
畢馬威(KPMG)美國供應(yīng)鏈主管瑪麗·羅爾曼(Mary Rollman)表示:“幾乎與我交談過的每一位客戶都已設(shè)立戰(zhàn)情室。他們組建起一支專職團隊,,團隊成員徹底擱置日常事務(wù),。當(dāng)下,,他們的任務(wù)就是關(guān)注新聞動態(tài),以便及時掌握最新消息,,并迅速向領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層匯報,。”
在2025年全球大貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)紛擾的復(fù)雜格局中——不過公司并非是這場戰(zhàn)爭的發(fā)起者,。在各國政府徹底重塑全球商業(yè)環(huán)境之際,,它們正奮力求生存、謀發(fā)展,。這一挑戰(zhàn)的核心在于供應(yīng)鏈,,而究竟該如何對其進行變革則是所有這些戰(zhàn)情室的首要議題。美國供應(yīng)鏈管理協(xié)會首席執(zhí)行官安倍·埃什肯納齊(Abe Eshkenazi)表示:“這在供應(yīng)鏈歷史上是絕無僅有的時期,,我們此前從未在如此復(fù)雜的局面下應(yīng)對過類似挑戰(zhàn),。”
全球皆預(yù)感重大變局將至——特朗普曾屢次向世界宣稱他將大幅提高關(guān)稅力度與規(guī)?!欢?,幾乎無人預(yù)料到他于4月2日針對57個國家所實施的關(guān)稅加征幅度竟如此之大。關(guān)稅稅率從11%(針對喀麥隆和剛果民主共和國)到49%(針對柬埔寨)不等,,這使得美國的平均有效關(guān)稅率飆升至22.5%——這是自1909年以來的最高水平,。一周后,他暫停了對大多數(shù)國家的關(guān)稅,,將除中國以外所有國家的關(guān)稅稅率降至10%,。當(dāng)下,沒有任何一位在世的美國企業(yè)經(jīng)營者,,擁有在如此環(huán)境下開展業(yè)務(wù)的經(jīng)驗 ,。
截至目前,大多數(shù)美國公司似乎都在采取規(guī)模有限的舉措,。羅爾曼表示,,部分公司正加速推進將制造業(yè)務(wù)回遷美國本土的既有規(guī)劃。還有部分公司在關(guān)稅政策調(diào)整時,,選擇將進口商品滯留在邊境,。但她表示,“此類舉措尚屬個別現(xiàn)象,。與我合作的大多數(shù)公司都在努力模擬各種應(yīng)對方案和情景,,但尚未做出任何重大決策?!?
進行調(diào)整并非易事,。在已然成為歷史的全球化經(jīng)濟模式下,,以汽車生產(chǎn)為例,,在美國組裝的汽車,,其零部件往往源自數(shù)十個國家。部分零部件在生產(chǎn)過程中需多次跨越國境流轉(zhuǎn),。福特公司表示,,它使用的零部件由約1400家供應(yīng)商提供的1000多種材料制成。重構(gòu)這樣的供應(yīng)鏈體系,,難度超乎想象,。
在特朗普首個任期實施加征關(guān)稅政策后,部分行業(yè)被迫廢棄原有的供應(yīng)鏈,,然而此次面對關(guān)稅變動,,那些行業(yè)恐難憑借此前經(jīng)驗占得先機。畢馬威美國及全球貿(mào)易與海關(guān)業(yè)務(wù)主管安德魯·西西利亞諾(Andrew Siciliano)表示:“我們看到紡織與服裝業(yè)成為受沖擊最為嚴重的行業(yè)之一,。特朗普首個任期實施加征關(guān)稅政策后,,許多公司于2018年撤離中國,轉(zhuǎn)而遷往越南,、泰國,、印度和馬來西亞?!苯刂?月2日,,上述四國均面臨高額關(guān)稅。盡管當(dāng)前關(guān)稅已下調(diào)至10%,,但關(guān)稅暫停期結(jié)束后,,這些國家將面臨何種關(guān)稅政策仍充滿不確定性。
當(dāng)下又平添一層變數(shù):今日的關(guān)稅,,明日是否依舊,?暫停加征關(guān)稅實屬意料之外,而從歷史來看,,未來無疑還將涌現(xiàn)更多不可預(yù)知的變數(shù),。例如,特朗普在首個任期內(nèi)曾宣布對源自巴西的金屬產(chǎn)品加征新關(guān)稅,,然后在與時任巴西總統(tǒng)雅伊爾·博索納羅(Jair Bolsonaro)會談數(shù)日后便取消了這項關(guān)稅,。如今,類似的情況再次出現(xiàn),,但規(guī)模遠超以往,。特朗普最近在“空軍一號”專機上對記者表示,關(guān)稅政策賦予美國“強大的談判權(quán)”,,并坦言“我已與眾多歐洲,、亞洲乃至全球各地的領(lǐng)袖展開對話,他們迫切希望達成協(xié)議”,。包括美國貿(mào)易代表賈米森·格里爾(Jamieson Greer)在內(nèi)的其他官員也暗示,,美國政府對達成協(xié)議持開放態(tài)度,。4月2日宣布的關(guān)稅政策顯然是談判中的初步試探,這意味著企業(yè)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人如今必須基于隨時可能毫無預(yù)兆發(fā)生變化的關(guān)稅政策來構(gòu)建新的供應(yīng)鏈體系,。
這恰恰是致使供應(yīng)鏈難以順暢運作的環(huán)境,。埃什肯納齊表示:“供應(yīng)鏈依賴于穩(wěn)定性,這種穩(wěn)定性既涵蓋數(shù)據(jù)層面,,也包括可預(yù)測性,。若能明確市場需求,我們便能精準規(guī)劃供應(yīng),、訂單,、庫存及物流。然而,,正如金融市場難以駕馭不確定性一樣,,供應(yīng)鏈體系同樣不擅長應(yīng)對突如其來的變數(shù)?!?
更棘手的是,,供應(yīng)鏈的重大調(diào)整往往需要長期的應(yīng)對措施。例如,,汽車制造商在美國新建一家制造工廠至少需要兩年半的時間,,部分工廠甚至耗時三到五年。待工廠正式投產(chǎn)時,,汽車制造商又需規(guī)避哪些國家的何種關(guān)稅呢,?那筆數(shù)十億美元的投資是否明智?再比如,,仿制藥的原料大多來自中國和印度,。羅爾曼說:“這種情況已經(jīng)持續(xù)了20年之久?!彼硎?,在美國生產(chǎn)這些原料,成本將高出35%,,而且在美國建廠可能需要長達兩年的時間,。在此期間,這些原料仍需進口,,且價格或?qū)⑦M一步攀升——具體漲幅無人能夠預(yù)知——這取決于與中印兩國的關(guān)稅談判結(jié)果,。
當(dāng)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)們努力做出重大決策時,由于難以洞悉特朗普的長期目標,,他們深感沮喪,。路易斯安那州共和黨參議員約翰·肯尼迪(John Kennedy)最近向《華爾街日報》坦言:“我實在無法揣測他當(dāng)下的戰(zhàn)略意圖。”埃什肯納齊則疑惑道:“通過所有這些關(guān)稅,,我們到底想要達成什么目標呢,?”他們或許應(yīng)該記住特朗普在2015年出版的《跛腳的美國》一書中寫道:“我不想讓人們確切地知道我在做什么——或者在想什么。我喜歡出其不意,,讓他們猝不及防?!?
顯然,,對于供應(yīng)鏈高管以及其他人而言,特朗普確實做到了這一點,。(財富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:中慧言-王芳
畢馬威(KPMG)美國供應(yīng)鏈主管瑪麗·羅爾曼(Mary Rollman)表示:“幾乎與我交談過的每一位客戶都已設(shè)立戰(zhàn)情室,。他們組建起一支專職團隊,團隊成員徹底擱置日常事務(wù),。當(dāng)下,,他們的任務(wù)就是關(guān)注新聞動態(tài),以便及時掌握最新消息,,并迅速向領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層匯報,。”
在2025年全球大貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)紛擾的復(fù)雜格局中——不過公司并非是這場戰(zhàn)爭的發(fā)起者,。在各國政府徹底重塑全球商業(yè)環(huán)境之際,,它們正奮力求生存、謀發(fā)展,。這一挑戰(zhàn)的核心在于供應(yīng)鏈,,而究竟該如何對其進行變革則是所有這些戰(zhàn)情室的首要議題。美國供應(yīng)鏈管理協(xié)會首席執(zhí)行官安倍·埃什肯納齊(Abe Eshkenazi)表示:“這在供應(yīng)鏈歷史上是絕無僅有的時期,,我們此前從未在如此復(fù)雜的局面下應(yīng)對過類似挑戰(zhàn),。”
全球皆預(yù)感重大變局將至——特朗普曾屢次向世界宣稱他將大幅提高關(guān)稅力度與規(guī)?!欢?,幾乎無人預(yù)料到他于4月2日針對57個國家所實施的關(guān)稅加征幅度竟如此之大。關(guān)稅稅率從11%(針對喀麥隆和剛果民主共和國)到49%(針對柬埔寨)不等,,這使得美國的平均有效關(guān)稅率飆升至22.5%——這是自1909年以來的最高水平,。一周后,他暫停了對大多數(shù)國家的關(guān)稅,,將除中國以外所有國家的關(guān)稅稅率降至10%,。當(dāng)下,沒有任何一位在世的美國企業(yè)經(jīng)營者,,擁有在如此環(huán)境下開展業(yè)務(wù)的經(jīng)驗 ,。
截至目前,大多數(shù)美國公司似乎都在采取規(guī)模有限的舉措。羅爾曼表示,,部分公司正加速推進將制造業(yè)務(wù)回遷美國本土的既有規(guī)劃,。還有部分公司在關(guān)稅政策調(diào)整時,選擇將進口商品滯留在邊境,。但她表示,,“此類舉措尚屬個別現(xiàn)象。與我合作的大多數(shù)公司都在努力模擬各種應(yīng)對方案和情景,,但尚未做出任何重大決策,。”
進行調(diào)整并非易事,。在已然成為歷史的全球化經(jīng)濟模式下,,以汽車生產(chǎn)為例,在美國組裝的汽車,,其零部件往往源自數(shù)十個國家,。部分零部件在生產(chǎn)過程中需多次跨越國境流轉(zhuǎn)。福特公司表示,,它使用的零部件由約1400家供應(yīng)商提供的1000多種材料制成,。重構(gòu)這樣的供應(yīng)鏈體系,難度超乎想象,。
在特朗普首個任期實施加征關(guān)稅政策后,,部分行業(yè)被迫廢棄原有的供應(yīng)鏈,然而此次面對關(guān)稅變動,,那些行業(yè)恐難憑借此前經(jīng)驗占得先機,。畢馬威美國及全球貿(mào)易與海關(guān)業(yè)務(wù)主管安德魯·西西利亞諾(Andrew Siciliano)表示:“我們看到紡織與服裝業(yè)成為受沖擊最為嚴重的行業(yè)之一。特朗普首個任期實施加征關(guān)稅政策后,,許多公司于2018年撤離中國,,轉(zhuǎn)而遷往越南、泰國,、印度和馬來西亞,。”截至4月2日,,上述四國均面臨高額關(guān)稅,。盡管當(dāng)前關(guān)稅已下調(diào)至10%,但關(guān)稅暫停期結(jié)束后,,這些國家將面臨何種關(guān)稅政策仍充滿不確定性,。
當(dāng)下又平添一層變數(shù):今日的關(guān)稅,明日是否依舊,?暫停加征關(guān)稅實屬意料之外,,而從歷史來看,未來無疑還將涌現(xiàn)更多不可預(yù)知的變數(shù)。例如,,特朗普在首個任期內(nèi)曾宣布對源自巴西的金屬產(chǎn)品加征新關(guān)稅,,然后在與時任巴西總統(tǒng)雅伊爾·博索納羅(Jair Bolsonaro)會談數(shù)日后便取消了這項關(guān)稅。如今,,類似的情況再次出現(xiàn),,但規(guī)模遠超以往。特朗普最近在“空軍一號”專機上對記者表示,,關(guān)稅政策賦予美國“強大的談判權(quán)”,,并坦言“我已與眾多歐洲、亞洲乃至全球各地的領(lǐng)袖展開對話,,他們迫切希望達成協(xié)議”,。包括美國貿(mào)易代表賈米森·格里爾(Jamieson Greer)在內(nèi)的其他官員也暗示,,美國政府對達成協(xié)議持開放態(tài)度,。4月2日宣布的關(guān)稅政策顯然是談判中的初步試探,這意味著企業(yè)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人如今必須基于隨時可能毫無預(yù)兆發(fā)生變化的關(guān)稅政策來構(gòu)建新的供應(yīng)鏈體系,。
這恰恰是致使供應(yīng)鏈難以順暢運作的環(huán)境,。埃什肯納齊表示:“供應(yīng)鏈依賴于穩(wěn)定性,這種穩(wěn)定性既涵蓋數(shù)據(jù)層面,,也包括可預(yù)測性,。若能明確市場需求,我們便能精準規(guī)劃供應(yīng),、訂單,、庫存及物流。然而,,正如金融市場難以駕馭不確定性一樣,,供應(yīng)鏈體系同樣不擅長應(yīng)對突如其來的變數(shù)?!?
更棘手的是,,供應(yīng)鏈的重大調(diào)整往往需要長期的應(yīng)對措施。例如,,汽車制造商在美國新建一家制造工廠至少需要兩年半的時間,,部分工廠甚至耗時三到五年。待工廠正式投產(chǎn)時,,汽車制造商又需規(guī)避哪些國家的何種關(guān)稅呢,?那筆數(shù)十億美元的投資是否明智?再比如,,仿制藥的原料大多來自中國和印度,。羅爾曼說:“這種情況已經(jīng)持續(xù)了20年之久。”她表示,,在美國生產(chǎn)這些原料,,成本將高出35%,而且在美國建廠可能需要長達兩年的時間,。在此期間,,這些原料仍需進口,且價格或?qū)⑦M一步攀升——具體漲幅無人能夠預(yù)知——這取決于與中印兩國的關(guān)稅談判結(jié)果,。
當(dāng)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)們努力做出重大決策時,,由于難以洞悉特朗普的長期目標,他們深感沮喪,。路易斯安那州共和黨參議員約翰·肯尼迪(John Kennedy)最近向《華爾街日報》坦言:“我實在無法揣測他當(dāng)下的戰(zhàn)略意圖,。”埃什肯納齊則疑惑道:“通過所有這些關(guān)稅,,我們到底想要達成什么目標呢,?”他們或許應(yīng)該記住特朗普在2015年出版的《跛腳的美國》一書中寫道:“我不想讓人們確切地知道我在做什么——或者在想什么。我喜歡出其不意,,讓他們猝不及防,。”
顯然,,對于供應(yīng)鏈高管以及其他人而言,,特朗普確實做到了這一點。(財富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:中慧言-王芳
“Almost every client I talk to has a war room,” says Mary Rollman, KPMG’s U.S. supply-chain leader. “They get a team spun up, and the members have completely dropped their day job. Their job now is to watch the news and see what comes out next, and quickly be able to present to leadership.”
That’s life in the chaotic Great Trade War of 2025—but companies aren’t waging the war. They’re trying to survive and thrive as governments radically remake the global business environment. At the heart of that challenge is the supply chain, and exactly how to transform it is Topic A in all those war rooms. “This is a unique time in supply-chain history,” says Abe Eshkenazi, CEO of the Association for Supply Chain Management. “It’s something we have never done at this level.”
Everyone knew something big was looming—President Trump had often told the world he would impose more and heavier tariffs—but hardly anyone was prepared for the magnitude of the tariffs he imposed on 57 countries on April 2. They ranged from 11% (on Cameroon and Democratic Republic of the Congo) to 49% (on Cambodia), raising the average effective U.S. tariff rate to 22.5%—the highest since 1909. A week later he paused most of those tariffs, reducing them to 10% for all countries except China, for which the tariff at this writing is 145%. No one alive has any experience managing a U.S. business in that environment.
So far, most U.S. companies seem to be taking small steps. Some are accelerating existing plans to bring manufacturing to the U.S., says Rollman. Some are holding imports at the border as tariffs change. But “that is the minority,” she says. “Most companies I work with are working to model options and scenarios but not making any major changes now.”
Adapting won’t be easy. In the now-gone globalized economy, cars assembled in the U.S. included parts from dozens of countries, for example. Some parts crossed borders multiple times as they were built. Ford says it uses parts made of over 1,000 materials supplied by some 1,400 suppliers. Redesigning that kind of supply chain will be mind-boggling.
A few industries had to scrap their supply chains after Trump’s tariffs in his first term, but that experience may not give them much of an advantage this time. “One industry we’re seeing that was heavily impacted was the textile and apparel industry,” says Andrew Siciliano, head of KPMG’s U.S. and global trade and customs practices. “Many companies moved out of China in 2018,” after Trump imposed tariffs in his first term, “and moved to Vietnam, Thailand, India, and Malaysia.” As of April 2, all four of those countries faced high tariffs. They’re now down to 10%, and there’s no telling what tariffs they will face when the pause expires.
Now add yet another layer of complexity: Will today’s tariff be the same tomorrow? The pause was a surprise, and history says more surprises are surely ahead. In his first term as president, Trump announced a new tariff on metals from Brazil, for example, then canceled it days later after speaking with then Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. A similar procedure is shaping up again, this time on a much larger scale. Trump recently told reporters on Air Force One that the tariffs give the U.S. “great powers to negotiate” and that “I spoke to a lot of Europeans, Asians, all over the world. They’re dying to make a deal.” Other officials, including U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, have signaled the administration is open to making deals. The tariffs announced on April 2 are apparently opening bids in a negotiation, which means business leaders must now build new supply chains based on tariffs that could change at any time with little warning.
That is exactly the environment in which supply chains work badly. “The supply chain depends on consistency, not only on data, but on predictability,” says Eshkenazi. “If we know what the demand is, then we know how to sequence supply and ordering and inventories and logistics. As in financial markets, we don’t deal well with uncertainty.”
Compounding the difficulty, big changes in supply chains often require long-term responses. Automakers need at least 2 ? years to build a U.S. manufacturing facility, for example, and some plants have required three to five years. By the time they’re running, what tariffs on which countries will automakers be trying to avoid? Will that billion-dollar investment have turned out to be wise? Or consider the ingredients for generic drugs, most of which are made in China and India. “It’s been that way for 20 years,” says Rollman. Producing them in the U.S. would cost 35% more, she says, but building U.S. plants could take up to two years. Until then, the ingredients would have to be imported at prices that could be even higher—no one knows how much—depending on tariffs negotiated with China and India.
As leaders struggle to make high-stakes decisions, they’re frustrated by the difficulty of discerning Trump’s long-term objectives. Republican Sen. John Kennedy of Louisiana recently confessed to the Wall Street Journal, “I just don’t know what his goal is right now.” Eshkenazi wonders, “What is it that we’re trying to accomplish through all these tariffs?” They may want to remember what Trump wrote in his 2015 book Crippled America: “I don’t want people to know exactly what I’m doing—or thinking. I like being unpredictable. It keeps them off-balance.”
With supply-chain executives and others, he is certainly succeeding.