
沒有人確切知道林肯電氣(Lincoln Electric)最近一次裁員是什么時(shí)候,。首席執(zhí)行官克里斯托弗·梅普斯認(rèn)為是在20世紀(jì)50年代。副總裁阿曼達(dá)·巴特勒認(rèn)為是在20世紀(jì)40年代末,。文件顯示,,最近一次裁員時(shí)間不晚于1951年,可能早在1925年,。無(wú)論最近一次裁員何時(shí)發(fā)生,,如今林肯電氣的員工沒有人親眼目睹,甚至在最近一次裁員時(shí)都未出生,。
裁員是商業(yè)常態(tài),。根據(jù)美國(guó)勞工統(tǒng)計(jì)局(Bureau of Labor Statistics)的數(shù)據(jù),每月有超過100萬(wàn)美國(guó)員工被裁,。因此,,對(duì)于一家公司來(lái)說,在20世紀(jì)80年代初的通貨膨脹,、2000年至2001年的股市暴跌,、2008年至2009年的金融危機(jī)以及疫情期間都能避免裁員似乎是不合常理的。為了避免裁員,該公司必然要犧牲財(cái)務(wù)業(yè)績(jī),。誠(chéng)然,,該公司會(huì)向那些厭惡工作、到點(diǎn)下班的員工支付低于標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的工資(其不裁員政策必然會(huì)吸引這樣的員工),。
但事實(shí)恰恰相反,。根據(jù)1975年哈佛商學(xué)院關(guān)于林肯電氣的案例研究——哈佛商學(xué)院的一位發(fā)言人表示,這是該學(xué)院有史以來(lái)最暢銷的案例之一——林肯電氣競(jìng)爭(zhēng)激烈,,以至于它“促使幾家大公司[包括通用電氣(General Electric)]退出該行業(yè)”,。該公司去年的營(yíng)收為38億美元,是全球最大的弧焊設(shè)備和耗材生產(chǎn)商之一(有些競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手是私營(yíng)企業(yè),,不公布營(yíng)收),。據(jù)美國(guó)勞工統(tǒng)計(jì)局報(bào)告,其財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表顯示,,林肯電氣在克利夫蘭地區(qū)主要生產(chǎn)基地的生產(chǎn)人員的工資高于制造業(yè)平均水平,,約為每周1,075美元。值得注意的是,,作為一家老牌制造商,,林肯電氣并沒有成立工會(huì)。該公司成立于1895年,,于1995年上市,。從那時(shí)起,標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)上漲了740%,,而林肯電氣的股價(jià)則上漲了3834%,。
在過去的20年時(shí)間里,,美國(guó)制造業(yè)產(chǎn)出一直停滯不前,,但林肯電氣的營(yíng)收卻增長(zhǎng)了15倍。其他公司紛紛叫囂著學(xué)習(xí)林肯電氣的成功之道,,尤其是在經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退可能即將到來(lái),、裁員焦慮日益加劇的情況下,。但答案并不像其他雇主希望的那么簡(jiǎn)單。林肯電氣為了避免裁員,,遵循特有的,、有著幾十年歷史的制度,這一制度要求員工和公司在清醒的情況下做出犧牲,,各自向?qū)Ψ阶龀龀兄Z,,而這需要相互信任。這一制度在林肯文化中行之有效,,但很少有其他公司能夠成功實(shí)施,,甚至林肯電氣也不可能在所有業(yè)務(wù)中都執(zhí)行這一制度,。對(duì)于如今的雇主來(lái)說,該制度是更具創(chuàng)意的方案,,還是可望而不可及的解決方案,?
“計(jì)劃”
梅普斯說:“本周,我收到一封來(lái)自美國(guó)一家年收入略高于10億美元的制造公司的電子郵件,。該公司希望與我會(huì)面,,以了解我們的計(jì)劃。這種情況經(jīng)常發(fā)生,?!痹摴颈硎荆咳剿膫€(gè)月就會(huì)有一次,。
林肯電氣的制度在內(nèi)部被稱為“計(jì)劃”,,該制度既激進(jìn),又看起來(lái)不那么簡(jiǎn)單,。生產(chǎn)部門的員工同意讓林肯電氣根據(jù)客戶需求在一定范圍內(nèi)增加或減少工時(shí)(標(biāo)準(zhǔn)工作時(shí)間為每周40小時(shí)),。他們按件計(jì)酬,而不是按時(shí)計(jì)酬,,并根據(jù)每位員工的表現(xiàn)分配年終獎(jiǎng),。公司則承諾不會(huì)因?yàn)闃I(yè)務(wù)欠佳而解雇他們。
當(dāng)首席執(zhí)行官們與梅普斯會(huì)面了解更多情況時(shí),,他首先會(huì)問他們?yōu)槭裁匆捎昧挚想姎獾闹贫取H绻皇菫榱颂岣呱a(chǎn)率,,他說:“從根本上說,,這可能不足以成為其生存的基礎(chǔ)”。該制度令人印象深刻的結(jié)果,,只是其總體管理理念中最明顯的要素,。這種管理理念引導(dǎo)著該公司渡過順境和逆境,而來(lái)訪者通常并不了解這一全面戰(zhàn)略,。他告訴來(lái)訪者:“如果不了解這一點(diǎn),,從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看,你們可能無(wú)法在該計(jì)劃中保持韌性,。這將是一個(gè)曇花一現(xiàn)的計(jì)劃”,。
這一倡議所蘊(yùn)含的理念(詳盡闡述版)來(lái)自一個(gè)具有傳奇色彩的人物,詹姆斯·F·林肯,。他是創(chuàng)始人最小的弟弟,,在1914年到1975年期間掌管公司,之前從未管理過任何事務(wù),。他不太可能是米爾頓·弗里德曼,、伯尼·桑德斯和當(dāng)今最狂熱的利益相關(guān)主義傳道者的結(jié)合體,對(duì)工會(huì)、總統(tǒng)富蘭克林·羅斯福和大多數(shù)企業(yè)高管不屑一顧,。極具表演者天賦的他不遺余力地推廣焊接技術(shù),,曾贊助過一次征文比賽,并為獲勝者提供焊接鋼支票,。在那個(gè)銀行通過打孔來(lái)取消已付支票的年代,,林肯用沖鋒槍在焊接支票上打孔。
然而林肯認(rèn)為工廠工人受到了嚴(yán)重虐待,。他在《激勵(lì)管理》(Incentive Management)一書中寫道:“如果一個(gè)經(jīng)理在收入,、安全、晉升和尊嚴(yán)等問題上得到與小時(shí)工相同的待遇,,他很快就會(huì)明白管理的真正問題所在,。”1914年,,他成立了員工咨詢委員會(huì),,至今仍在運(yùn)作,并接受了該委員會(huì)提出的諸多建議,,包括減少工時(shí)和增加工資,。
該委員會(huì)制定了兩項(xiàng)至今仍然有效且對(duì)整個(gè)制度至關(guān)重要的變革性政策。第一項(xiàng)是1914年實(shí)行的計(jì)件工資制,,即按個(gè)人產(chǎn)出而不是按小時(shí)支付工人工資。即使在當(dāng)時(shí),,計(jì)件工資制也常常被認(rèn)為是野蠻,,且具有剝削性質(zhì)的政策,但林肯認(rèn)為,,只要管理得當(dāng),,計(jì)件工資制可以使工人和公司都受益。計(jì)件工資制必須做到公平,,這樣以合理的速度工作(在工人看來(lái))就能得到與計(jì)時(shí)工資(在該鎮(zhèn)從事同樣工作)大致相同的報(bào)酬,。至關(guān)重要的是,除非工作方式發(fā)生改變,,比如公司引進(jìn)更高效的機(jī)器,,否則單件工資也不會(huì)降低。這種制度激勵(lì)員工提高技能,,埋頭苦干,,這樣他們的收入就會(huì)比其他公司從事同樣工作的工人高得多。在林肯電氣位于克利夫蘭地區(qū)的工廠里,,大約有3,000名工人,,他們中的大多數(shù)人仍然按這種方式支付工資(少數(shù)人的工作與制造產(chǎn)品沒有直接關(guān)系,,如制作工具和模具,他們的工資按小時(shí)支付),。
第二項(xiàng)變革性政策于1934年實(shí)施,,即給當(dāng)時(shí)所有工廠工人發(fā)放年終獎(jiǎng)——這一概念簡(jiǎn)單明了,但極不尋常,,而且林肯電氣的做法也遠(yuǎn)非如此簡(jiǎn)單,。獎(jiǎng)金的豐厚程度令人驚嘆,通常相當(dāng)于基本工資的50%,,有時(shí)甚至更高,,在業(yè)績(jī)突出的年份甚至達(dá)到100%。這一比例由高管決定,,他們的獎(jiǎng)金來(lái)自另一個(gè)資金池,。去年是林肯電氣業(yè)績(jī)表現(xiàn)突出的一年,公司稱平均獎(jiǎng)金約為37,500美元,,相當(dāng)于普通員工55,970美元基本年薪的67%,。總薪酬達(dá)到93,470美元,。
但獎(jiǎng)金并不是平均分配的,。主管每年兩次根據(jù)產(chǎn)出、質(zhì)量,、可靠性和合作情況對(duì)每位員工進(jìn)行評(píng)分,,決定每位員工應(yīng)得的份額。這些評(píng)分按鐘形曲線分布,,即平均值必須為100分,。每有一名員工被評(píng)為110分,就必須有其他員工被評(píng)為90分,。梅普斯說:“你不能說'我們都是領(lǐng)頭羊'?!币虼?,獎(jiǎng)金會(huì)相應(yīng)地進(jìn)行分配。
這一獎(jiǎng)金制度的實(shí)施效果令詹姆斯·林肯以外的所有人都感到震驚,。在1934年采用該制度后的10年中,,他幾乎每年都提高獎(jiǎng)金總額在基本工資中所占的比例,直到第二次世界大戰(zhàn)期間提高到基本工資的100%以上,。在此期間,,包括獎(jiǎng)金在內(nèi),每位員工的年均總薪酬增長(zhǎng)了170%,。該公司認(rèn)為,,在20世紀(jì)40年代中期,,它支付的制造業(yè)工資是世界上最高的。它之所以能夠負(fù)擔(dān)得起這樣做,,是因?yàn)槊课粏T工的美元產(chǎn)出也驚人地增加了170%,,利潤(rùn)飆升。
這些結(jié)果表明,,林肯找到了一個(gè)更好的辦法,,但他希望保守這個(gè)秘密。他會(huì)大致描述實(shí)施的制度,,但對(duì)那些令人瞠目的數(shù)字嚴(yán)加保密,,直到1944年《財(cái)富》雜志在一篇文章中披露了這些數(shù)字。林肯電氣很快成為佼佼者,。哈佛商學(xué)院在1948年撰寫了一篇關(guān)于該公司的案例研究,,這是眾多案例研究的開山之作。
公司在沒有實(shí)施不裁員政策的情況下取得了這些成就,,但林肯最終得出結(jié)論,,正如他在《激勵(lì)管理》一書中所寫的那樣,“持續(xù)就業(yè)”是實(shí)現(xiàn)“工業(yè)效率最大化”的關(guān)鍵,。工廠工人經(jīng)常擔(dān)心,,如果他們的生產(chǎn)力過高,有些人就會(huì)失去工作,;生產(chǎn)力的提高意味著實(shí)現(xiàn)同樣的產(chǎn)出所需的工人數(shù)量減少,,因此有些人會(huì)被解雇。但如果他們知道自己的工作有保障,,林肯推斷,,他們會(huì)接受新方法和技術(shù)。林肯公司于1951年試行了“保證持續(xù)雇傭計(jì)劃”,,并于1958年成為公司的正式政策,,該計(jì)劃將涵蓋成功通過試用期的所有員工(目前的試用期為三年)。
巨大的代價(jià)
不裁員政策有很大的局限性,。
該制度涵蓋了俄亥俄州東北部的多家工廠(最初是為這些工廠制定的),,但無(wú)法在林肯電氣最近擴(kuò)張的工廠實(shí)施,特別是在國(guó)際市場(chǎng)(大多數(shù)員工目前工作的地方),。在這其中的許多市場(chǎng),,尤其是歐洲和南美,該制度的某些要素可能違反當(dāng)?shù)胤苫蚍ㄒ?guī),。例如,,荷蘭對(duì)績(jī)效薪酬施加了限制。在委內(nèi)瑞拉,,該公司不能采用計(jì)件工資制或酌情發(fā)放獎(jiǎng)金,。
理論上講,,在某些地方,如果沒有實(shí)施全套制度,,裁員是有可能發(fā)生的,,但是否發(fā)生過裁員則關(guān)乎如何定義裁員。林肯電氣的部分增長(zhǎng)是通過收購(gòu)實(shí)現(xiàn)的,,過去也曾在這些公司實(shí)施裁員,,包括 2017 年在法國(guó)液化空氣集團(tuán)(Air Liquide)的焊接業(yè)務(wù)部門實(shí)施裁員。在林肯看來(lái),,這并不是因?yàn)槟繕?biāo)公司人浮于事而裁員,。這是在解決前任雇主的問題。但林肯電氣近年來(lái)也對(duì)其歐洲業(yè)務(wù)進(jìn)行了重組,,關(guān)閉了一些工廠,,以便將業(yè)務(wù)轉(zhuǎn)移到其他地方。大多數(shù)人會(huì)稱之為裁員,,這就帶來(lái)了另一大局限性,。詹姆斯·林肯承諾不會(huì)因?yàn)闃I(yè)務(wù)欠佳而裁減生產(chǎn)人員,卻沒有提及其他潛在原因,。林肯電氣在其原有的美國(guó)業(yè)務(wù)中避免了以任何理由進(jìn)行裁員,,但在那些阻礙全面實(shí)施該計(jì)劃的地方,詹姆斯·林肯的承諾就變得模棱兩可了,。
一位發(fā)言人表示,,無(wú)論公司在哪里運(yùn)營(yíng),林肯都會(huì)使用當(dāng)?shù)卦试S的激勵(lì)機(jī)制要素,,比如某種浮動(dòng)獎(jiǎng)金,。盡管如此,梅普斯說:“如果我能在林肯電氣的每個(gè)工廠都實(shí)施這項(xiàng)計(jì)劃,,我會(huì)這么做的,。”
這一計(jì)劃的實(shí)施并不依賴于魔法,。工人要為工作得到保障付出代價(jià),。焊接業(yè)務(wù)時(shí)好時(shí)壞,在經(jīng)濟(jì)低迷時(shí)期,,該公司可以將工人的工作時(shí)間減少到每周標(biāo)準(zhǔn)工作時(shí)間的75%(30小時(shí))。在經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮時(shí)期,,工人必須接受加班以滿足需求,,但他們的工資也會(huì)增加。無(wú)論哪種情況,,員工得到的好處都是工作有保障,。
對(duì)該公司來(lái)說,,好處是它可以比大多數(shù)雇主更容易、更迅速地即時(shí)調(diào)整產(chǎn)量和勞動(dòng)力成本,。梅普斯說:“我們的團(tuán)隊(duì)每天都在車間進(jìn)行調(diào)整,。“我們能夠靈活調(diào)整看似固定的成本,,并在每日輪班的基礎(chǔ)上使其更具靈活多變性,,這為我們帶來(lái)了巨大的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)?!?/p>
當(dāng)2020年疫情爆發(fā)時(shí),,對(duì)工業(yè)設(shè)備的需求驟減,美國(guó)的失業(yè)率在數(shù)周內(nèi)從3.5%飆升至14.7%,?!坝卸嗌俟驹诳吹叫枨笙陆禃r(shí)迅速做出決定(將勞動(dòng)力視為固定成本),進(jìn)行裁員,,并關(guān)閉工廠,?”梅普斯問道?!拔覀儧]有這樣做,。”相反,,正如梅普斯所說,,公司“撬動(dòng)了杠桿”,減少了工作時(shí)間,,為員工提供了數(shù)周的無(wú)薪自愿休假,,并將受到嚴(yán)重打擊的業(yè)務(wù)部門的交叉培訓(xùn)工人調(diào)往需求更旺盛的地區(qū)。當(dāng)需求以比預(yù)期更快的速度反彈時(shí),,這一決定得到了回報(bào),。該公司表示,在所有人齊心協(xié)力的情況下,,該公司可以在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手無(wú)法交付產(chǎn)品時(shí)交付產(chǎn)品,。該公司總就業(yè)人數(shù)在2020年下降了不到3%,主要是由于自然流失和員工自愿離職,,然后在2021年出現(xiàn)反彈,。
埋頭苦干以獲得報(bào)酬
林肯電氣在俄亥俄州歐幾里得的90號(hào)州際公路旁有一家生產(chǎn)焊機(jī)的大型工廠,占地34英畝,。沿著高速公路開一小段路,,另一家林肯工廠大量生產(chǎn)焊絲,這些焊絲在焊槍6500度的電弧中熔化,有助于熔化金屬件,。機(jī)器每天生產(chǎn)約35,000英里的焊絲,,足夠繞地球1.4圈。
現(xiàn)年50歲的馬龍·巴恩斯在林肯電氣工作了兩年,,是機(jī)械廠的一名裝配工,。他說:“很長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)間以來(lái),我一直想來(lái)林肯電氣工作,。我之前的工作都是在餐館,。這里的壓力要小得多?!?/p>
去年12月,,他拿到了第一筆全年獎(jiǎng)金。他說:“我盡量不去想獎(jiǎng)金會(huì)有多少,。當(dāng)我看到獎(jiǎng)金時(shí),,我震驚了?!庇卸嗌??“3萬(wàn)美元多一點(diǎn)?!笨紤]到林肯電氣的計(jì)件工資制度,,我問他,和他交談是否會(huì)讓他的工資減少,。他沒有說不會(huì),。他說:“沒關(guān)系?!?/p>
負(fù)責(zé)克利夫蘭業(yè)務(wù)的副總裁埃德·克勞斯后來(lái)告訴我,,沒有人的工作日程安排會(huì)緊張到不能交談幾分鐘。但是,,毫無(wú)疑問,,離開工作崗位意味著產(chǎn)量減少,從而也意味著工資減少,。在最近的一次員工咨詢委員會(huì)會(huì)議(每四至六周舉行一次)上,,一些員工抱怨說,餐廳里的一臺(tái)微波爐壞了,,耽誤了他們的工作時(shí)間,,降低了生產(chǎn)速度。公司很快又購(gòu)買了一臺(tái)微波爐,。
52歲的比爾·瓦格納是一名卷線工,,他從海軍退役后加入林肯電氣,已經(jīng)在這里工作了30年。他承認(rèn):“我們埋頭苦干,。但是,如果你想獲得高薪,,就必須埋頭苦干,。我試著告訴年輕員工,你需要磨練,。你不能只經(jīng)受一次,。你需要一直經(jīng)受磨練?!北葼栒f他喜歡這份工作,,并希望再干10年。
即使有不裁員政策,,也不是每個(gè)人都適合在林肯電氣工作,。在Glassdoor、Indeed或其他求職網(wǎng)站上查看員工對(duì)該公司的評(píng)價(jià),,你會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)很多批評(píng)意見,。林肯電氣的支持者喜歡高薪和工作有保障,而批評(píng)者則不喜歡工作時(shí)間的不確定性,,而且可能會(huì)覺得他們的主管在給員工評(píng)分時(shí)厚此薄彼,。
不裁員政策會(huì)持續(xù)下去嗎?林肯電氣并沒有保證會(huì)持續(xù)實(shí)施該政策,。相反,,該公司在其美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)年度報(bào)告中指出,“當(dāng)公司繼續(xù)正常運(yùn)營(yíng)的能力受到不可抵抗力的嚴(yán)重限制時(shí),,‘保證持續(xù)雇傭計(jì)劃’就無(wú)法繼續(xù)實(shí)施下去,。”此外,,該公司可以在年底無(wú)理由終止該計(jì)劃,,但需提前六個(gè)月通知員工。
寶貴的藝術(shù)品
更大的問題是,,為什么其他雇主不效仿林肯電氣的計(jì)劃,。梅普斯說他經(jīng)常被問到這個(gè)問題?!拔抑皇遣恢榔渌臼欠裼心芰υ谄錁I(yè)務(wù)中建立這種程度的信心,。”他指的是員工的信心,,即他們會(huì)得到公正的評(píng)價(jià),,獲得獎(jiǎng)金,并避免被裁。相比之下,,梅普斯說,,林肯電氣有“90年的計(jì)劃實(shí)施經(jīng)驗(yàn)”。據(jù)林肯電氣所知,,沒有一家公司引進(jìn)了全套計(jì)劃,。
自詹姆斯·林肯時(shí)代以來(lái),世界已經(jīng)發(fā)生了變化,。該公司表示,,其人員流動(dòng)率低于行業(yè)平均水平,但遠(yuǎn)高于過去,。該公司不愿透露其人員流動(dòng)率,。在20世紀(jì)60年代,每月的人員流動(dòng)率不到1%,。公司高管認(rèn)為,,一些新員工對(duì)拿到獎(jiǎng)金沒有信心,或者只是不想等到年底,,所以他們離職去找底薪更高的工作,。在勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)緊張的今天,這樣的工作很容易找到,。
也許持續(xù)雇傭計(jì)劃已經(jīng)成為一件寶貴的藝術(shù)品,,一件只有在很久以前才能創(chuàng)造出的令人欽佩的作品。也許再也不會(huì)有其他雇主效仿了,。也許有一天,,就連林肯電氣也不得不放棄它。但就目前而言,,作為一個(gè)獨(dú)有的,,也許是不可復(fù)制的制度的一部分,詹姆斯·林肯的計(jì)劃仍能起到事半功倍的效果,。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:中慧言-王芳
沒有人確切知道林肯電氣(Lincoln Electric)最近一次裁員是什么時(shí)候,。首席執(zhí)行官克里斯托弗·梅普斯認(rèn)為是在20世紀(jì)50年代。副總裁阿曼達(dá)·巴特勒認(rèn)為是在20世紀(jì)40年代末,。文件顯示,,最近一次裁員時(shí)間不晚于1951年,可能早在1925年,。無(wú)論最近一次裁員何時(shí)發(fā)生,,如今林肯電氣的員工沒有人親眼目睹,甚至在最近一次裁員時(shí)都未出生,。
裁員是商業(yè)常態(tài),。根據(jù)美國(guó)勞工統(tǒng)計(jì)局(Bureau of Labor Statistics)的數(shù)據(jù),,每月有超過100萬(wàn)美國(guó)員工被裁。因此,,對(duì)于一家公司來(lái)說,,在20世紀(jì)80年代初的通貨膨脹、2000年至2001年的股市暴跌,、2008年至2009年的金融危機(jī)以及疫情期間都能避免裁員似乎是不合常理的,。為了避免裁員,該公司必然要犧牲財(cái)務(wù)業(yè)績(jī),。誠(chéng)然,該公司會(huì)向那些厭惡工作,、到點(diǎn)下班的員工支付低于標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的工資(其不裁員政策必然會(huì)吸引這樣的員工),。
但事實(shí)恰恰相反。根據(jù)1975年哈佛商學(xué)院關(guān)于林肯電氣的案例研究——哈佛商學(xué)院的一位發(fā)言人表示,,這是該學(xué)院有史以來(lái)最暢銷的案例之一——林肯電氣競(jìng)爭(zhēng)激烈,,以至于它“促使幾家大公司[包括通用電氣(General Electric)]退出該行業(yè)”。該公司去年的營(yíng)收為38億美元,,是全球最大的弧焊設(shè)備和耗材生產(chǎn)商之一(有些競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手是私營(yíng)企業(yè),,不公布營(yíng)收)。據(jù)美國(guó)勞工統(tǒng)計(jì)局報(bào)告,,其財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表顯示,,林肯電氣在克利夫蘭地區(qū)主要生產(chǎn)基地的生產(chǎn)人員的工資高于制造業(yè)平均水平,約為每周1,075美元,。值得注意的是,,作為一家老牌制造商,林肯電氣并沒有成立工會(huì),。該公司成立于1895年,,于1995年上市。從那時(shí)起,,標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)上漲了740%,,而林肯電氣的股價(jià)則上漲了3834%。
在過去的20年時(shí)間里,,美國(guó)制造業(yè)產(chǎn)出一直停滯不前,,但林肯電氣的營(yíng)收卻增長(zhǎng)了15倍。其他公司紛紛叫囂著學(xué)習(xí)林肯電氣的成功之道,,尤其是在經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退可能即將到來(lái),、裁員焦慮日益加劇的情況下。但答案并不像其他雇主希望的那么簡(jiǎn)單,。林肯電氣為了避免裁員,,遵循特有的,、有著幾十年歷史的制度,這一制度要求員工和公司在清醒的情況下做出犧牲,,各自向?qū)Ψ阶龀龀兄Z,,而這需要相互信任。這一制度在林肯文化中行之有效,,但很少有其他公司能夠成功實(shí)施,,甚至林肯電氣也不可能在所有業(yè)務(wù)中都執(zhí)行這一制度。對(duì)于如今的雇主來(lái)說,,該制度是更具創(chuàng)意的方案,,還是可望而不可及的解決方案?
“計(jì)劃”
梅普斯說:“本周,,我收到一封來(lái)自美國(guó)一家年收入略高于10億美元的制造公司的電子郵件,。該公司希望與我會(huì)面,以了解我們的計(jì)劃,。這種情況經(jīng)常發(fā)生,。”該公司表示,,每三到四個(gè)月就會(huì)有一次,。
林肯電氣的制度在內(nèi)部被稱為“計(jì)劃”,該制度既激進(jìn),,又看起來(lái)不那么簡(jiǎn)單,。生產(chǎn)部門的員工同意讓林肯電氣根據(jù)客戶需求在一定范圍內(nèi)增加或減少工時(shí)(標(biāo)準(zhǔn)工作時(shí)間為每周40小時(shí))。他們按件計(jì)酬,,而不是按時(shí)計(jì)酬,,并根據(jù)每位員工的表現(xiàn)分配年終獎(jiǎng)。公司則承諾不會(huì)因?yàn)闃I(yè)務(wù)欠佳而解雇他們,。
當(dāng)首席執(zhí)行官們與梅普斯會(huì)面了解更多情況時(shí),,他首先會(huì)問他們?yōu)槭裁匆捎昧挚想姎獾闹贫取H绻皇菫榱颂岣呱a(chǎn)率,,他說:“從根本上說,,這可能不足以成為其生存的基礎(chǔ)”。該制度令人印象深刻的結(jié)果,,只是其總體管理理念中最明顯的要素,。這種管理理念引導(dǎo)著該公司渡過順境和逆境,而來(lái)訪者通常并不了解這一全面戰(zhàn)略,。他告訴來(lái)訪者:“如果不了解這一點(diǎn),,從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看,你們可能無(wú)法在該計(jì)劃中保持韌性,。這將是一個(gè)曇花一現(xiàn)的計(jì)劃”,。
這一倡議所蘊(yùn)含的理念(詳盡闡述版)來(lái)自一個(gè)具有傳奇色彩的人物,,詹姆斯·F·林肯。他是創(chuàng)始人最小的弟弟,,在1914年到1975年期間掌管公司,,之前從未管理過任何事務(wù)。他不太可能是米爾頓·弗里德曼,、伯尼·桑德斯和當(dāng)今最狂熱的利益相關(guān)主義傳道者的結(jié)合體,,對(duì)工會(huì)、總統(tǒng)富蘭克林·羅斯福和大多數(shù)企業(yè)高管不屑一顧,。極具表演者天賦的他不遺余力地推廣焊接技術(shù),,曾贊助過一次征文比賽,并為獲勝者提供焊接鋼支票,。在那個(gè)銀行通過打孔來(lái)取消已付支票的年代,,林肯用沖鋒槍在焊接支票上打孔。
然而林肯認(rèn)為工廠工人受到了嚴(yán)重虐待,。他在《激勵(lì)管理》(Incentive Management)一書中寫道:“如果一個(gè)經(jīng)理在收入、安全,、晉升和尊嚴(yán)等問題上得到與小時(shí)工相同的待遇,,他很快就會(huì)明白管理的真正問題所在?!?914年,,他成立了員工咨詢委員會(huì),至今仍在運(yùn)作,,并接受了該委員會(huì)提出的諸多建議,,包括減少工時(shí)和增加工資。
該委員會(huì)制定了兩項(xiàng)至今仍然有效且對(duì)整個(gè)制度至關(guān)重要的變革性政策,。第一項(xiàng)是1914年實(shí)行的計(jì)件工資制,,即按個(gè)人產(chǎn)出而不是按小時(shí)支付工人工資。即使在當(dāng)時(shí),,計(jì)件工資制也常常被認(rèn)為是野蠻,,且具有剝削性質(zhì)的政策,但林肯認(rèn)為,,只要管理得當(dāng),,計(jì)件工資制可以使工人和公司都受益。計(jì)件工資制必須做到公平,,這樣以合理的速度工作(在工人看來(lái))就能得到與計(jì)時(shí)工資(在該鎮(zhèn)從事同樣工作)大致相同的報(bào)酬,。至關(guān)重要的是,除非工作方式發(fā)生改變,,比如公司引進(jìn)更高效的機(jī)器,,否則單件工資也不會(huì)降低,。這種制度激勵(lì)員工提高技能,埋頭苦干,,這樣他們的收入就會(huì)比其他公司從事同樣工作的工人高得多,。在林肯電氣位于克利夫蘭地區(qū)的工廠里,大約有3,000名工人,,他們中的大多數(shù)人仍然按這種方式支付工資(少數(shù)人的工作與制造產(chǎn)品沒有直接關(guān)系,,如制作工具和模具,他們的工資按小時(shí)支付),。
第二項(xiàng)變革性政策于1934年實(shí)施,,即給當(dāng)時(shí)所有工廠工人發(fā)放年終獎(jiǎng)——這一概念簡(jiǎn)單明了,但極不尋常,,而且林肯電氣的做法也遠(yuǎn)非如此簡(jiǎn)單,。獎(jiǎng)金的豐厚程度令人驚嘆,通常相當(dāng)于基本工資的50%,,有時(shí)甚至更高,,在業(yè)績(jī)突出的年份甚至達(dá)到100%。這一比例由高管決定,,他們的獎(jiǎng)金來(lái)自另一個(gè)資金池,。去年是林肯電氣業(yè)績(jī)表現(xiàn)突出的一年,公司稱平均獎(jiǎng)金約為37,500美元,,相當(dāng)于普通員工55,970美元基本年薪的67%,。總薪酬達(dá)到93,470美元,。
但獎(jiǎng)金并不是平均分配的,。主管每年兩次根據(jù)產(chǎn)出、質(zhì)量,、可靠性和合作情況對(duì)每位員工進(jìn)行評(píng)分,,決定每位員工應(yīng)得的份額。這些評(píng)分按鐘形曲線分布,,即平均值必須為100分,。每有一名員工被評(píng)為110分,就必須有其他員工被評(píng)為90分,。梅普斯說:“你不能說'我們都是領(lǐng)頭羊',。”因此,,獎(jiǎng)金會(huì)相應(yīng)地進(jìn)行分配,。
這一獎(jiǎng)金制度的實(shí)施效果令詹姆斯·林肯以外的所有人都感到震驚。在1934年采用該制度后的10年中,,他幾乎每年都提高獎(jiǎng)金總額在基本工資中所占的比例,,直到第二次世界大戰(zhàn)期間提高到基本工資的100%以上,。在此期間,包括獎(jiǎng)金在內(nèi),,每位員工的年均總薪酬增長(zhǎng)了170%,。該公司認(rèn)為,在20世紀(jì)40年代中期,,它支付的制造業(yè)工資是世界上最高的,。它之所以能夠負(fù)擔(dān)得起這樣做,是因?yàn)槊课粏T工的美元產(chǎn)出也驚人地增加了170%,,利潤(rùn)飆升,。
這些結(jié)果表明,林肯找到了一個(gè)更好的辦法,,但他希望保守這個(gè)秘密,。他會(huì)大致描述實(shí)施的制度,但對(duì)那些令人瞠目的數(shù)字嚴(yán)加保密,,直到1944年《財(cái)富》雜志在一篇文章中披露了這些數(shù)字,。林肯電氣很快成為佼佼者。哈佛商學(xué)院在1948年撰寫了一篇關(guān)于該公司的案例研究,,這是眾多案例研究的開山之作,。
公司在沒有實(shí)施不裁員政策的情況下取得了這些成就,但林肯最終得出結(jié)論,,正如他在《激勵(lì)管理》一書中所寫的那樣,,“持續(xù)就業(yè)”是實(shí)現(xiàn)“工業(yè)效率最大化”的關(guān)鍵,。工廠工人經(jīng)常擔(dān)心,,如果他們的生產(chǎn)力過高,有些人就會(huì)失去工作,;生產(chǎn)力的提高意味著實(shí)現(xiàn)同樣的產(chǎn)出所需的工人數(shù)量減少,,因此有些人會(huì)被解雇。但如果他們知道自己的工作有保障,,林肯推斷,,他們會(huì)接受新方法和技術(shù)。林肯公司于1951年試行了“保證持續(xù)雇傭計(jì)劃”,,并于1958年成為公司的正式政策,,該計(jì)劃將涵蓋成功通過試用期的所有員工(目前的試用期為三年)。
巨大的代價(jià)
不裁員政策有很大的局限性,。
該制度涵蓋了俄亥俄州東北部的多家工廠(最初是為這些工廠制定的),,但無(wú)法在林肯電氣最近擴(kuò)張的工廠實(shí)施,特別是在國(guó)際市場(chǎng)(大多數(shù)員工目前工作的地方),。在這其中的許多市場(chǎng),,尤其是歐洲和南美,,該制度的某些要素可能違反當(dāng)?shù)胤苫蚍ㄒ?guī)。例如,,荷蘭對(duì)績(jī)效薪酬施加了限制,。在委內(nèi)瑞拉,該公司不能采用計(jì)件工資制或酌情發(fā)放獎(jiǎng)金,。
理論上講,,在某些地方,如果沒有實(shí)施全套制度,,裁員是有可能發(fā)生的,,但是否發(fā)生過裁員則關(guān)乎如何定義裁員。林肯電氣的部分增長(zhǎng)是通過收購(gòu)實(shí)現(xiàn)的,,過去也曾在這些公司實(shí)施裁員,,包括 2017 年在法國(guó)液化空氣集團(tuán)(Air Liquide)的焊接業(yè)務(wù)部門實(shí)施裁員。在林肯看來(lái),,這并不是因?yàn)槟繕?biāo)公司人浮于事而裁員,。這是在解決前任雇主的問題。但林肯電氣近年來(lái)也對(duì)其歐洲業(yè)務(wù)進(jìn)行了重組,,關(guān)閉了一些工廠,,以便將業(yè)務(wù)轉(zhuǎn)移到其他地方。大多數(shù)人會(huì)稱之為裁員,,這就帶來(lái)了另一大局限性,。詹姆斯·林肯承諾不會(huì)因?yàn)闃I(yè)務(wù)欠佳而裁減生產(chǎn)人員,卻沒有提及其他潛在原因,。林肯電氣在其原有的美國(guó)業(yè)務(wù)中避免了以任何理由進(jìn)行裁員,,但在那些阻礙全面實(shí)施該計(jì)劃的地方,詹姆斯·林肯的承諾就變得模棱兩可了,。
一位發(fā)言人表示,,無(wú)論公司在哪里運(yùn)營(yíng),林肯都會(huì)使用當(dāng)?shù)卦试S的激勵(lì)機(jī)制要素,,比如某種浮動(dòng)獎(jiǎng)金,。盡管如此,梅普斯說:“如果我能在林肯電氣的每個(gè)工廠都實(shí)施這項(xiàng)計(jì)劃,,我會(huì)這么做的,。”
這一計(jì)劃的實(shí)施并不依賴于魔法,。工人要為工作得到保障付出代價(jià),。焊接業(yè)務(wù)時(shí)好時(shí)壞,在經(jīng)濟(jì)低迷時(shí)期,該公司可以將工人的工作時(shí)間減少到每周標(biāo)準(zhǔn)工作時(shí)間的75%(30小時(shí)),。在經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮時(shí)期,,工人必須接受加班以滿足需求,但他們的工資也會(huì)增加,。無(wú)論哪種情況,,員工得到的好處都是工作有保障。
對(duì)該公司來(lái)說,,好處是它可以比大多數(shù)雇主更容易,、更迅速地即時(shí)調(diào)整產(chǎn)量和勞動(dòng)力成本。梅普斯說:“我們的團(tuán)隊(duì)每天都在車間進(jìn)行調(diào)整,?!拔覀兡軌蜢`活調(diào)整看似固定的成本,并在每日輪班的基礎(chǔ)上使其更具靈活多變性,,這為我們帶來(lái)了巨大的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì),。”
當(dāng)2020年疫情爆發(fā)時(shí),,對(duì)工業(yè)設(shè)備的需求驟減,,美國(guó)的失業(yè)率在數(shù)周內(nèi)從3.5%飆升至14.7%?!坝卸嗌俟驹诳吹叫枨笙陆禃r(shí)迅速做出決定(將勞動(dòng)力視為固定成本),,進(jìn)行裁員,并關(guān)閉工廠,?”梅普斯問道,。“我們沒有這樣做,?!毕喾矗缑菲账顾f,,公司“撬動(dòng)了杠桿”,,減少了工作時(shí)間,,為員工提供了數(shù)周的無(wú)薪自愿休假,,并將受到嚴(yán)重打擊的業(yè)務(wù)部門的交叉培訓(xùn)工人調(diào)往需求更旺盛的地區(qū)。當(dāng)需求以比預(yù)期更快的速度反彈時(shí),,這一決定得到了回報(bào),。該公司表示,在所有人齊心協(xié)力的情況下,,該公司可以在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手無(wú)法交付產(chǎn)品時(shí)交付產(chǎn)品,。該公司總就業(yè)人數(shù)在2020年下降了不到3%,主要是由于自然流失和員工自愿離職,然后在2021年出現(xiàn)反彈,。
埋頭苦干以獲得報(bào)酬
林肯電氣在俄亥俄州歐幾里得的90號(hào)州際公路旁有一家生產(chǎn)焊機(jī)的大型工廠,,占地34英畝。沿著高速公路開一小段路,,另一家林肯工廠大量生產(chǎn)焊絲,,這些焊絲在焊槍6500度的電弧中熔化,有助于熔化金屬件,。機(jī)器每天生產(chǎn)約35,000英里的焊絲,,足夠繞地球1.4圈。
現(xiàn)年50歲的馬龍·巴恩斯在林肯電氣工作了兩年,,是機(jī)械廠的一名裝配工,。他說:“很長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)間以來(lái),我一直想來(lái)林肯電氣工作,。我之前的工作都是在餐館,。這里的壓力要小得多?!?/p>
去年12月,,他拿到了第一筆全年獎(jiǎng)金。他說:“我盡量不去想獎(jiǎng)金會(huì)有多少,。當(dāng)我看到獎(jiǎng)金時(shí),,我震驚了?!庇卸嗌??“3萬(wàn)美元多一點(diǎn)?!笨紤]到林肯電氣的計(jì)件工資制度,,我問他,和他交談是否會(huì)讓他的工資減少,。他沒有說不會(huì),。他說:“沒關(guān)系?!?/p>
負(fù)責(zé)克利夫蘭業(yè)務(wù)的副總裁埃德·克勞斯后來(lái)告訴我,,沒有人的工作日程安排會(huì)緊張到不能交談幾分鐘。但是,,毫無(wú)疑問,,離開工作崗位意味著產(chǎn)量減少,從而也意味著工資減少,。在最近的一次員工咨詢委員會(huì)會(huì)議(每四至六周舉行一次)上,,一些員工抱怨說,餐廳里的一臺(tái)微波爐壞了,耽誤了他們的工作時(shí)間,,降低了生產(chǎn)速度,。公司很快又購(gòu)買了一臺(tái)微波爐。
52歲的比爾·瓦格納是一名卷線工,,他從海軍退役后加入林肯電氣,,已經(jīng)在這里工作了30年。他承認(rèn):“我們埋頭苦干,。但是,,如果你想獲得高薪,,就必須埋頭苦干,。我試著告訴年輕員工,你需要磨練,。你不能只經(jīng)受一次,。你需要一直經(jīng)受磨練?!北葼栒f他喜歡這份工作,,并希望再干10年。
即使有不裁員政策,,也不是每個(gè)人都適合在林肯電氣工作,。在Glassdoor、Indeed或其他求職網(wǎng)站上查看員工對(duì)該公司的評(píng)價(jià),,你會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)很多批評(píng)意見,。林肯電氣的支持者喜歡高薪和工作有保障,而批評(píng)者則不喜歡工作時(shí)間的不確定性,,而且可能會(huì)覺得他們的主管在給員工評(píng)分時(shí)厚此薄彼,。
不裁員政策會(huì)持續(xù)下去嗎?林肯電氣并沒有保證會(huì)持續(xù)實(shí)施該政策,。相反,,該公司在其美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)年度報(bào)告中指出,“當(dāng)公司繼續(xù)正常運(yùn)營(yíng)的能力受到不可抵抗力的嚴(yán)重限制時(shí),,‘保證持續(xù)雇傭計(jì)劃’就無(wú)法繼續(xù)實(shí)施下去,。”此外,,該公司可以在年底無(wú)理由終止該計(jì)劃,,但需提前六個(gè)月通知員工,。
寶貴的藝術(shù)品
更大的問題是,,為什么其他雇主不效仿林肯電氣的計(jì)劃。梅普斯說他經(jīng)常被問到這個(gè)問題?!拔抑皇遣恢榔渌臼欠裼心芰υ谄錁I(yè)務(wù)中建立這種程度的信心,。”他指的是員工的信心,,即他們會(huì)得到公正的評(píng)價(jià),,獲得獎(jiǎng)金,并避免被裁,。相比之下,,梅普斯說,林肯電氣有“90年的計(jì)劃實(shí)施經(jīng)驗(yàn)”,。據(jù)林肯電氣所知,,沒有一家公司引進(jìn)了全套計(jì)劃。
自詹姆斯·林肯時(shí)代以來(lái),,世界已經(jīng)發(fā)生了變化,。該公司表示,其人員流動(dòng)率低于行業(yè)平均水平,,但遠(yuǎn)高于過去,。該公司不愿透露其人員流動(dòng)率。在20世紀(jì)60年代,,每月的人員流動(dòng)率不到1%,。公司高管認(rèn)為,一些新員工對(duì)拿到獎(jiǎng)金沒有信心,,或者只是不想等到年底,,所以他們離職去找底薪更高的工作。在勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)緊張的今天,,這樣的工作很容易找到,。
也許持續(xù)雇傭計(jì)劃已經(jīng)成為一件寶貴的藝術(shù)品,一件只有在很久以前才能創(chuàng)造出的令人欽佩的作品,。也許再也不會(huì)有其他雇主效仿了,。也許有一天,就連林肯電氣也不得不放棄它,。但就目前而言,,作為一個(gè)獨(dú)有的,也許是不可復(fù)制的制度的一部分,,詹姆斯·林肯的計(jì)劃仍能起到事半功倍的效果,。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:中慧言-王芳
No one is sure when Lincoln Electric had its most recent layoff. CEO Christopher Mapes thinks it was in the 1950s. Vice president Amanda Butler believes it was the late 1940s. Documents suggest it was no later than 1951 and could have been as long as 1925. Whenever it was, no one at Lincoln Electric today was there to witness it, or maybe even alive when it happened.
Layoffs are a fact of business life. Over 1 million U.S. workers lose their jobs that way every month, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. So for a company to avoid layoffs through the towering inflation of the early 1980s, the stock market plunge of 2000-2001, the Great Financial Crisis of 2008-2009, and the pandemic seems abnormal. To avoid layoffs, surely such a company must sacrifice financial performance. Surely it pays substandard wages to work-averse, clock-watching employees its no-layoffs policy must attract.
But the reality is just the opposite. Lincoln Electric is ferociously competitive, so much so that it “encouraged the exit of several major companies (including General Electric) from the industry,” according to a 1975 Harvard Business School case study on Lincoln—one of the best-selling cases the school has ever produced, says an HBS spokesperson. The company, which reported revenue of $3.8 billion last year, is among the world’s largest producers of arc welding equipment and supplies (some competitors are privately held and don’t publish revenues). Financial statements show that Lincoln’s production employees at its primary manufacturing sites in the Cleveland area receive pay above the manufacturing industry average—around $1,075 a week, as the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported. And remarkably, for an old manufacturer, Lincoln Electric isn’t unionized. Founded in 1895, the company went public in 1995. Since then, the S&P 500 is up 740%, while Lincoln Electric stock is up 3,834%.
U.S. manufacturing output has stagnated over the past 20 years, but Lincoln’s revenue has grown 15-fold. Other companies clamor to learn how Lincoln does it, especially as layoff anxiety mounts with a recession perhaps on the horizon. But the answer isn’t as easy as other employers might wish. Lincoln avoids layoffs by following a unique, decades-old system that requires sobering sacrifices by employees and the company, each making promises to the other that require mutual trust. That system works within the Lincoln culture, but few, if any, other companies have implemented it successfully—and even Lincoln can’t execute it in every part of its business. Is the system an innovative answer for today’s employers, or is it a tantalizing solution just out of reach?
‘The program’
“I got an email this week from a manufacturing company in the United States, slightly over a billion dollars in annual revenue. Wanted to meet with me to talk about our program,” says Mapes. “It happens a lot.” Once every three or four months, the company says.
The Lincoln Electric system, known internally as “the program,” is radical and deceptively simple. Production employees agree to let Lincoln increase or decrease their standard 40-hour workweek within limits based on customer demand. They get paid by piecework instead of the hour and receive a year-end bonus reflecting each worker’s performance. The company, in turn, pledges not to lay them off for lack of business.
When CEOs visit Mapes to learn more, he first asks them why they want to install the Lincoln system. If it’s just to increase productivity, he says, “That may not be enough, foundationally, for it to survive.” The system’s impressive results are only the most visible elements of an overarching philosophy of management that guides the business through good times and bad, a comprehensive strategy that Mapes’s visitors typically don’t understand. Without that, he tells them, “You’re probably not going to have the resilience in the program longer term. It’ll be a flash-in-the-pan program.”
The thoroughly elaborated philosophy that undergirds the initiative comes from a larger-than-life character, James F. Lincoln, the youngest brother of the founder, who ran the company from 1914 to 1975, having never previously managed anything. An unlikely amalgam of Milton Friedman, Bernie Sanders, and today’s most fervent stakeholder evangelists, he disdained labor unions, President Franklin Roosevelt, and most corporate executives. He tirelessly promoted welding with a showman’s flair, once sponsoring an essay contest and paying winners with welded-steel checks. Back in those days, when banks canceled paid checks by perforating them, Lincoln had his welded checks perforated with submachine guns.
Yet Lincoln thought factory workers were grievously mistreated. He wrote in his book Incentive Management, “If a manager received the same treatment in matters of income, security, advancement, and dignity as the hourly worker, he would soon understand the real problem of management.” He established an employee advisory board in 1914, still in operation, and accepted many of its suggestions, including reducing hours and increasing wages.
Two transformational policies, still in force and vital to the overall system, resulted from that board. The first was the adoption in 1914 of a piecework system, paying workers not by the hour but by individual output. Even then, piecework was often considered barbaric and exploitative, but Lincoln thought that, properly managed, it could benefit workers and the company. The pay per piece had to be fair so that working at a reasonable pace (in the worker’s view) would pay about the same as the hourly wage for that job in that town. Crucially, the pay per piece also couldn’t be reduced unless the way of doing the job changed, for example, if the company introduced more efficient machines. The system incentivized workers to improve their skills and work hard, in which case they could earn much more than their counterparts at the same job in other companies. Most workers at Lincoln Electric’s Cleveland-area factories, some 3,000, are still paid this way (a few whose jobs aren’t related directly to building the product, such as making tools and dies, are paid hourly).
The second transformational policy, adopted in 1934, was a year-end bonus for all factory workers at the time–straightforward in concept but highly unusual and far from simple as practiced at Lincoln Electric. The bonus can be stunningly generous, often equaling 50% of base pay and occasionally much more, even 100% in outstanding years. The proportion is decided by the top executives, whose bonuses come from a different pool of money. Last year, an excellent year for Lincoln, the average bonus was about $37,500, the company says, equaling some 67% of the average employee’s annual base pay of $55,970. Total pay works out to $93,470.
But the bonuses aren’t doled out equally. Twice-yearly ratings from their supervisor determine each employee’s portion based on output, quality, dependability, and cooperation. Those ratings are distributed on a bell curve, meaning they must average 100. For every worker rated 110, some other worker must be rated 90. “You’re not allowed to say, ‘We’re all A players,’” Mapes says. The bonus pool is allocated accordingly.
The results of implementing this bonus system would have astounded anyone other than James Lincoln. In the 10 years after the system’s adoption in 1934, he increased the bonus pool as a percentage of base pay almost every year until it rose above 100% of base pay during World War II. Including bonuses, the total annual average pay per worker increased 170% in that period. The company believes it paid the highest manufacturing wages in the world at that time, in the mid-1940s. It could afford to do so because, remarkably, dollar output per worker also increased 170%, and profits rocketed.
As those results showed, Lincoln had found a better way, and he wanted to keep it a secret. He would broadly describe his system but kept the eye-popping numbers closely guarded until Fortune revealed them in a 1944 article. Lincoln Electric quickly became a corporate celebrity. The Harvard Business School wrote a case study about the company in 1948, the first of many.
The company achieved all this without a no-layoffs policy, but Lincoln eventually concluded that “continuous employment” was essential to achieving “maximum efficiency in industry,” as he wrote in Incentive Management. Factory workers often fear that if they become too productive, some will lose their jobs; increased productivity means fewer workers can produce the same output, so some will get fired. But if they know their job is secure, Lincoln reasoned, they’ll embrace new methods and technologies. Lincoln adopted the Guaranteed Continuous Employment Plan on a trial basis in 1951, and it became official company policy in 1958, covering employees after they had come successfully through a trial period, currently set at three years.
Big tradeoffs
The no-layoffs policy comes with significant limitations.
It covers the multiple northeast Ohio factories for which it was originally created but can’t be instituted at the locations where Lincoln has expanded recently, especially in the international markets where most employees now work. In many of those markets, notably Europe and South America, some elements of the system would violate local laws or regulations. The Netherlands imposes restrictions on pay for performance, for example. In Venezuela, the company can’t use piecework pay or discretionary bonuses.
Layoffs are theoretically possible in some locations without the full system in place, though whether any have occurred is a matter of definition. Lincoln has grown in part by acquisition and has laid off employees at those companies in the past, including France’s Air Liquide welding business in 2017. In Lincoln’s view, that isn’t a layoff because the target company was overstaffed. It’s fixing a previous owner’s problems. But Lincoln Electric has also restructured its European operations in recent years, closing some locations in order to move operations elsewhere. Most people would call that a layoff, which brings up another limitation. James Lincoln promised not to lay off production workers for lack of business, leaving other potential causes unmentioned. Lincoln Electric has avoided layoffs for any reason in its original U.S. operations, but in locales that hinder the full program’s use, the spirit of James Lincoln’s guarantee becomes murky.
Wherever the company operates, a spokesperson says, Lincoln uses locally permissible elements of its incentive system, such as some kind of variable bonus. Still, Mapes says, “If I could put the program everywhere at Lincoln Electric, I would.”
The program doesn’t rely on magic. Workers pay a price for job security. The welding business booms and busts, and in downturns, the company can cut workers’ hours to as little as 75% (30 hours) of the workweek. In booms, workers must accept overtime to meet demand, but their pay also increases. The employee benefit in either scenario is that they keep their jobs.
The upside for the company is that it can instantly adjust output and tweak its labor costs more easily and quickly than most employers. “Our team makes adjustments daily, right on the shop floor,” Mapes says. “Our ability to flex what looks like fixed cost and make it more variable on a daily shift-by-shift basis gives us a huge competitive advantage.”
When the pandemic hit in 2020, and demand for industrial equipment plunged, U.S. unemployment spiked from 3.5% to 14.7% in weeks. “How many companies quickly went in when they saw demand drop, and they attacked labor as fixed costs, laid people off, shut down facilities?” Mapes asks. “We didn’t.” Instead, the company “pulled our levers,” as Mapes says, reducing work hours, offering employees a few weeks of unpaid voluntary time off, and transferring cross-trained workers in badly hit operations to areas with stronger demand. That decision paid off when demand surged back faster than anticipated. With all hands on deck, the company says it could deliver products when competitors couldn’t. Total employment declined less than 3% in 2020, mostly by attrition and employees accepting voluntary buyouts, then rebounded in 2021.
Working hard to get paid
The vast factory where Lincoln Electric makes welding machines just off I-90 in Euclid, Ohio, occupies 34 acres under one roof. A short drive up the highway, another Lincoln factory produces huge quantities of the wires that melt in the welding torch’s 6,500-degree electric arc and help fuse metal pieces. Machines shoot out some 35,000 miles of wire a day, enough to go around the world 1.4 times.
Marlon Barnes, 50, who has been at Lincoln for two years, is an assembler in the machine plant. “I’d been trying to get a job at Lincoln for a long time,” he says. “My previous jobs had been at restaurants. The stress level here is way less.”
Last December, he received his first full-year bonus. “I tried not to think about what it would be,” he says. “When I saw it, I was shocked.” How much? “A little over $30,000.” In light of Lincoln’s piecework pay system, I ask if I’m costing him money by talking with him. He doesn’t say no. He says, “It’s okay.”
Ed Crouse, vice president for Cleveland operations, tells me later that no one is so tightly scheduled that they can’t talk for a few minutes. But, yes, time away from the task means less production and, thus, less pay. At a recent employee advisory board meeting (held every four to six weeks), some employees complained that one of the microwaves in the lunchroom wasn’t working, cutting into their work time and slowing production. The company quickly brought in another microwave.
Bill Wagner, 52, a coil winder, has been at Lincoln for 30 years, joining after leaving the Navy. “We work hard,” he admits. “But you have to work hard if you want to get paid well. I try to tell the younger employees that you need discipline. You can’t just do it once. You need to have it all the time.” Bill says he enjoys his job and wants to stay another 10 years.
Even with a no-layoffs policy, working at Lincoln Electric isn’t for everyone. Examine employee ratings of the company at Glassdoor, Indeed, or other job sites, and you’ll find plenty of criticism. Its fans like the pay and job security, while critics dislike the uncertainty of when they’ll be working and may feel their supervisor plays favorites when rating workers.
Will the no-layoffs policy survive? Lincoln doesn’t promise it will. On the contrary, the company states in its annual SEC report that the Guaranteed Continuous Employment Plan “does not guarantee employment when the Company’s ability to continue normal operations is seriously restricted by events beyond the control of the Company.” In addition, the company can terminate the plan at year-end without reason and with six months’ notice.
A valuable artifact
The larger question is why other employers don’t replicate Lincoln’s program. Mapes says he’s often asked that question. “I just don’t know whether other companies have the ability in their business to build that level of confidence.” He’s referring to employees’ faith that they’ll be rated fairly, receive bonuses, and dodge layoffs. By contrast, Mapes says, Lincoln has “90 years of running the program.” Lincoln does not know of any company that has imported the full system.
The world has changed since James Lincoln’s day. The company says its turnover rate, which it won’t disclose, is lower than the industry average but much higher than it used to be. In the 1960s, it was less than 1% monthly. Company executives believe some new employees aren’t confident they’ll receive bonuses or just don’t want to wait until year-end, and they leave for jobs with higher base pay. Such jobs are easy to find in today’s tight labor market.
Maybe the continuous employment plan has become a valuable artifact, an admired creation that could have been built only in some long-ago era. Maybe no other employer will ever copy it. Maybe, someday, even Lincoln Electric might have to abandon it. But for now—as one part of a unique and perhaps irreproducible system—James Lincoln’s program is still working extraordinarily well.