Jim Collins: And as we stood back and looked at it we came to see that there are these stages. And I've been influenced by kind of a staging thing thinking that most people are at one time or another, their lives are touched by cancer, whether it be cancer, whether it be someone in their family, whether it be themselves, or somebody they know. And it's a staging process and the thing that's very scary is you can look healthy on the outside, but then be actually sick on the inside.
I started thinking that is what happens to companies too that actually you're looking healthy on the outside, but you're already in a stage of decline. And it actually turns out that, at least in the cases we studied and how they fell, that turns out to be the case. And we found these five stages and you don't actually visibly fall to where the rest of the world knows you're in trouble until stage four. So, in fact you do look healthy for the first three of five stages of your decline.
And then in that sense, I think it is a really sobering thing to look at, but very worthwhile to look at if your company had a spurt in growth and success.
The other thing that jumps out, I just want to briefly circle back to the cancer analogy.
Basically, the big difference, though, is that cancer's not self-inflicted. And self-destruction of an enterprise which brings the company down, or social system down -- that is self-inflicted at least through the lenses of the analysis that we did.
So, the first stage in that process is not success per se. The idea had been that success is inevitably followed by some sort of regression to the mean, and all sort of great periods of success are followed by decline and that's the inevitable cycle. Well, maybe over very long periods of time that might be true, but we have cases as we talked about that stretch back well over 100 years, maybe going on 200 years and that hasn't happened to them yet.
In capital systems in rapidly changing markets, in fact, there's no law that says, if you have been successful you're going to fall. It's when the successes are followed by a very high degree of arrogance (that failure can follow).
And I've always loved the definition of hubris that was articulated by a classics professor, J. Rufus Fears. Which is: "outrageous arrogance that inflicts suffering on the innocent." And of course, that goes back to a first perspective of the ancient Greeks. So, this idea of arrogance leading to decline is so universal that it goes back thousands of years in conceptual understanding. And certainly if you go back to very ancient literature, you see it. So, I think it's a very universal thing.
Now, in the realm of companies, what might you look at that might be indicators that you're in this stage of hubris and one of them is, if you just cease to be afraid. And if you don't always kind of feel like, our doom could be just around the corner. We may not be that good, we may have just been lucky and what happens if our luck runs out? If you begin to actually think that your success is deserved, that somehow it really was all you, that you really are that good. That you look in the mirror and you say, "we're successful because we're so great," then you're in trouble already.
I'm reminded of a conversation I had with one of chief executives in one of our studies who actually asked before we published the book, if we could take them out of the book. And I said, "You're one of the great companies, you're what we're studying." And he said, "Well, all the more reason I don't want to be in the book." And they were there because they made all the financial cuts and so forth.
But, it was very interesting because he felt that it would ultimately be a disservice to the company to be featured in a book about great companies. Because he said, "the moment you think you're great, you're not." By definition, the moment you think you're great, you're not.
So, I think the first step is to always kind of distrust everything good that has happened. And to realize that you may be actually weak, might have just been lucky, your luck's going to run its course. And you really weren't that good, and you had the wind at your back and all of these sorts of things, and basically (you'd better ) be fearful all the time.
The other things that we begin to see in terms of behavior patterns that would show up in this early stage... and I think there are two that are really crucial.
One is really becoming arrogant about what you do, rather than accepting and understanding why you do what you do, so you can change it.
And so, if you have a great company like Southwest Airlines, which has this thing about turning its airplanes around every 20 minutes. It's a very important part of what runs its system.
But, the critical thing is not to basically to get fixated on that, but to always be able to say, why? Why? Why do we do we do that?
Why do we have business divisions where business is driven by ethos at Johnson & Johnson?
Why do we grow our own managers at General Electric?
Why do we have all these financial things in place?
Why do we have a one-page memo at Procter & Gamble?
Why do we have a 15% rule at 3M, where people get 15% of their time to do creative things?
The point is not the doing of them; it's the understanding why you do them, and why they produce results.
So, that later we can say, that we're not just thinking we do these things, therefore we're successful. You look at them and can say, you know, conditions have changed; we ought to think about evolving perhaps, under what conditions do they no longer work?
A second thing that jumps out to me, and I think is one of the most interesting things about the analysis. So, entrepreneurs by nature love opportunity and they get all excited and want to go grow something new and do something aggressive and that's actually part of what makes something go. But, never forget that the next big thing is very likely the big thing you already have.
And that, if you've started to build something that's very successful, if you then basically say, ok that's successful. Now, what I'm going to do is to leap over here to a new adventure, a new journey, a new thing, and I'm just going to let this run on autopilot, which is a very arrogant thing to do, it's so successful I can just let it run.
So, in "How The Mighty Fall" we write about the demise of a Circuit City and Best Buy continuing to be successful. And the folks at Circuit City essentially started looking elsewhere for new adventures and new opportunities, not that those were bad. But what they find renewing themselves as doing something new and let the big thing run on autopilot. Which is very different than what Best Buy did, which is they said, well we may do some new things but the most important thing is to pay attention to the primary flywheel, which is their electronic super stars, and to keep it renewed.
So, if you inflict neglect of any kind, arrogant neglect of any kind, that is a very high level of hubris that will bring you down.
I would imagine in China, that there are some very successful entrepreneurs who have added new businesses and have lots of expansions and lot of energy and they're very opportunistic and they see something and they seize it and that's a big part of their success.
This isn't necessarily bad but if in that reaching for the new thing you neglect the core flywheel that made you successful. And what if that new thing turns out not to be as glittery as you thought and then you turn back and this one's in decline, you're in trouble. |
|
吉姆·柯林斯：退一步看這種演變,，就會(huì)看到這個(gè)過(guò)程是分階段的,。而我一直受到這種階段性現(xiàn)象的影響,。大多數(shù)人的生活中或早或晚都會(huì)接觸到癌癥,，不論患病的是家庭成員,、自己還是他們認(rèn)識(shí)的人,。這就是一個(gè)階段性現(xiàn)象，令人害怕的是你外表看起來(lái)可能很健康,，可事實(shí)上已經(jīng)生病了,。
于是我開始思索,，對(duì)于企業(yè)而言情況是否也是如此：外表看起來(lái)一切正常,，可是內(nèi)部已經(jīng)在走下坡路,。我們的研究最終表明那些衰落的公司的確經(jīng)歷了這樣的過(guò)程,。而且我們發(fā)現(xiàn)了五個(gè)階段，其中直到第四階段,，外界才會(huì)看出公司處于困境之中,。也就是說(shuō)在五個(gè)衰落階段的前三個(gè)階段,，公司從外部看來(lái)都是健康的,。
從這個(gè)意義上來(lái)講，我認(rèn)為如果在你公司成長(zhǎng)很快的同時(shí),，仔細(xì)地進(jìn)行自省是很很明智的做法,，而且也會(huì)有好的回報(bào),。
還有一個(gè)問(wèn)題,，我簡(jiǎn)短地回到那個(gè)癌癥類比上,。
基本上來(lái)說(shuō)，癌癥和公司衰落的很大不同就在于,，癌癥不是由自身原因造成的,。而如果一家公司的自我毀滅拖垮了公司,，甚至社會(huì)體系——那么至少?gòu)奈覀兊难芯恳暯莵?lái)看,，這完全是咎由自取。
因此,，衰落的第一階段并不是（如人們所說(shuō)的）成功本身,。人們一直認(rèn)為成功之后必然是某種倒退，各種偉大的成功時(shí)期之后都跟隨著衰落期,，而這是不可避免的周期性規(guī)律,。也許從很長(zhǎng)的發(fā)展時(shí)間看,，這是有道理的。但是我們的案例中也有跨越上百年,，甚至兩百年，卻仍然沒(méi)有陷入這種周期的公司,。
所以事實(shí)上在快速變化的資本市場(chǎng),，沒(méi)有什么定律表明你成功之后必然會(huì)走下坡路。但是人們?cè)诔晒χ笕糇兊梅浅８甙磷源螅▌t的確可能招致失?。?。
我一直很欣賞經(jīng)典歷史教授杰?魯夫斯?菲爾斯對(duì)于驕傲自大的定義， 那就是“會(huì)對(duì)無(wú)辜者造成傷害的蠻橫的傲慢態(tài)度”,。當(dāng)然了，這可以追溯到古希臘的早期思想。由此看來(lái),，這個(gè)“謙受益,，滿招損”的理念十分普遍,，可以追溯到上千年前。當(dāng)然了,，如果你翻看十分古老的文學(xué)作品，也能看到這個(gè)理念,。因此，我認(rèn)為這是放之四海而皆準(zhǔn)的,。
說(shuō)到公司環(huán)境，驕傲自大的狀態(tài)是有跡可循的,，其中一種跡象就是你變得無(wú)所畏懼,。你不再有失敗的危機(jī)感,。不再懷疑自己是否真的強(qiáng)大,、不再懷疑是否是好運(yùn)氣在幫忙,。如果你開始真心認(rèn)為你的成功是理所應(yīng)當(dāng)?shù)?，而且這種成功源自你自身的強(qiáng)大，當(dāng)看著鏡子中的自己，你說(shuō)“我們很成功因?yàn)槲覀兪莻ゴ蟮摹?，那么你已?jīng)有麻煩了,。
我想起了和一位研究對(duì)象公司總裁的對(duì)話,。在我們的研究成果出版之前,，他曾請(qǐng)求我們將有關(guān)該公司的內(nèi)容撤掉,。我說(shuō)：“你們的公司是卓越的公司,，正是我們研究的對(duì)象?！彼f(shuō)：“那么，我就更有理由拒絕出現(xiàn)在書中,。”那家公司進(jìn)行了很多諸如縮減財(cái)政開支的舉措,，因此榜上有名,。
但是這個(gè)情況很有意思,，這位總裁認(rèn)為該公司出現(xiàn)在一本專門談?wù)撟吭焦镜臅校瑲w根結(jié)底是對(duì)公司的某種傷害,。因?yàn)樗f(shuō)：“當(dāng)你認(rèn)為自己很卓越時(shí),，你就不那么卓越了,?！倍@是卓越定義的一部分。
因此,，第一步是總是應(yīng)該對(duì)于已經(jīng)獲取的成功抱有一定的懷疑。認(rèn)識(shí)到你的力量可能是薄弱的,，可能只是走運(yùn),，但是運(yùn)氣會(huì)用完,。而你其實(shí)沒(méi)那么厲害,，只是身處順境,?？傮w來(lái)說(shuō)，就是要心有所畏,。
我們?cè)冢ㄋヂ涞模┰缙陔A段顯現(xiàn)出來(lái)的行為模式中還會(huì)看到其他內(nèi)容。我認(rèn)為有兩點(diǎn)至關(guān)重要。
第一就是對(duì)于自己所作所為非常自傲，而不是接受并理解你工作的原動(dòng)力，從而可以設(shè)法改進(jìn)做法。
如果你的公司像西南航空（Southwest Airlines）一樣強(qiáng)大,，每二十分鐘就有一架飛機(jī)起降,，那么如何運(yùn)營(yíng)這個(gè)系統(tǒng)是至關(guān)重要的。
但是關(guān)鍵在于不要拘泥于此，而是要不斷提出問(wèn)題，問(wèn)自己“為什么？為什么,？為什么我們要這樣做,？”
為什么在強(qiáng)生（Johnson & Johnson）這樣的企業(yè),，是企業(yè)精神驅(qū)動(dòng)著公司不同的業(yè)務(wù)部門,？
為什么通用電氣（General Electric）自己培養(yǎng)經(jīng)理,？
為什么我們有這樣的財(cái)務(wù)規(guī)章制度,？
為什么寶潔（Procter & Gamble）的工作備忘不能超過(guò)一頁(yè)紙,？
為什么在3M 公司,，員工可以獲得15%的工作時(shí)間用于自主創(chuàng)新？
關(guān)鍵不在于做這些事,，而是在于明白為何而做,、為何這樣的做法會(huì)產(chǎn)生好的效果。
我們以后可以說(shuō),，（當(dāng)初）正因?yàn)槲覀儾⒉恢皇敲つ康毓ぷ鳎晕覀兛梢匀〉贸晒?。而現(xiàn)在，你看著當(dāng)初的做法，深知時(shí)過(guò)境遷了,；而且我們知道在哪些情況下這些過(guò)去的手段會(huì)失去效力，所以應(yīng)該開始考慮發(fā)展變革了,。
此外第二點(diǎn),，也是這個(gè)分析中最有趣的一點(diǎn),。企業(yè)家們天生向往各種機(jī)遇,，他們往往情緒激昂想要開拓新的業(yè)務(wù),，開創(chuàng)新的領(lǐng)域，這事實(shí)上也的確推動(dòng)著業(yè)績(jī)的增長(zhǎng),。但是千萬(wàn)要銘記一點(diǎn),，對(duì)你來(lái)說(shuō)下一個(gè)偉大的目標(biāo)很可能是你現(xiàn)實(shí)中已經(jīng)成功的業(yè)務(wù)。
如果你已經(jīng)有了很成功的事業(yè)，心想,，這已經(jīng)算是成功了,，我現(xiàn)在要跨越過(guò)去開始新的商業(yè)探險(xiǎn),，眼下的業(yè)務(wù)完全可以讓它自行運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)，思量著“這么成功的業(yè)務(wù),，應(yīng)該可以放任不管了”，那么你就太剛愎自用了。
因此,，在《巨人如何倒下》一書中， 我們寫到了電路城（Circuit City）公司的衰落和百思買（Best Buy）的持續(xù)成功,。電路城在尋求新的冒險(xiǎn)領(lǐng)域和機(jī)遇，這并沒(méi)有錯(cuò),，但是他們將自我重塑看作是新的業(yè)務(wù)機(jī)會(huì),，而將已有的龐大業(yè)務(wù)撒手不管。這和百思買的做法完全不同,。百思買認(rèn)為,，我們也許可以拓展新的業(yè)務(wù),，但是最重要的是立足于最基礎(chǔ)的“飛輪”，也就是那些明星電子產(chǎn)品業(yè)務(wù)，使其保持推陳出新,。
因此，一旦你有所疏忽,，無(wú)論是什么類型的高傲自大態(tài)度都會(huì)將你拖垮,。
在我的想象中,，中國(guó)一些很成功的企業(yè)家創(chuàng)辦了新的企業(yè),，進(jìn)行了大量擴(kuò)張,，投入了很多精力,。他們高度樂(lè)觀，看到新機(jī)遇就牢牢抓住,，這是助其成功的重要原因,。
這種做法未必不可取，但是如果在探尋新領(lǐng)域的過(guò)程中放棄了自己得以起家的核心“飛輪”，而新領(lǐng)域不如預(yù)想的那樣光鮮,，回頭發(fā)現(xiàn)傳統(tǒng)業(yè)務(wù)已經(jīng)衰落了,，那么你就陷入了窘境,。 |
