家卓越公司的平均時(shí)間是36年,。這些公司是不會(huì)很快地?fù)Q掉創(chuàng)業(yè)者的，他們通常會(huì)繼續(xù)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)公司很多年,。并且這些公司大多都沒(méi)有接受大量外部資金,。

Thomas D. Gorman: Well, I know you've been asked this question, thousands of times, but...

Jim Collins: Sometimes the same question produces different answers because I grow in my thinking.

Thomas D. Gorman: But, let's go back to entrepreneurs, and specifically entrepreneurs in China, of whom there are many.

Jim Collins: Which is exciting.

Thomas D. Gorman: It is exciting.

Jim Collins: The research set for your books has obviously consisted of large American companies, large public companies for the most part. And the questions that I'm sure you're tired of being asked, but I think it needs to be asked again, is: What relevance and what learning is there in your research for the entrepreneur? In other words, are the lessons generally applicable to the entrepreneurial set, as much as they are to the big public company set.?

First of all, when we get to the next piece of work that's coming, it actually really picks up a really explicit emphasis on startups that went on to become great companies, and the reason is because we wanted them because they are so vulnerable to the environment. So, we're going to have a lot to say at that point. But, I can say two things now.

Jim Collins: Now, obviously GE had a lot of outside capital, they were trying to bring electricity to the world, they needed a lot of capital, but Bill Hewlett and David Packard had a few hundred dollars from their mentor, Fred Turman who helped them basically try a bunch of little products and they boot strapped. And they did little contracts early on, they did a contract for electronic shock jiggle machine for people, and they had a clock drive for a telescope, and electronic bowling alley sensor, and a number of things in the beginning, to bring in some revenue. Yeah exactly, that's what they were doing. If you take a look at Morita and Ibuka at Sony, try the rice cooker, if that doesn't work, then try this thing; they would do anything to just try to keep the doors open, while running very lean. The original A&W Root Beer franchise with Marriott, just get it running, get some root beer sold. It was fascinating to look at, how did they end up as sort of evolving? (Marriot) goes to Washington, DC and opens a root beer stand in the summer, people like root beer in the summer. The difference is, that winter comes, so he has a root beer stand, nobody wants root beer in December. So, he expands, I've got to do something, I'm really good, people like coming to my place, so he started offering food, and he had the first Hot Shoppes. So, he had this store, Hot Shoppes and people began to come in and then after a while, and eventually scaled that idea up and had a number of these Hot Shoppes and then as an experiment they tried a, they said, you know, we're really good at having people feel good when they come here, maybe we should do a hotel, they tried one and it worked. And that eventually became the Marriott that we know today. But, it was a little thing, the greatest ones,not the idea that somehow they started out with tremendous advantages, not that they had all this capital so that they did it quickly, most 'overnight successes' are about 20 years in the making.

We talked about Wal-Mart; Wal-Mart's big in China now. Sam Walton didn't open his second dime store until seven years after he started the company. A quarter of a century, 25 years into Wal-Mart's history, he had 38 stores. 38 stores is a lot, but that took 25 years to get there.

All of them, they worked really hard to just get one click onthe flywheel, two clicks on the flywheel, they tended to boot strap, they were very good with cash flow, they were building their culture from early on. And eventually they became a very large company. But, it was a real step-by-step process in most cases.

And here's the really interesting thing. If you look at the less successful folks that they were competing against, that we looked at as the comparisons, and you say, well, you have this image, what you have to do to start a company is you have to have a great idea. Was the rice cooker a great idea? Was the clock drive for a telescope a great idea? They didn't even know what they were going to make, right? What we're going to make is postponed, we're going to start a company. And we go back and look at them and what made them different, is that in the end, they understood that their ultimate product was the company. And from very, very early on, they were clear they were building a culture. They were clear that they were building a system. They were clear that they were building a company that may evolve into different businesses, but it was the company that was their ultimate creation.

Which is very different than "I'm going to make a computer," or I'm going to, I've got this one particular idea, it's all about just having the idea.

The less successful companies often had a great idea. These great companies often had some failed ideas early, they learned from those ideas. And because they boot strapped and managed their cash flow and had money from family and from friends. Little steps eventually became foundations of what became great companies. So, if you look over at the United States, you see Wal-Mart, you would see HP, you would see all these companies and you would see them as big companies today, but there's a small startup story in every one of them.

And almost none of those stories were somebody who had great advantages.

Thomas D. Gorman: Nor, I'm guessing from listening to you, were the founders typically motivated by "I'm going to go out and make zillions of dollars."

Jim Collins: No, I think they would have been happy just to pay themselves at first. They were motivated by the desire to create something. Did you find a pattern among these great successful company builders, a pattern in terms of humble roots versus not so humble roots, school of hard knocks versus coming from easy street, coming from famous schools versus not, or was it pretty much a mixed bag? What I'm doing is processing through my head the folks who were entrepreneurs and built great companies, but I have to put them against other entrepreneurs who didn't build a great company. And I can't see a real difference between them on that. However, there are very few of them that came from privilege. Most of them had not (had such benefits) necessarily. There's a lot of advantage coming from austerity, because if you've grown up in a garage, or you never had that much, or you had some difficult times, then it's not so scary to start something, because you already know what the difficulty is like. Sometimes they might have even come from a reasonably stable home but they had some other shaping life experience.

David Packard worked in a mine here in Pueblo, Colorado, when he was in high school as part of earning some money to go away to college. And a big part of his shaping experience was he felt that the way people were treated in that mine was terrible. And he said, I want to build something that stands as the antithesis to that. But here's a person, I think his father was a lawyer, but he went and dug holes and worked in a mine;(the experience) probably helped him when he was in the garage.