
3月12日,,美國(guó)總統(tǒng)特朗普在“空軍一號(hào)”上豪言:“我們將收獲數(shù)千億美元的關(guān)稅收入,,我們會(huì)變得非常有錢,有錢到甚至不知道該把這些錢花在哪,?!北M管商界哀鴻遍野,股市一片慘淡,,美國(guó)的各大貿(mào)易伙伴紛紛發(fā)聲譴責(zé),,但是特朗普仍然不為所動(dòng)。特朗普暢想的兩駕調(diào)控財(cái)政赤字的增收馬車,,一駕是馬斯克搞的狗狗幣,,另一駕就是進(jìn)口關(guān)稅。但是如果你了解了關(guān)于關(guān)稅的以下五個(gè)事實(shí),,你就會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn),,關(guān)稅的確會(huì)對(duì)美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)生巨大影響,但展開(kāi)的方式卻絕對(duì)不會(huì)像特朗普預(yù)料的那樣,。
事實(shí)1:關(guān)稅大部分會(huì)被轉(zhuǎn)嫁到美國(guó)消費(fèi)者身上
特朗普一直堅(jiān)稱,,美國(guó)對(duì)進(jìn)口商品加征的關(guān)稅,,將由外國(guó)政府或公司承擔(dān)全部成本。在去年9月份的競(jìng)選活動(dòng)中,,特朗普就曾表示:“這不是要對(duì)中產(chǎn)階級(jí)征稅,,而是對(duì)另一個(gè)國(guó)家征稅?!彼€說(shuō):“這不會(huì)讓你們付出代價(jià),,而是要讓另一個(gè)國(guó)家付出代價(jià)?!?/p>
首先,,我們要了解這筆錢究竟是誰(shuí)出的。當(dāng)一個(gè)中國(guó)或者加拿大的出口商將某個(gè)工業(yè)制成品或者零部件運(yùn)送到美國(guó)的328個(gè)入境口岸之一時(shí),,購(gòu)買它的美國(guó)進(jìn)口商就要向美國(guó)海關(guān)與邊境保護(hù)局支付關(guān)稅,。請(qǐng)注意,掏錢的是美國(guó)進(jìn)口商,,而不是外國(guó)政府或者外國(guó)出口商。特朗普要加征的關(guān)稅也叫進(jìn)口稅,,是按照稅前商品價(jià)格的固定比例征收的,。這筆費(fèi)用也會(huì)被增加到美國(guó)進(jìn)口商支付的貨款價(jià)格中。
但是在實(shí)際操作中,,關(guān)稅的實(shí)際成本很可能部分或全部由三個(gè)群體來(lái)承擔(dān),。打個(gè)比方,如果美國(guó)將汽車零部件進(jìn)口關(guān)稅提高了 10%,,那海外生產(chǎn)商有可能會(huì)相應(yīng)地降低該零部件的銷售價(jià)格,,以維護(hù)福特或通用等美國(guó)汽車廠商的訂單。如果出口商不肯降價(jià),,那么美國(guó)的汽車制造商就可能要承擔(dān)這筆額外費(fèi)用,,他們?nèi)绻惶嵘嚨匿N售價(jià)格,就要被迫接受利潤(rùn)率下降,。從理論上講,,如果外國(guó)出口商和美國(guó)進(jìn)口商共同承擔(dān)了關(guān)稅成本,那么關(guān)稅成本就不會(huì)落到美國(guó)消費(fèi)者的身上,。但是承擔(dān)這筆成本的美國(guó)進(jìn)口商的利潤(rùn)就會(huì)大幅減少,,因此用于建設(shè)新工廠和擴(kuò)大招聘的資金就會(huì)相應(yīng)減少。
但是,,從既往關(guān)稅上調(diào)造成的實(shí)際影響看,,實(shí)際情況并非如此簡(jiǎn)單?!督?jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)季刊》發(fā)表過(guò)一篇關(guān)于2018年到2019年特朗普關(guān)稅體制的論文,,四名主筆的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家在論文中分析了特朗普首個(gè)任期內(nèi)上調(diào)關(guān)稅的影響,。在特朗普首個(gè)任期內(nèi),他上調(diào)了近1.8萬(wàn)種產(chǎn)品(包括多種鋼材,、鋁材和電器)的關(guān)稅,,平均稅率從3.7%提高到26.8%,涉及金額4210億美元,,占美國(guó)總進(jìn)口額的18%以上,。他們的研究發(fā)現(xiàn),對(duì)于鋼材產(chǎn)品,,出口商實(shí)際上是降價(jià)賣給了美國(guó)進(jìn)口商(包括建筑商,、批發(fā)商、罐頭制造商等),,降幅完全抵消了關(guān)稅,,從而避免了對(duì)其美國(guó)市場(chǎng)銷量的重大沖擊。
但這只是個(gè)例,??傮w上看,從2018年到2019年底,,這些被加征關(guān)稅的目標(biāo)產(chǎn)品的價(jià)格平均上漲了21.9%,。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),除了鋼鐵之外,,“美國(guó)消費(fèi)者幾乎承擔(dān)了全部的關(guān)稅成本,。”在汽車,、超市消費(fèi)品等領(lǐng)域,,美國(guó)消費(fèi)者更是承受了幾乎百分之百的關(guān)稅轉(zhuǎn)嫁。美國(guó)國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)研究局2020年發(fā)表過(guò)一項(xiàng)名為《誰(shuí)在為關(guān)稅買單》的研究,,該研究也得出了類似的結(jié)論,。研究指出:“我們發(fā)現(xiàn),在大多數(shù)行業(yè),,關(guān)稅已經(jīng)完全轉(zhuǎn)嫁給了美國(guó)企業(yè)和消費(fèi)者,。”這篇文章沒(méi)有給出詳細(xì)數(shù)據(jù),,但是它指出,,被特朗普關(guān)稅政府折騰到痛苦不堪的,并不是外國(guó)公司,,而恰恰是美國(guó)公司,。
事實(shí)2:關(guān)稅只會(huì)抑制而不會(huì)加速生產(chǎn)和就業(yè)
特朗普經(jīng)常吹噓:“關(guān)稅是我們?yōu)閲?guó)家所做的最大的一件好事。”
但是根據(jù)2020年1月的論文《論保護(hù)主義的回歸》,,特朗普首個(gè)任期關(guān)稅政策的得失顯然是不支持這種說(shuō)法的,。該論文指出,美國(guó)加征關(guān)稅確實(shí)會(huì)有贏家和輸家,,但總體而言,,其對(duì)美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的傷害大于幫助。該論文估計(jì),,2018年到2019年,,美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)商每年因關(guān)稅而增加的銷售額在240億美元左右。這是因?yàn)殛P(guān)稅提高了進(jìn)口商品的價(jià)格,,使得美國(guó)本土商品對(duì)消費(fèi)者具有了更大的吸引力,。關(guān)稅還帶來(lái)了每年650億美元的稅收收入。但不利的一面是,,關(guān)稅每年使美國(guó)的消費(fèi)價(jià)格上漲了1140億美元,。據(jù)《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)雜志》估算,美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)在這次大規(guī)模關(guān)稅試驗(yàn)中遭受了大約250億美元的凈損失(即:消費(fèi)者多支出的1140億美元,,減去稅收以及美國(guó)公司增收的部分共890億美元),。
另外,由于遭受了外國(guó)政府的對(duì)等報(bào)復(fù),,美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)商也損失了80億美元的出口額,。所以該研究的結(jié)論是,在2018年到2019年間,,特朗普的關(guān)稅政策使美國(guó)GDP下降了0.13%。如果沒(méi)有特朗普的關(guān)稅政策,,這兩年美國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)出水平本可以達(dá)到 4.9%,,而不是實(shí)際上的4.75%。而且要知道,,實(shí)際增稅涉及的領(lǐng)域,,還只是特朗普所設(shè)想的宏大征稅版圖的一部分,但是這就已經(jīng)對(duì)美國(guó)GDP造成了如此顯著的沖擊,。
關(guān)于這個(gè)問(wèn)題,,國(guó)際貨幣基金組織(IMF)2019年進(jìn)行過(guò)一次最為深入的歷史性分析??上н@項(xiàng)分析發(fā)布得太早,,所以它無(wú)法評(píng)估特朗普首個(gè)任期內(nèi)的關(guān)稅政策的影響。但它也已經(jīng)為將來(lái)可能發(fā)生的事敲響了警鐘,。該分析的四位作者研究了1963年到2014年間,,151個(gè)國(guó)家上調(diào)關(guān)稅所產(chǎn)生的影響。研究結(jié)果顯示:一國(guó)的進(jìn)口關(guān)稅平均提高3.5%,五年后會(huì)就會(huì)使其GDP增長(zhǎng)率降低 0.4%,,失業(yè)率上升1.5%,。而且該研究的作者們還沒(méi)有計(jì)算其他國(guó)家的對(duì)等報(bào)復(fù)所帶來(lái)的額外沖擊。
事實(shí)3:征收巨額關(guān)稅也不能降低美國(guó)的財(cái)政赤字
2月14日白宮發(fā)布的一份資料指出,,特朗普的所謂“公平互惠貿(mào)易計(jì)劃”(也就是實(shí)際上的加征關(guān)稅計(jì)劃)的主要目標(biāo)是 “減少長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)的巨額貿(mào)易逆差”,。特朗普經(jīng)常掛在嘴邊的就是進(jìn)口關(guān)稅將如何縮小美國(guó)與其他國(guó)家的貿(mào)易赤字,他還經(jīng)??浯筚Q(mào)易逆差的程度,,以增強(qiáng)自己的說(shuō)服力。
但是光靠嘴炮是不能產(chǎn)生效益的,,因?yàn)樗`背了一條基本的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)定律,。美國(guó)的年度貿(mào)易逆差必然與美國(guó)的總儲(chǔ)蓄和總投資之間的差額是一致的。多年以來(lái),,美國(guó)納稅人和企業(yè)的儲(chǔ)蓄就算全加起來(lái),,也遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)無(wú)法滿足美國(guó)對(duì)股票、債券,、新工廠,、新數(shù)據(jù)中心、新住房項(xiàng)目,、新私募基金以及其他各種盈利項(xiàng)目的需求,。其原因在于,在聯(lián)邦層面,,美國(guó)今年的預(yù)算赤字已逼近驚人的1.9萬(wàn)億美元,。美國(guó)政府以高利率吸納了美國(guó)儲(chǔ)蓄中很大一部分資金,否則這些資金就會(huì)流入私人投資領(lǐng)域,。
去年,,美國(guó)儲(chǔ)蓄與投資之間的缺口達(dá)到了9710億美元,恰好等于1.2萬(wàn)億美元的商品貿(mào)易逆差減去3000億美元左右的服務(wù)貿(mào)易順差,。在經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)原理中,,貿(mào)易逆差基本等于消費(fèi)與儲(chǔ)蓄之差,這幾乎是一個(gè)“恒等式”,。(服務(wù)通常不受關(guān)稅影響,,所以商品關(guān)稅將在未來(lái)決定美國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)格局。)為什么會(huì)有這個(gè)等式存在,?因?yàn)?024年,,外國(guó)通過(guò)向美國(guó)出口商品,獲得了9710億美元的凈收益,。所有這些資金都是以美元計(jì)價(jià)的,,而美元只在美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)有用。因此,外國(guó)人把所有這些資金又都投回了美國(guó),,用于投資美國(guó)人自己無(wú)法負(fù)擔(dān)得起的各種項(xiàng)目——而美國(guó)自己之所以負(fù)擔(dān)不起這些項(xiàng)目,,則主要是因?yàn)槲覀兊暮艽笠徊糠謨?chǔ)蓄都被用于填補(bǔ)龐大的財(cái)政赤字了。
外國(guó)人之所以愿意一直賺美元攢美元,,是因?yàn)樗麄冊(cè)诿绹?guó)這個(gè)能產(chǎn)生全球最高回報(bào)率的國(guó)家投資可以獲得豐厚的利潤(rùn),。約翰霍普金斯大學(xué)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家史蒂夫?漢克指出,“由于美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)充滿活力,,我們相對(duì)輕松地解決了預(yù)算赤字導(dǎo)致的低儲(chǔ)蓄與大規(guī)模投資之間的巨額缺口問(wèn)題”,。他表示,大量的外國(guó)資金流入對(duì)美國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)是一件好事,,因?yàn)榕c用其他方法平衡財(cái)政預(yù)算相比,,它使美國(guó)民眾可用于消費(fèi)的錢大大增加了,同時(shí)還使美國(guó)有足夠資本投入到新工廠和車間的建設(shè)上,,并將傳統(tǒng)的家族企業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型為高效的現(xiàn)代化企業(yè),。漢克表示:“我們有大量?jī)?chǔ)備貨幣,有全球最大最優(yōu)秀的資本市場(chǎng),。如果你能用國(guó)外資金填補(bǔ)赤字,,這也不失為一件好事。這樣一來(lái),,美國(guó)消費(fèi)者可以消費(fèi)的,,就遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)了我們可以生產(chǎn)的?!?/p>
漢克還指出,,特朗普完全把貿(mào)易問(wèn)題的因果倒置了?!疤乩势湛偸潜г刮覀兊馁Q(mào)易逆差是外國(guó)人造成的,。但實(shí)際上,美國(guó)的貿(mào)易逆差并非是外國(guó)人的不公平行為造成的,,而是我們自己造成的。任何一個(gè)儲(chǔ)蓄與投資出現(xiàn)缺口的國(guó)家,,都會(huì)出現(xiàn)與之規(guī)模相當(dāng)?shù)馁Q(mào)易逆差,。”
總之,,加征關(guān)稅或許能夠減少進(jìn)口,,但除非美國(guó)大幅增加儲(chǔ)蓄或者大幅削減投資,否則美國(guó)的貿(mào)易平衡現(xiàn)狀不會(huì)有任何改變,。比如在特朗普的第一任期后,,美國(guó)對(duì)中國(guó)的出口大幅下降,而且整體的出口增長(zhǎng)速度還落后于進(jìn)口的增長(zhǎng)速度。從2019年以來(lái),,美國(guó)的對(duì)華貿(mào)易逆差(包括服務(wù)貿(mào)易)反而擴(kuò)大了63%,。
事實(shí)4:關(guān)稅無(wú)助于縮小聯(lián)邦財(cái)政赤字
根據(jù)無(wú)黨派獨(dú)立機(jī)構(gòu)“稅收基金會(huì)”估算,如特朗普按目前計(jì)劃實(shí)施關(guān)稅措施,,2026 年美國(guó)的關(guān)稅收入將達(dá)到3000億美元左右,。這確實(shí)是一筆巨款,大約相當(dāng)于美國(guó)去年個(gè)人所得稅總額的八分之一,。但問(wèn)題在于,,關(guān)稅會(huì)拉低美國(guó)的GDP,甚至是老百姓的收入,,人均收入少了,,老百姓繳的稅就少了。這樣一來(lái),,關(guān)稅和個(gè)人所得稅一升一降,,保不齊到時(shí)美國(guó)財(cái)政部的財(cái)政收入倒不如不加征關(guān)稅的時(shí)候。關(guān)稅看似一劑治重癥的猛藥,,但也得看美國(guó)這個(gè)病人遭不遭得住,。比如據(jù)“稅收基金會(huì)”預(yù)測(cè),到2020年代末期,,特朗普的關(guān)稅政策有可能導(dǎo)致美國(guó)GDP相較于不加征關(guān)稅時(shí)少收入2萬(wàn)億美元左右,。得之桑榆,失之東隅,,是得是失,,還是個(gè)很難說(shuō)的問(wèn)題。
另外,,學(xué)界普遍認(rèn)為,,關(guān)稅并非增加財(cái)政收入的理想手段。有學(xué)者認(rèn)為,,除非關(guān)稅稅率被定得很高,,否則它們并不能帶來(lái)多少收入。而關(guān)稅稅率一旦被定得很高,,就只會(huì)助長(zhǎng)走私行為,。關(guān)稅實(shí)際上是一種效率很低的征稅方式。在過(guò)去70年里,,世界各國(guó)都在靠所得稅和增值稅來(lái)增加財(cái)政收入,,已經(jīng)沒(méi)有大國(guó)還在依賴關(guān)稅來(lái)增加財(cái)政收入了。
事實(shí)5:美國(guó)不是國(guó)際貿(mào)易中被“坑”的一方
特朗普認(rèn)為,,美國(guó)在國(guó)際貿(mào)易中被一些國(guó)家占了便宜,。這些國(guó)家一邊故意阻礙從美國(guó)進(jìn)口產(chǎn)品,,一邊利用美國(guó)的開(kāi)放市場(chǎng)獲取豐厚利潤(rùn)。但這一觀點(diǎn)與實(shí)際數(shù)據(jù)不符,。當(dāng)然,,美國(guó)所有的貿(mào)易伙伴都會(huì)設(shè)置一些相當(dāng)高的關(guān)稅或技術(shù)壁壘,以保護(hù)他們本國(guó)的特定產(chǎn)業(yè),。比如加拿大采取了一種“供應(yīng)管理”體系,,以維持國(guó)內(nèi)乳制品的高價(jià),這一體系實(shí)際上對(duì)美國(guó)乳制品設(shè)置了進(jìn)口限制,。不過(guò)美國(guó)自己也有限制市場(chǎng)準(zhǔn)入的做法,,包括對(duì)食糖進(jìn)口實(shí)行配額制度,而且美國(guó)也對(duì)奶粉等乳制品設(shè)置了進(jìn)口壁壘,。
但總體而言,,美國(guó)的主要貿(mào)易伙伴大多都和美國(guó)一樣——或者說(shuō)和美國(guó)過(guò)去一樣,是熱情擁護(hù)自由貿(mào)易的,。比如,,在特朗普大幅加稅并引發(fā)報(bào)復(fù)措施之前,歐盟對(duì)美國(guó)進(jìn)口商品僅征稅平均1%的關(guān)稅,,與美國(guó)對(duì)歐盟出口商品征收的關(guān)稅稅率完全相同,。去年,歐盟從美國(guó)制造的商品上征收的關(guān)稅僅為30億美元,,還不到美國(guó)對(duì)歐盟商品所征關(guān)稅的一半,。
加拿大和墨西哥對(duì)美國(guó)商品征收的關(guān)稅,確實(shí)比美國(guó)對(duì)它們征收的關(guān)稅略高一些,。美國(guó)商品進(jìn)入加拿大的平均關(guān)稅為 3.1%,,而加拿大商品進(jìn)入美國(guó)的平均關(guān)稅為2.0%。墨西哥對(duì)美國(guó)商品平均征收5.2%的關(guān)稅,,比美國(guó)對(duì)墨西哥商品的進(jìn)口關(guān)稅高1.8個(gè)百分點(diǎn),。消除這些關(guān)稅差異,將極大地使美國(guó)的出口商受益,。但是這些差異本來(lái)就很小,,根本不足以成為發(fā)動(dòng)一場(chǎng)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的理由。尤其是加拿大和墨西哥一旦發(fā)動(dòng)反制措施,,還有可能對(duì)美國(guó)生產(chǎn)商造成致命打擊,。畢竟美國(guó)很多生產(chǎn)商的命運(yùn),就依賴于向這兩個(gè)國(guó)家出口重型機(jī)械,、化工產(chǎn)品和塑料制品等商品。
就連中國(guó)在貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)爆發(fā)前,,對(duì)美國(guó)商品征收的平均關(guān)稅也僅為2.7%,。而自2018年到2019年以來(lái),,美國(guó)對(duì)華進(jìn)口關(guān)稅已提高到10%,而且特朗普剛剛又在這基礎(chǔ)上提高了10%,。
如果特朗普真能全部說(shuō)到做到,,那么特朗普將對(duì)加拿大、墨西哥和歐盟進(jìn)口商品全面征收25%的關(guān)稅(除了對(duì)加拿大進(jìn)口能源僅征收10%的關(guān)稅),。至于中國(guó),,特朗普現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)將對(duì)華進(jìn)口關(guān)稅提高到20%。而對(duì)從全球進(jìn)口的汽車,、鋼鐵,、鋁,則已實(shí)施25%的關(guān)稅政策,,下一步就會(huì)擴(kuò)大到半導(dǎo)體和制藥業(yè),。木材、銅和農(nóng)產(chǎn)品也在特朗普的加稅范圍內(nèi),。特朗普的加稅清單十分龐大,,涵蓋了價(jià)值2.1萬(wàn)億美元的進(jìn)口商品,約占 2024年美國(guó)4.1萬(wàn)億美元進(jìn)口總額的一半,。
目前,,美國(guó)對(duì)所有進(jìn)口商品征收的平均關(guān)稅為2.5%,這一稅率大約是特朗普在2018 年實(shí)施首輪關(guān)稅政策前的兩倍,,即便是拜登政府也保留了其中的大部分關(guān)稅,。據(jù)“稅收基金會(huì)”估算,就特朗普已宣布的關(guān)稅措施而言,,如果它們都得以實(shí)施,,則美國(guó)的平均關(guān)稅稅率將上升超過(guò)11個(gè)百分點(diǎn),達(dá)到13.8%,。這項(xiàng)政策的影響是極其巨大的,,它有可能導(dǎo)致美國(guó)的GDP下降0.55%,換句話說(shuō),,它將導(dǎo)致未來(lái)幾年的美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)率下降八分之一,。
當(dāng)然,總會(huì)有人從貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中賺得盆滿缽滿,,但總的而言,,這個(gè)贏家不會(huì)是美國(guó)。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:樸成奎
3月12日,,美國(guó)總統(tǒng)特朗普在“空軍一號(hào)”上豪言:“我們將收獲數(shù)千億美元的關(guān)稅收久,,我們會(huì)變得非常有錢,有錢到甚至不知道該把這些錢花在哪,?!北M管商界哀鴻遍野,,股市一片慘淡,美國(guó)的各大貿(mào)易伙伴紛紛發(fā)聲譴責(zé),,但是特朗普仍然不為所動(dòng),。特朗普暢想的兩駕調(diào)控財(cái)政赤字的增收馬車,一駕是馬斯克搞的狗狗幣,,另一駕就是進(jìn)口關(guān)稅,。但是如果你了解了關(guān)于關(guān)稅的以下五個(gè)事實(shí),你就會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn),,關(guān)稅的確會(huì)對(duì)美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)生巨大影響,,但展開(kāi)的方式卻絕對(duì)不會(huì)像特朗普預(yù)料的那樣。
事實(shí)1:關(guān)稅大部分會(huì)被轉(zhuǎn)嫁到美國(guó)消費(fèi)者身上
特朗普一直堅(jiān)稱,,美國(guó)對(duì)進(jìn)口商品加征的關(guān)稅,,將由外國(guó)政府或公司承擔(dān)全部成本。在去年9月份的競(jìng)選活動(dòng)中,,特朗普就曾表示:“這不是要對(duì)中產(chǎn)階級(jí)征稅,,而是對(duì)另一個(gè)國(guó)家征稅?!彼€說(shuō):“這不會(huì)讓你們付出代價(jià),,而是要讓另一個(gè)國(guó)家付出代價(jià)?!?/p>
首先,,我們要了解這筆錢究竟是誰(shuí)出的。當(dāng)一個(gè)中國(guó)或者加拿大的出口商將某個(gè)工業(yè)制成品或者零部件運(yùn)送到美國(guó)的328個(gè)入境口岸之一時(shí),,購(gòu)買它的美國(guó)進(jìn)口商就要向美國(guó)海關(guān)與邊境保護(hù)局支付關(guān)稅,。請(qǐng)注意,掏錢的是美國(guó)進(jìn)口商,,而不是外國(guó)政府或者外國(guó)出口商,。特朗普要加征的關(guān)稅也叫進(jìn)口稅,是按照稅前商品價(jià)格的固定比例征收的,。這筆費(fèi)用也會(huì)被增加到美國(guó)進(jìn)口商支付的貨款價(jià)格中,。
但是在實(shí)際操作中,關(guān)稅的實(shí)際成本很可能部分或全部由三個(gè)群體來(lái)承擔(dān),。打個(gè)比方,,如果美國(guó)將汽車零部件進(jìn)口關(guān)稅提高了 10%,那海外生產(chǎn)商有可能會(huì)相應(yīng)地降低該零部件的銷售價(jià)格,,以維護(hù)福特或通用等美國(guó)汽車廠商的訂單,。如果出口商不肯降價(jià),那么美國(guó)的汽車制造商就可能要承擔(dān)這筆額外費(fèi)用,,他們?nèi)绻惶嵘嚨匿N售價(jià)格,,就要被迫接受利潤(rùn)率下降,。從理論上講,如果外國(guó)出口商和美國(guó)進(jìn)口商共同承擔(dān)了關(guān)稅成本,,那么關(guān)稅成本就不會(huì)落到美國(guó)消費(fèi)者的身上。但是承擔(dān)這筆成本的美國(guó)進(jìn)口商的利潤(rùn)就會(huì)大幅減少,,因此用于建設(shè)新工廠和擴(kuò)大招聘的資金就會(huì)相應(yīng)減少,。
但是,從既往關(guān)稅上調(diào)造成的實(shí)際影響看,,實(shí)際情況并非如此簡(jiǎn)單,。《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)季刊》發(fā)表過(guò)一篇關(guān)于2018年到2019年特朗普關(guān)稅體制的論文,,四名主筆的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家在論文中分析了特朗普首個(gè)任期內(nèi)上調(diào)關(guān)稅的影響,。在特朗普首個(gè)任期內(nèi),他上調(diào)了近1.8萬(wàn)種產(chǎn)品(包括多種鋼材,、鋁材和電器)的關(guān)稅,,平均稅率從3.7%提高到26.8%,涉及金額4210億美元,,占美國(guó)總進(jìn)口額的18%以上,。他們的研究發(fā)現(xiàn),對(duì)于鋼材產(chǎn)品,,出口商實(shí)際上是降價(jià)賣給了美國(guó)進(jìn)口商(包括建筑商,、批發(fā)商、罐頭制造商等),,降幅完全抵消了關(guān)稅,,從而避免了對(duì)其美國(guó)市場(chǎng)銷量的重大沖擊。
但這只是個(gè)例,??傮w上看,從2018年到2019年底,,這些被加征關(guān)稅的目標(biāo)產(chǎn)品的價(jià)格平均上漲了21.9%,。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),除了鋼鐵之外,,“美國(guó)消費(fèi)者幾乎承擔(dān)了全部的關(guān)稅成本,。”在汽車,、超市消費(fèi)品等領(lǐng)域,,美國(guó)消費(fèi)者更是承受了幾乎百分之百的關(guān)稅轉(zhuǎn)嫁。美國(guó)國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)研究局2020年發(fā)表過(guò)一項(xiàng)名為《誰(shuí)在為關(guān)稅買單》的研究,,該研究也得出了類似的結(jié)論,。研究指出:“我們發(fā)現(xiàn),,在大多數(shù)行業(yè),關(guān)稅已經(jīng)完全轉(zhuǎn)嫁給了美國(guó)企業(yè)和消費(fèi)者,?!边@篇文章沒(méi)有給出詳細(xì)數(shù)據(jù),但是它指出,,被特朗普關(guān)稅政府折騰到痛苦不堪的,,并不是外國(guó)公司,而恰恰是美國(guó)公司,。
事實(shí)2:關(guān)稅只會(huì)抑制而不會(huì)加速生產(chǎn)和就業(yè)
特朗普經(jīng)常吹噓:“關(guān)稅是我們?yōu)閲?guó)家所做的最大的一件好事,。”
但是根據(jù)2020年1月的論文《論保護(hù)主義的回歸》,,特朗普首個(gè)任期關(guān)稅政策的得失顯然是不支持這種說(shuō)法的,。該論文指出,美國(guó)加征關(guān)稅確實(shí)會(huì)有贏家和輸家,,但總體而言,,其對(duì)美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的傷害大于幫助。該論文估計(jì),,2018年到2019年,,美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)商每年因關(guān)稅而增加的銷售額在240億美元左右。這是因?yàn)殛P(guān)稅提高了進(jìn)口商品的價(jià)格,,使得美國(guó)本土商品對(duì)消費(fèi)者具有了更大的吸引力,。關(guān)稅還帶來(lái)了每年650億美元的稅收收入。但不利的一面是,,關(guān)稅每年使美國(guó)的消費(fèi)價(jià)格上漲了1140億美元,。據(jù)《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)雜志》估算,美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)在這次大規(guī)模關(guān)稅試驗(yàn)中遭受了大約250億美元的凈損失(即:消費(fèi)者多支出的1140億美元,,減去稅收以及美國(guó)公司增收的部分共890億美元),。
另外,由于遭受了外國(guó)政府的對(duì)等報(bào)復(fù),,美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)商也損失了80億美元的出口額,。所以該研究的結(jié)論是,在2018年到2019年間,,特朗普的關(guān)稅政策使美國(guó)GDP下降了0.13%,。如果沒(méi)有特朗普的關(guān)稅政策,這兩年美國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)出水平本可以達(dá)到 4.9%,,而不是實(shí)際上的4.75%,。而且要知道,實(shí)際增稅涉及的領(lǐng)域,還只是特朗普所設(shè)想的宏大征稅版圖的一部分,,但是這就已經(jīng)對(duì)美國(guó)GDP造成了如此顯著的沖擊,。
關(guān)于這個(gè)問(wèn)題,國(guó)際貨幣基金組織(IMF)2019年進(jìn)行過(guò)一次最為深入的歷史性分析,??上н@項(xiàng)分析發(fā)布得太早,所以它無(wú)法評(píng)估特朗普首個(gè)任期內(nèi)的關(guān)稅政策的影響,。但它也已經(jīng)為將來(lái)可能發(fā)生的事敲響了警鐘,。該分析的四位作者研究了1963年到2014年間,151個(gè)國(guó)家上調(diào)關(guān)稅所產(chǎn)生的影響,。研究結(jié)果顯示:一國(guó)的進(jìn)口關(guān)稅平均提高3.5%,五年后會(huì)就會(huì)使其GDP增長(zhǎng)率降低 0.4%,,失業(yè)率上升1.5%,。而且該研究的作者們還沒(méi)有計(jì)算其他國(guó)家的對(duì)等報(bào)復(fù)所帶來(lái)的額外沖擊。
事實(shí)3:征收巨額關(guān)稅也不能降低美國(guó)的財(cái)政赤字
2月14日白宮發(fā)布的一份資料指出,,特朗普的所謂“公平互惠貿(mào)易計(jì)劃”(也就是實(shí)際上的加征關(guān)稅計(jì)劃)的主要目標(biāo)是 “減少長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)的巨額貿(mào)易逆差”,。特朗普經(jīng)常掛在嘴邊的就是進(jìn)口關(guān)稅將如何縮小美國(guó)與其他國(guó)家的貿(mào)易赤字,他還經(jīng)??浯筚Q(mào)易逆差的程度,,以增強(qiáng)自己的說(shuō)服力。
但是光靠嘴炮是不能產(chǎn)生效益的,,因?yàn)樗`背了一條基本的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)定律,。美國(guó)的年度貿(mào)易逆差必然與美國(guó)的總儲(chǔ)蓄和總投資之間的差額是一致的。多年以來(lái),,美國(guó)納稅人和企業(yè)的儲(chǔ)蓄就算全加起來(lái),,也遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)無(wú)法滿足美國(guó)對(duì)股票、債券,、新工廠,、新數(shù)據(jù)中心、新住房項(xiàng)目,、新私募基金以及其他各種盈利項(xiàng)目的需求,。其原因在于,在聯(lián)邦層面,,美國(guó)今年的預(yù)算赤字已逼近驚人的1.9萬(wàn)億美元,。美國(guó)政府以高利率吸納了美國(guó)儲(chǔ)蓄中很大一部分資金,否則這些資金就會(huì)流入私人投資領(lǐng)域,。
去年,,美國(guó)儲(chǔ)蓄與投資之間的缺口達(dá)到了9710億美元,恰好等于1.2萬(wàn)億美元的商品貿(mào)易逆差減去3000億美元左右的服務(wù)貿(mào)易順差。在經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)原理中,,貿(mào)易逆差基本等于消費(fèi)與儲(chǔ)蓄之差,,這幾乎是一個(gè)“恒等式”。(服務(wù)通常不受關(guān)稅影響,,所以商品關(guān)稅將在未來(lái)決定美國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)格局,。)為什么會(huì)有這個(gè)等式存在?因?yàn)?024年,,外國(guó)通過(guò)向美國(guó)出口商品,,獲得了9710億美元的凈收益。所有這些資金都是以美元計(jì)價(jià)的,,而美元只在美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)有用,。因此,外國(guó)人把所有這些資金又都投回了美國(guó),,用于投資美國(guó)人自己無(wú)法負(fù)擔(dān)得起的各種項(xiàng)目——而美國(guó)自己之所以負(fù)擔(dān)不起這些項(xiàng)目,,則主要是因?yàn)槲覀兊暮艽笠徊糠謨?chǔ)蓄都被用于填補(bǔ)龐大的財(cái)政赤字了。
外國(guó)人之所以愿意一直賺美元攢美元,,是因?yàn)樗麄冊(cè)诿绹?guó)這個(gè)能產(chǎn)生全球最高回報(bào)率的國(guó)家投資可以獲得豐厚的利潤(rùn),。約翰霍普金斯大學(xué)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家史蒂夫?漢克指出,“由于美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)充滿活力,,我們相對(duì)輕松地解決了預(yù)算赤字導(dǎo)致的低儲(chǔ)蓄與大規(guī)模投資之間的巨額缺口問(wèn)題”,。他表示,大量的外國(guó)資金流入對(duì)美國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)是一件好事,,因?yàn)榕c用其他方法平衡財(cái)政預(yù)算相比,,它使美國(guó)民眾可用于消費(fèi)的錢大大增加了,同時(shí)還使美國(guó)有足夠資本投入到新工廠和車間的建設(shè)上,,并將傳統(tǒng)的家族企業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型為高效的現(xiàn)代化企業(yè),。漢克表示:“我們有大量?jī)?chǔ)備貨幣,有全球最大最優(yōu)秀的資本市場(chǎng),。如果你能用國(guó)外資金填補(bǔ)赤字,,這也不失為一件好事。這樣一來(lái),,美國(guó)消費(fèi)者可以消費(fèi)的,,就遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)了我們可以生產(chǎn)的?!?/p>
漢克還指出,,特朗普完全把貿(mào)易問(wèn)題的因果倒置了?!疤乩势湛偸潜г刮覀兊馁Q(mào)易逆差是外國(guó)人造成的,。但實(shí)際上,,美國(guó)的貿(mào)易逆差并非是外國(guó)人的不公平行為造成的,而是我們自己造成的,。任何一個(gè)儲(chǔ)蓄與投資出現(xiàn)缺口的國(guó)家,,都會(huì)出現(xiàn)與之規(guī)模相當(dāng)?shù)馁Q(mào)易逆差?!?/p>
總之,,加征關(guān)稅或許能夠減少進(jìn)口,但除非美國(guó)大幅增加儲(chǔ)蓄或者大幅削減投資,,否則美國(guó)的貿(mào)易平衡現(xiàn)狀不會(huì)有任何改變,。比如在特朗普的第一任期后,美國(guó)對(duì)中國(guó)的出口大幅下降,,而且整體的出口增長(zhǎng)速度還落后于進(jìn)口的增長(zhǎng)速度,。從2019年以來(lái),美國(guó)的對(duì)華貿(mào)易逆差(包括服務(wù)貿(mào)易)反而擴(kuò)大了63%,。
事實(shí)4:關(guān)稅無(wú)助于縮小聯(lián)邦財(cái)政赤字
根據(jù)無(wú)黨派獨(dú)立機(jī)構(gòu)“稅收基金會(huì)”估算,,如特朗普按目前計(jì)劃實(shí)施關(guān)稅措施,2026 年美國(guó)的關(guān)稅收入將達(dá)到3000億美元左右,。這確實(shí)是一筆巨款,大約相當(dāng)于美國(guó)去年個(gè)人所得稅總額的八分之一,。但問(wèn)題在于,,關(guān)稅會(huì)拉低美國(guó)的GDP,甚至是老百姓的收入,,人均收入少了,,老百姓繳的稅就少了。這樣一來(lái),,關(guān)稅和個(gè)人所得稅一升一降,,保不齊到時(shí)美國(guó)財(cái)政部的財(cái)政收入倒不如不加征關(guān)稅的時(shí)候。關(guān)稅看似一劑治重癥的猛藥,,但也得看美國(guó)這個(gè)病人遭不遭得住,。比如據(jù)“稅收基金會(huì)”預(yù)測(cè),到2020年代末期,,特朗普的關(guān)稅政策有可能導(dǎo)致美國(guó)GDP相較于不加征關(guān)稅時(shí)少收入2萬(wàn)億美元左右,。得之桑榆,失之東隅,,是得是失,,還是個(gè)很難說(shuō)的問(wèn)題。
另外,,學(xué)界普遍認(rèn)為,,關(guān)稅并非增加財(cái)政收入的理想手段。有學(xué)者認(rèn)為,除非關(guān)稅稅率被定得很高,,否則它們并不能帶來(lái)多少收入,。而關(guān)稅稅率一旦被定得很高,就只會(huì)助長(zhǎng)走私行為,。關(guān)稅實(shí)際上是一種效率很低的征稅方式,。在過(guò)去70年里,世界各國(guó)都在靠所得稅和增值稅來(lái)增加財(cái)政收入,,已經(jīng)沒(méi)有大國(guó)還在依賴關(guān)稅來(lái)增加財(cái)政收入了,。
事實(shí)5:美國(guó)不是國(guó)際貿(mào)易中被“坑”的一方
特朗普認(rèn)為,美國(guó)在國(guó)際貿(mào)易中被一些國(guó)家占了便宜,。這些國(guó)家一邊故意阻礙從美國(guó)進(jìn)口產(chǎn)品,,一邊利用美國(guó)的開(kāi)放市場(chǎng)獲取豐厚利潤(rùn)。但這一觀點(diǎn)與實(shí)際數(shù)據(jù)不符,。當(dāng)然,,美國(guó)所有的貿(mào)易伙伴都會(huì)設(shè)置一些相當(dāng)高的關(guān)稅或技術(shù)壁壘,以保護(hù)他們本國(guó)的特定產(chǎn)業(yè),。比如加拿大采取了一種“供應(yīng)管理”體系,,以維持國(guó)內(nèi)乳制品的高價(jià),這一體系實(shí)際上對(duì)美國(guó)乳制品設(shè)置了進(jìn)口限制,。不過(guò)美國(guó)自己也有限制市場(chǎng)準(zhǔn)入的做法,,包括對(duì)食糖進(jìn)口實(shí)行配額制度,而且美國(guó)也對(duì)奶粉等乳制品設(shè)置了進(jìn)口壁壘,。
但總體而言,,美國(guó)的主要貿(mào)易伙伴大多都和美國(guó)一樣——或者說(shuō)和美國(guó)過(guò)去一樣,是熱情擁護(hù)自由貿(mào)易的,。比如,,在特朗普大幅加稅并引發(fā)報(bào)復(fù)措施之前,歐盟對(duì)美國(guó)進(jìn)口商品僅征稅平均1%的關(guān)稅,,與美國(guó)對(duì)歐盟出口商品征收的關(guān)稅稅率完全相同,。去年,歐盟從美國(guó)制造的商品上征收的關(guān)稅僅為30億美元,,還不到美國(guó)對(duì)歐盟商品所征關(guān)稅的一半,。
加拿大和墨西哥對(duì)美國(guó)商品征收的關(guān)稅,確實(shí)比美國(guó)對(duì)它們征收的關(guān)稅略高一些,。美國(guó)商品進(jìn)入加拿大的平均關(guān)稅為 3.1%,,而加拿大商品進(jìn)入美國(guó)的平均關(guān)稅為2.0%。墨西哥對(duì)美國(guó)商品平均征收5.2%的關(guān)稅,,比美國(guó)對(duì)墨西哥商品的進(jìn)口關(guān)稅高1.8個(gè)百分點(diǎn),。消除這些關(guān)稅差異,,將極大地使美國(guó)的出口商受益。但是這些差異本來(lái)就很小,,根本不足以成為發(fā)動(dòng)一場(chǎng)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的理由,。尤其是加拿大和墨西哥一旦發(fā)動(dòng)反制措施,還有可能對(duì)美國(guó)生產(chǎn)商造成致命打擊,。畢竟美國(guó)很多生產(chǎn)商的命運(yùn),,就依賴于向這兩個(gè)國(guó)家出口重型機(jī)械、化工產(chǎn)品和塑料制品等商品,。
就連中國(guó)在貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)爆發(fā)前,,對(duì)美國(guó)商品征收的平均關(guān)稅也僅為2.7%。而自2018年到2019年以來(lái),,美國(guó)對(duì)華進(jìn)口關(guān)稅已提高到10%,,而且特朗普剛剛又在這基礎(chǔ)上提高了10%。
如果特朗普真能全部說(shuō)到做到,,那么特朗普將對(duì)加拿大,、墨西哥和歐盟進(jìn)口商品全面征收25%的關(guān)稅(除了對(duì)加拿大進(jìn)口能源僅征收10%的關(guān)稅)。至于中國(guó),,特朗普現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)將對(duì)華進(jìn)口關(guān)稅提高到20%,。而對(duì)從全球進(jìn)口的汽車、鋼鐵,、鋁,,則已實(shí)施25%的關(guān)稅政策,下一步就會(huì)擴(kuò)大到半導(dǎo)體和制藥業(yè),。木材,、銅和農(nóng)產(chǎn)品也在特朗普的加稅范圍內(nèi),。特朗普的加稅清單十分龐大,,涵蓋了價(jià)值2.1萬(wàn)億美元的進(jìn)口商品,約占 2024年美國(guó)4.1萬(wàn)億美元進(jìn)口總額的一半,。
目前,,美國(guó)對(duì)所有進(jìn)口商品征收的平均關(guān)稅為2.5%,這一稅率大約是特朗普在2018 年實(shí)施首輪關(guān)稅政策前的兩倍,,即便是拜登政府也保留了其中的大部分關(guān)稅,。據(jù)“稅收基金會(huì)”估算,就特朗普已宣布的關(guān)稅措施而言,,如果它們都得以實(shí)施,,則美國(guó)的平均關(guān)稅稅率將上升超過(guò)11個(gè)百分點(diǎn),達(dá)到13.8%,。這項(xiàng)政策的影響是極其巨大的,,它有可能導(dǎo)致美國(guó)的GDP下降0.55%,,換句話說(shuō),它將導(dǎo)致未來(lái)幾年的美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)率下降八分之一,。
當(dāng)然,,總會(huì)有人從貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中賺得盆滿缽滿,但總的而言,,這個(gè)贏家不會(huì)是美國(guó),。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:樸成奎
Boarding Air Force One on March 12, President Donald Trump quipped, “We’re going to raise hundreds of billions in tariffs; we’re going to become so rich we’re not going to know where to spend that money.” Despite hand-wringing from CEOs, the stock market tanking, and widespread condemnation from our trading partners, the President is forging ahead with his trade war. In doing so, he’s counting on big windfalls from these import taxes, along with the savings he boasts will flow from Elon Musk’s DOGE campaign, to fulfill his promise of sharply reducing America’s yawning fiscal deficits. But in examining five facts about how tariffs actually work, it’s clear that they will have a huge effect on the economy—just not the one the President is projecting.
Fact 1: Tariffs are a tax that will be mainly, if not wholly, borne by U.S. consumers
Trump has always insisted that other nations or foreign companies will pay the full cost of the tariffs that the U.S. collects on imports. During campaign stops in September, he stated, “It’s not a tax on the middle class. It’s a tax on another country,” and “It’s not going to cost you, it’ going to be a cost to another country.”
As a first step, it’s important to understand who actually makes the payment. When a Chinese or Canadian exporter ships components or finished goods to one of the 328 US ports of entry, the U.S. importer purchasing the goods—not the exporter or another nation—pays the tariff, also called an “import tax,” to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency. The tariff is assessed as a fixed percentage of the price the exporter’s charges pre-tariff. That charge gets added to the price the U.S. importer pays.
The real cost of the tariff, however, can fall in part or whole on three parties. If the U.S. just increased tariffs on auto parts by 10%, the overseas producer could reduce its price by a like amount to maintain its sales to Ford or GM. Or, if the exporter tacks the 10% duty onto its selling price, the automakers could absorb the extra expense; they’d keep their car prices the same, and accept lower margins. In theory, if between them, the foreign exporter and the U.S. importer swallow the tariff, the cost won’t fall on the U.S. consumer. On the other hand, a U.S. importer shouldering the charge would be making a lot less money, and gain less earnings for building new plants and expanding its workforce.
But that’s not how it works in practice, according to studies of the real-world impact of past tariff increases. In a paper on the Trump tariff regime of 2018 and 2019 published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, the four economist-authors analyzed the effect of the increase in tariffs during Trump’s first term from an average of 3.7% to 26.8% on almost 18,000 products including many types of steel, aluminum, and appliances, and covering $421 billion or over 18% of all U.S. imports. Their review found that for steel, exporters actually dropped their prices to U.S. importers—a group that would encompass builders, wholesalers, canners, and other customers, fully offsetting the tariffs—thereby ducking a big blow to their U.S. sales.
But that was an outlier. Overall, prices for the targeted goods rose 21.9% on average between the time the tariffs struck in 2018 and the close of 2019. The study found that, steel aside, “U.S. consumers have borne the entire incidence of U.S. tariffs.” Americans at the auto lots and supermarkets shouldered what’s known as a “one hundred percent pass-through” of the tariff tax. A second analysis of the first Trump wave from the National Bureau of Economic Research, “Who’s Paying for the Tariffs?” (2020), reached a similar conclusion, noting: “We have found that in most sectors, tariffs have been completely passed on to U.S. firms and consumers.” The article doesn’t posit how much goes to consumer prices versus lower margins, but finds the U.S., not foreign companies, felt the full force of Trump’s first round to import taxes.
Fact 2: Tariffs don’t accelerate growth in output and employment, they throttle both
President Trump often trumpets that “tariffs are going to be the greatest thing we’ve ever done for our country.”
But the experience from his first term doesn’t confirm this confidence, according to “The Return of Protectionism,” as updated in January 2020. The paper details that tariff increases do indeed create winners and losers, but on balance, they hurt the economy more than they help. The authors estimate that domestic producers gained $24 billion in sales per year in 2018 and 2019, as tariffs raised prices for competing imports, making U.S.-produced goods more attractive to consumers and businesses. The duties also generated $65 billion in annual tax revenue. Downside: The tariffs raised prices to U.S. customers by $114 billion each year. Hence, according to the reckoning in the Journal of Economics, the U.S. economy suffered a net loss from the first big experiment of $25 billion (the $114 billion extra spent by consumers less the $89 billion from taxes and increased revenues by U.S. companies).
Domestic producers, the study estimates, would have benefited much more if they hadn’t lost $8 billion of their own export sales due to retaliation from abroad. All told, the authors estimate that tariffs shaved 0.13% from annual GDP in 2018 and 2019. Upshot: Sans tariffs, our output would have averaged 4.9% over the two-year span instead of the 4.75% the U.S. achieved. Keep in mind that a tariff increase that’s a fraction of what Trump’s envisioning drove this meaningful zap to GDP.
The most in-depth, historical analysis on the topic, an IMF working paper from 2019, appeared too early to assess the duties imposed in Trump’s first term. But they were a harbinger for what happened then—and what’s ahead. The four authors studied the impact of tariff increases from 1963 to 2014 across 151 nations. Their finding: a rise of 3.5% in import duties shaved 0.4% from annual GDP growth after five years, and led to a 1.5% increase in unemployment. And the authors didn’t calculate the extra pounding from our producers’ loss of exports triggered by retaliation.
Fact 3: Big tariffs will not reduce the Trump-hated trade deficit
A White House fact sheet from February 14 states that the major goal of Trump’s “Fair and Reciprocal Plan” for widespread tariffs is to “reduce our large and persistent annual trade deficit.” Trump talks constantly about how the import duties will narrow the lopsided exchange of goods between the U.S. and our foreign cohorts, rhetorically multiplying the size of the ravines to bolster his case.
But the President’s offensive won’t work, because it collides with a basic law of economics. The annual trade deficit by definition must match the difference between all U.S. savings and all U.S. investment. For many years, American taxpayers and businesses, all in, haven’t been saving nearly enough to fund the huge demand for our stocks and privately issued bonds, new factories and data centers, housing project and stakes in PE funds, and sundry other profit-spinning ventures. The reason: gigantic budget deficits expected to reach a staggering $1.9 trillion this year at the federal level. Uncle Sam is paying high rates to hoover up a huge share of America’s savings that would otherwise flow into private investments.
The U.S. shortage of savings to investment last year hit $971 billion, and it precisely equals the trade deficit in goods of $1.2 trillion, less our services surplus of roughly $300 billion. That savings less investment and the trade deficit must match is called an “identity” in economic jargon. (Services usually aren’t subject to tariffs, so it’s the duties on goods that are will reshape the economy moving ahead.) Why must the numbers equal out? Because foreign nations amassed net proceeds of $971 billion selling stuff to the U.S. in 2024. All that money is denominated in dollars, and those dollars are only good Stateside. Hence, foreigners send all that cash back across our borders to fund all the investments we can’t cover, mainly because such a big chunk of our savings go to funding the ravenous budget deficit.
Foreigners are willing to keep accumulating all those greenbacks because they richly prosper investing in the nation that’s generating the world’s highest returns. As a result, says economist Steve Hanke of Johns Hopkins, “The U.S. has been able to finance the difference between our low savings, driven by the budget deficit, and big investments because of our vibrancy, with relative ease.” The big inflows from abroad are a boon to America, he says, because they allow our citizens to spend a lot more than if we had to balance our own federal budget, and at the same time pour money into new factories, fabs, and transforming old-line family outfits into models of modern efficiency. “We have the reserve currency and biggest and best capital markets,” says Hanke. “If you can finance deficits with money from abroad, they can be a wonderful thing. They’re allowing America to consume much more than we produce.”
Hanke adds that Trump has gotten the trade issue topsy-turvy. “Trump can moan all he wants about foreigners causing our trade deficits,” says Hanke. “But they’re not caused by foreigners engaging in unfair practices. They’re homemade. Any country posting a savings-investment deficiency will post a trade deficit the same size.”
The upshot: Tariffs could lower imports, but unless the U.S. either saves a lot more or invests far less, the trade balance won’t change. In fact, the big legacy from the original Trump tariffs is just that: Exports to China dropped sharply, and overall export expansion lagged the rise in imports. But the trade deficit (including services) expanded 63% since 2019.
Fact 4: Tariffs will do little if anything to shrink the federal budget deficit
The independent, nonpartisan Tax Foundation estimates that tariffs, if enacted as currently planned, would raise around $300 billion in 2026. That’s big money, equivalent to about one-eighth of what the US collected in personal income taxes last year. The question is whether the downdraft on GDP would flatten or lower folks’ incomes to the point where less cash would flow to the Treasury in total than if U.S. didn’t resort to tariffs. Most likely, they’re a false panacea for our fiscal profligacy. For example, the Tax Foundation predicts that the Trump tariffs would shave around $2 trillion from where annual GDP would be without them by around the late 2020s. That drag on growth could easily reduce the growth in tax receipts by more than the tariffs would collect.
Besides, tariffs are widely regarded as a poor tool for raising revenue. “They don’t raise much money unless they’re really high,” says Rose. “And when they’re really high, that just encourages smuggling. Tariffs are a really inefficient means of taxation. In the past 70 years, the world has turned to income and VATs to fund their budgets. No large country uses tariffs.”
Fact 5: We’re not getting fleeced by conniving, protectionist trading partners
Trump’s view that America is getting unjustly skewered by nations that hobble our imports while profiting richly from America’s wide-open markets doesn’t align with the data. Of course, all of our trading partners impose some especially high charges or technical barriers to protect their favorite products. Canada, for example, deploys a “supply management” system to keep dairy prices high within its borders, a system that puts an effective limit on U.S. imports. But the U.S. harbors its own market-closing practices as well, including a quota system for sugar imports and barriers shielding many dairy products, including powdered milk.
But in general, of our major counterparts mainly embrace free trade just as ardently as we do—or as we used to. For example, pre-Trump and retaliation, the EU put an average charge of 1% on US imports, exactly the same toll we imposed on its exports. Last year, the bloc collected just $3 billion in tariffs on U.S.-made goods, less than half what we charged the EU.
Canada and Mexico both exact somewhat higher tariffs on the US than the other way around. The average rate on US goods entering Canada is 3.1%, compared to 2.0% for their products flowing south across our borders. We pay 5.2% to sell stuff in Mexico, 1.8 points more than we our take on goods crossing the Rio Grande. Closing these differences would greatly benefit our exporters. But they’re far too slight to justify a trade war—especially since the backlash from both nations could prove a killer for our producers whose fortunes rely heavily on sending the likes of heavy machinery, chemicals, and plastics to those countries.
Even China exacted just 2.7% on average pre-trade war, while the U.S. since the Trump bumps in 2018 and 2019 was squeezing 10% on imports from its giant rival, a toll he just doubled.
Look at what Trump’s announced, and assume he does all of it. Trump’s planning 25% across-the-board tariffs on Canada, Mexico, and the EU, except for a 10% charge on Canadian energy imports. He’s already doubled the rate on China to 20%. The charge on autos, steel, aluminum, and autos from around the globe, set at the familiar 25%, is already in place, and Trump promises the same rate on all cars, semiconductors, and pharmaceuticals. Lumber, copper, and ag products are also in his sights. This immense list covers an astounding $2.1 trillion in imports or around half the 2024 total of $4.1 trillion.
Today, the average tariff charged across all U.S. imports is 2.5%, about double the number before Trump imposed his first round in 2018 and the Biden administration kept most of those levies in place. Now the Tax Foundation estimates that on what’s already been announced, the norm will rise by over 11 points to 13.8%. The long-term cost, it forecasts, will be immense, amounting to a 0.55% reduction in annual GDP, about a one-eighth reduction in what the CBO views as our probable rate of expansion in the years ahead.
Someone may get rich from this trade war, but it’s not going to be America.