
在工業(yè)革命(Industrial Revolution)剛剛掀起的年代,,作家拉爾夫·沃爾多·愛默生曾經(jīng)寫道:“大自然厭惡衰老?!爆F(xiàn)代的很多觀察人士也得出了同樣的結(jié)論,,不過理由卻是這位作家未曾預(yù)見到的。
現(xiàn)在很多發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家都已經(jīng)邁入老齡化社會(huì),,大量工人都到了退休的年紀(jì),,特別是在日本和歐洲,在美國(guó)也是如此,。
我是能夠坦然面對(duì)衰老的,,因?yàn)闆]有人可以逃脫生老病死。但對(duì)于這些增長(zhǎng)已經(jīng)見頂?shù)陌l(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體來說,,人口老齡化會(huì)引發(fā)一系列連鎖問題,。一方面,,這些國(guó)家對(duì)新機(jī)器的投資已然在減少;另一方面,,老齡化又減少了社會(huì)的勞動(dòng)力供給,,導(dǎo)致了生產(chǎn)率的進(jìn)一步下降。而養(yǎng)老金和醫(yī)療保健等支出,,又會(huì)帶來巨大的財(cái)政負(fù)擔(dān),,導(dǎo)致社會(huì)財(cái)富越來越多地用來供養(yǎng)老年人口??偠灾?,隨著就業(yè)崗位不斷向國(guó)外流出,加上機(jī)器人的普遍應(yīng)用,,發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家正在面臨著勞動(dòng)人口越來越少,,而他們需要供養(yǎng)的老齡人口越來越多的問題。
如果這種趨勢(shì)繼續(xù)下去(目前我看不到它有任何停止的理由),,那么幾個(gè)世紀(jì)以來,,社會(huì)一代比一代進(jìn)步的趨勢(shì)就會(huì)停止。因?yàn)樯鐣?huì)主要?jiǎng)趧?dòng)力的收入大頭都將用于為老年人構(gòu)筑社會(huì)保障,,而不是用于消費(fèi)和養(yǎng)育下一代,。年輕一代的消費(fèi)率和儲(chǔ)蓄率的下降,必將給經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)踩下剎車,。
諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)得主米爾頓·弗里德曼一向是堅(jiān)決反對(duì)政府干預(yù)市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的,,不過他也最早指出了這個(gè)問題。早在1980年,,弗里德曼就指出一場(chǎng)危機(jī)即將到來,,而那時(shí)我們明明有更多的時(shí)間來著手解決這個(gè)問題。
現(xiàn)在我們的稅收和社保體系,,其本質(zhì)上就是在用年輕人交的稅來供養(yǎng)老年人。雖然幾十年來,,越來越多的證據(jù)表明這種危險(xiǎn)是確實(shí)存在的,,但令人費(fèi)解的是,我們并未做出任何改變,。2012年,,《代際沖突》(The Clash of Generations)一書的作者勞倫斯·科特利科夫和斯科特·伯恩斯曾經(jīng)為美國(guó)計(jì)算過官方公共債務(wù)和包括未融資債務(wù)時(shí)的真實(shí)負(fù)債之間的缺口,他們將這一差額稱為“財(cái)政缺口”,。當(dāng)時(shí)他們計(jì)算的美國(guó)的官方債務(wù)為11萬億美元,,而真實(shí)負(fù)債則達(dá)到了令人驚掉下巴的211萬億美元。雖然他們敲響了警鐘,,但美國(guó)的政策制定者卻什么都沒有做,。
在《代際沖突》出版十年后的今天,,美國(guó)的財(cái)政缺口已經(jīng)達(dá)到GDP的14倍。更令人震驚的是,,他們發(fā)現(xiàn),,財(cái)政缺口“已經(jīng)達(dá)到了官方債務(wù)的22倍?!边@可不是什么好兆頭,。
巨大的財(cái)政缺口已經(jīng)成為全球經(jīng)濟(jì)格局的一部分。世界銀行(World Bank)曾經(jīng)警告道:“老齡化在全歐洲范圍內(nèi)都是一個(gè)顯著現(xiàn)象,?!币圆ㄌm為例。1956年,,半數(shù)波蘭人口都在26歲以下,,非常年輕。時(shí)至今日,,波蘭人的年齡中位數(shù)已經(jīng)接近40歲,,并將于2050年達(dá)到51歲。另外,,波蘭人口總數(shù)也在老齡化中日趨減少,。預(yù)計(jì)2050年的波蘭人口將在3,200萬左右,比1995年整整減少600萬人,。

從統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)能夠看出,,在各個(gè)發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家,老齡化都帶來了一種危險(xiǎn)的失衡,。國(guó)民收入越來越多地被用于保障退休人員的生活水平,,而不是流向年輕勞動(dòng)者。隨著適齡勞動(dòng)者人口的持續(xù)下降,,和老年群體福利支出的激增,,各國(guó)的養(yǎng)老財(cái)政缺口每年都在急劇惡化。長(zhǎng)此以往,,年輕人不甘心承受巨大的社會(huì)化養(yǎng)老壓力,,必然會(huì)表達(dá)不滿。你可以看看媒體上,,近一段時(shí)間,,年輕人與老人發(fā)生沖突的新聞是不是越來越多了?
在這個(gè)問題上,,我們非但沒有進(jìn)步,,反而一再倒退。根據(jù)美國(guó)社會(huì)保障局(Social Security Administration)的數(shù)據(jù),,1960年,,美國(guó)退休和殘疾工人與在職工人的比例是1:5,。但是2009年就已經(jīng)下跌到1:3,到2030年將進(jìn)一步下降到1:2,,也就是說,,每一位勞動(dòng)者都要供養(yǎng)兩個(gè)吃社會(huì)保障的人。
美國(guó)的情況雖然很糟糕,,但相比歐洲還是稍強(qiáng)一些,,這是因?yàn)槊绹?guó)是一個(gè)移民社會(huì),在一定程度上能夠填補(bǔ)美國(guó)的勞動(dòng)力供給,。雖然美國(guó)的生育率遠(yuǎn)低于每個(gè)婦女生育2.1個(gè)孩子的所謂“自然替代率”,,但美國(guó)的總?cè)丝诓⑽礈p少。由于來自亞洲,、中美洲,、拉丁美洲等地的移民大量涌入,美國(guó)的總?cè)丝陔m然增長(zhǎng)緩慢,,但還是在增長(zhǎng)的,。盡管如此,隨著退休人員的增加,,美國(guó)領(lǐng)社保的人群很快將達(dá)到7,300萬人,,幾乎比2010年翻了一番。目前,,美國(guó)即將到期的未融資債務(wù)已經(jīng)超過5萬億美元,,其規(guī)模超過了2021年拜登政府提出的雄心勃勃的《就業(yè)法案》2.5倍。
日本是全球人口老齡化最嚴(yán)重的國(guó)家之一,,日本的人口出生率很低,,而且人口預(yù)期壽命很高。由于日本和歐洲的綜合社會(huì)福利計(jì)劃都有嚴(yán)重的遺留問題,,因此日本和歐洲也將在這方面面臨最嚴(yán)峻的挑戰(zhàn),。這些地區(qū)的老齡化問題都比美國(guó)嚴(yán)重,而且他們的養(yǎng)老福利總體上也比美國(guó)更高,。但是上一代人羨慕不已的高福利的社會(huì)保障網(wǎng)絡(luò),,卻也讓當(dāng)代和未來幾代人背上了堆積如山的債務(wù)。
在這場(chǎng)與老齡化賽跑的比賽中,,美國(guó)緊緊追趕在歐洲和日本身后。當(dāng)然對(duì)這場(chǎng)比賽而言,,勝利者是沒有任何榮譽(yù)可言的,。這個(gè)問題不僅僅出在聯(lián)邦政府身上。衡量隱性債務(wù)的一個(gè)關(guān)鍵指標(biāo),,就是50個(gè)州分別在養(yǎng)老金系統(tǒng)中持有多少資產(chǎn),,以及欠了多少債務(wù),。
目前,美國(guó)的私營(yíng)部門養(yǎng)老金計(jì)劃融資嚴(yán)重不足,,納稅人可能還得承擔(dān)1,850億美元的債務(wù),,而這就算是最好的情況了。
近年來,,美國(guó)的醫(yī)保支出甚至已經(jīng)超過了養(yǎng)老支出,。2020年,美國(guó)兩大醫(yī)保體系Medicare和Medicaid,,加上私人保險(xiǎn)公司,、醫(yī)院、診所,、臨床服務(wù),,以及患者自付費(fèi)用和處方藥支出增長(zhǎng)了近10%,達(dá)到5.4萬億美元,,相當(dāng)于人均12,530美元,,或者相當(dāng)于美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的20%。
醫(yī)療支出帶來的財(cái)政壓力也是必然會(huì)繼續(xù)增長(zhǎng)的,。預(yù)計(jì)到2028年,,美國(guó)的醫(yī)療支出將以每年超5%的速度增長(zhǎng)。
美國(guó)國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)研究局(National Bureau of Economic Research)2010年的一篇論文顯示,,社保體系已經(jīng)成了美國(guó)隨時(shí)會(huì)被引爆的一顆地雷,。大衛(wèi)·奧特爾和馬克·杜甘在《失去勞動(dòng)力人群社保支出的增長(zhǎng):一場(chǎng)財(cái)政危機(jī)》(The Growth in the Social Security Disability Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis Unfolding)一文中指出,美國(guó)的社保體系為80%以上未達(dá)到退休年齡的身心殘疾者提供了保險(xiǎn),,這一數(shù)字要比以往高得多,。他們認(rèn)為這主要是三個(gè)因素造成的:一是美國(guó)通過立法,降低了患有腰痛,、關(guān)節(jié)炎和精神疾病者獲得社保福利的門檻,;二是殘疾人獲得了額外的稅收優(yōu)惠,使工人擁有了申領(lǐng)福利的動(dòng)機(jī),;三是職業(yè)女性的急劇增加也擴(kuò)大了受保工人的數(shù)量,。
因此,隨著老齡化的加深,,加之現(xiàn)行的“現(xiàn)收現(xiàn)付”養(yǎng)老金體系,,一個(gè)國(guó)家的養(yǎng)老金債務(wù)必然是巨大的,而且會(huì)隨著時(shí)間呈爆炸式增長(zhǎng),,特別是在發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體,,但現(xiàn)在一些老齡化的新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體也面臨著同樣的問題。顯然,這些隱性債務(wù)已經(jīng)成了一顆巨大的定時(shí)炸彈,。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
本文作者努里埃爾·魯比尼(Nouriel Roubini)是紐約大學(xué)斯特恩商學(xué)院(New York University’s Stern School of Business)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教授,,曾經(jīng)在白宮和美國(guó)財(cái)政部任職。他還是經(jīng)濟(jì)與金融咨詢公司RGE Monitor的創(chuàng)始人和董事長(zhǎng),,他也是全球多個(gè)國(guó)家央行的顧問,。
本文節(jié)選自努里埃爾·魯比尼的《超級(jí)威脅》(Megathreats)一書。Copyright ? 2022 by Nouriel Roubini,。經(jīng)Little,、Brown和Company許可轉(zhuǎn)載。版權(quán)所有,,翻印必究,。
譯者:樸成奎
在工業(yè)革命(Industrial Revolution)剛剛掀起的年代,作家拉爾夫·沃爾多·愛默生曾經(jīng)寫道:“大自然厭惡衰老,?!爆F(xiàn)代的很多觀察人士也得出了同樣的結(jié)論,不過理由卻是這位作家未曾預(yù)見到的,。
現(xiàn)在很多發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家都已經(jīng)邁入老齡化社會(huì),,大量工人都到了退休的年紀(jì),特別是在日本和歐洲,,在美國(guó)也是如此,。
我是能夠坦然面對(duì)衰老的,因?yàn)闆]有人可以逃脫生老病死,。但對(duì)于這些增長(zhǎng)已經(jīng)見頂?shù)陌l(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體來說,,人口老齡化會(huì)引發(fā)一系列連鎖問題。一方面,,這些國(guó)家對(duì)新機(jī)器的投資已然在減少,;另一方面,老齡化又減少了社會(huì)的勞動(dòng)力供給,,導(dǎo)致了生產(chǎn)率的進(jìn)一步下降,。而養(yǎng)老金和醫(yī)療保健等支出,又會(huì)帶來巨大的財(cái)政負(fù)擔(dān),,導(dǎo)致社會(huì)財(cái)富越來越多地用來供養(yǎng)老年人口,。總而言之,,隨著就業(yè)崗位不斷向國(guó)外流出,,加上機(jī)器人的普遍應(yīng)用,發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家正在面臨著勞動(dòng)人口越來越少,,而他們需要供養(yǎng)的老齡人口越來越多的問題,。
如果這種趨勢(shì)繼續(xù)下去(目前我看不到它有任何停止的理由),那么幾個(gè)世紀(jì)以來,,社會(huì)一代比一代進(jìn)步的趨勢(shì)就會(huì)停止,。因?yàn)樯鐣?huì)主要?jiǎng)趧?dòng)力的收入大頭都將用于為老年人構(gòu)筑社會(huì)保障,而不是用于消費(fèi)和養(yǎng)育下一代,。年輕一代的消費(fèi)率和儲(chǔ)蓄率的下降,,必將給經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)踩下剎車。
諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)得主米爾頓·弗里德曼一向是堅(jiān)決反對(duì)政府干預(yù)市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的,,不過他也最早指出了這個(gè)問題,。早在1980年,弗里德曼就指出一場(chǎng)危機(jī)即將到來,,而那時(shí)我們明明有更多的時(shí)間來著手解決這個(gè)問題,。
現(xiàn)在我們的稅收和社保體系,其本質(zhì)上就是在用年輕人交的稅來供養(yǎng)老年人,。雖然幾十年來,,越來越多的證據(jù)表明這種危險(xiǎn)是確實(shí)存在的,但令人費(fèi)解的是,,我們并未做出任何改變,。2012年,《代際沖突》(The Clash of Generations)一書的作者勞倫斯·科特利科夫和斯科特·伯恩斯曾經(jīng)為美國(guó)計(jì)算過官方公共債務(wù)和包括未融資債務(wù)時(shí)的真實(shí)負(fù)債之間的缺口,,他們將這一差額稱為“財(cái)政缺口”,。當(dāng)時(shí)他們計(jì)算的美國(guó)的官方債務(wù)為11萬億美元,而真實(shí)負(fù)債則達(dá)到了令人驚掉下巴的211萬億美元,。雖然他們敲響了警鐘,,但美國(guó)的政策制定者卻什么都沒有做。
在《代際沖突》出版十年后的今天,,美國(guó)的財(cái)政缺口已經(jīng)達(dá)到GDP的14倍,。更令人震驚的是,他們發(fā)現(xiàn),,財(cái)政缺口“已經(jīng)達(dá)到了官方債務(wù)的22倍,。”這可不是什么好兆頭,。
巨大的財(cái)政缺口已經(jīng)成為全球經(jīng)濟(jì)格局的一部分,。世界銀行(World Bank)曾經(jīng)警告道:“老齡化在全歐洲范圍內(nèi)都是一個(gè)顯著現(xiàn)象?!币圆ㄌm為例,。1956年,半數(shù)波蘭人口都在26歲以下,,非常年輕,。時(shí)至今日,波蘭人的年齡中位數(shù)已經(jīng)接近40歲,并將于2050年達(dá)到51歲,。另外,,波蘭人口總數(shù)也在老齡化中日趨減少。預(yù)計(jì)2050年的波蘭人口將在3,200萬左右,,比1995年整整減少600萬人,。
從統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)能夠看出,在各個(gè)發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家,,老齡化都帶來了一種危險(xiǎn)的失衡,。國(guó)民收入越來越多地被用于保障退休人員的生活水平,而不是流向年輕勞動(dòng)者,。隨著適齡勞動(dòng)者人口的持續(xù)下降,,和老年群體福利支出的激增,各國(guó)的養(yǎng)老財(cái)政缺口每年都在急劇惡化,。長(zhǎng)此以往,,年輕人不甘心承受巨大的社會(huì)化養(yǎng)老壓力,必然會(huì)表達(dá)不滿,。你可以看看媒體上,,近一段時(shí)間,年輕人與老人發(fā)生沖突的新聞是不是越來越多了,?
在這個(gè)問題上,,我們非但沒有進(jìn)步,反而一再倒退,。根據(jù)美國(guó)社會(huì)保障局(Social Security Administration)的數(shù)據(jù),,1960年,,美國(guó)退休和殘疾工人與在職工人的比例是1:5,。但是2009年就已經(jīng)下跌到1:3,到2030年將進(jìn)一步下降到1:2,,也就是說,,每一位勞動(dòng)者都要供養(yǎng)兩個(gè)吃社會(huì)保障的人。
美國(guó)的情況雖然很糟糕,,但相比歐洲還是稍強(qiáng)一些,,這是因?yàn)槊绹?guó)是一個(gè)移民社會(huì),在一定程度上能夠填補(bǔ)美國(guó)的勞動(dòng)力供給,。雖然美國(guó)的生育率遠(yuǎn)低于每個(gè)婦女生育2.1個(gè)孩子的所謂“自然替代率”,,但美國(guó)的總?cè)丝诓⑽礈p少。由于來自亞洲,、中美洲,、拉丁美洲等地的移民大量涌入,,美國(guó)的總?cè)丝陔m然增長(zhǎng)緩慢,但還是在增長(zhǎng)的,。盡管如此,,隨著退休人員的增加,美國(guó)領(lǐng)社保的人群很快將達(dá)到7,300萬人,,幾乎比2010年翻了一番。目前,,美國(guó)即將到期的未融資債務(wù)已經(jīng)超過5萬億美元,其規(guī)模超過了2021年拜登政府提出的雄心勃勃的《就業(yè)法案》2.5倍,。
日本是全球人口老齡化最嚴(yán)重的國(guó)家之一,,日本的人口出生率很低,,而且人口預(yù)期壽命很高。由于日本和歐洲的綜合社會(huì)福利計(jì)劃都有嚴(yán)重的遺留問題,,因此日本和歐洲也將在這方面面臨最嚴(yán)峻的挑戰(zhàn)。這些地區(qū)的老齡化問題都比美國(guó)嚴(yán)重,,而且他們的養(yǎng)老福利總體上也比美國(guó)更高。但是上一代人羨慕不已的高福利的社會(huì)保障網(wǎng)絡(luò),,卻也讓當(dāng)代和未來幾代人背上了堆積如山的債務(wù),。
在這場(chǎng)與老齡化賽跑的比賽中,美國(guó)緊緊追趕在歐洲和日本身后,。當(dāng)然對(duì)這場(chǎng)比賽而言,,勝利者是沒有任何榮譽(yù)可言的。這個(gè)問題不僅僅出在聯(lián)邦政府身上,。衡量隱性債務(wù)的一個(gè)關(guān)鍵指標(biāo),,就是50個(gè)州分別在養(yǎng)老金系統(tǒng)中持有多少資產(chǎn),以及欠了多少債務(wù),。
目前,,美國(guó)的私營(yíng)部門養(yǎng)老金計(jì)劃融資嚴(yán)重不足,,納稅人可能還得承擔(dān)1,850億美元的債務(wù),,而這就算是最好的情況了。
近年來,,美國(guó)的醫(yī)保支出甚至已經(jīng)超過了養(yǎng)老支出,。2020年,,美國(guó)兩大醫(yī)保體系Medicare和Medicaid,加上私人保險(xiǎn)公司,、醫(yī)院,、診所、臨床服務(wù),,以及患者自付費(fèi)用和處方藥支出增長(zhǎng)了近10%,,達(dá)到5.4萬億美元,相當(dāng)于人均12,530美元,,或者相當(dāng)于美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的20%,。
醫(yī)療支出帶來的財(cái)政壓力也是必然會(huì)繼續(xù)增長(zhǎng)的。預(yù)計(jì)到2028年,,美國(guó)的醫(yī)療支出將以每年超5%的速度增長(zhǎng),。
美國(guó)國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)研究局(National Bureau of Economic Research)2010年的一篇論文顯示,社保體系已經(jīng)成了美國(guó)隨時(shí)會(huì)被引爆的一顆地雷,。大衛(wèi)·奧特爾和馬克·杜甘在《失去勞動(dòng)力人群社保支出的增長(zhǎng):一場(chǎng)財(cái)政危機(jī)》(The Growth in the Social Security Disability Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis Unfolding)一文中指出,,美國(guó)的社保體系為80%以上未達(dá)到退休年齡的身心殘疾者提供了保險(xiǎn),這一數(shù)字要比以往高得多,。他們認(rèn)為這主要是三個(gè)因素造成的:一是美國(guó)通過立法,,降低了患有腰痛、關(guān)節(jié)炎和精神疾病者獲得社保福利的門檻,;二是殘疾人獲得了額外的稅收優(yōu)惠,,使工人擁有了申領(lǐng)福利的動(dòng)機(jī);三是職業(yè)女性的急劇增加也擴(kuò)大了受保工人的數(shù)量,。
因此,,隨著老齡化的加深,加之現(xiàn)行的“現(xiàn)收現(xiàn)付”養(yǎng)老金體系,,一個(gè)國(guó)家的養(yǎng)老金債務(wù)必然是巨大的,,而且會(huì)隨著時(shí)間呈爆炸式增長(zhǎng),特別是在發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體,,但現(xiàn)在一些老齡化的新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體也面臨著同樣的問題,。顯然,這些隱性債務(wù)已經(jīng)成了一顆巨大的定時(shí)炸彈,。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
本文作者努里埃爾·魯比尼(Nouriel Roubini)是紐約大學(xué)斯特恩商學(xué)院(New York University’s Stern School of Business)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教授,,曾經(jīng)在白宮和美國(guó)財(cái)政部任職。他還是經(jīng)濟(jì)與金融咨詢公司RGE Monitor的創(chuàng)始人和董事長(zhǎng),,他也是全球多個(gè)國(guó)家央行的顧問,。
本文節(jié)選自努里埃爾·魯比尼的《超級(jí)威脅》(Megathreats)一書。Copyright ? 2022 by Nouriel Roubini,。經(jīng)Little,、Brown和Company許可轉(zhuǎn)載,。版權(quán)所有,翻印必究,。
譯者:樸成奎
“Nature abhors the old,” Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote when the Industrial Revolution was in its youth. Modern observers are reaching the same conclusion for reasons that the author of Self-Reliance could not have foreseen.
Many workers in advanced economies are approaching advanced and retirement age, especially in Japan and Europe but also the United States.
I have no beef with getting older. No one escapes it. But an aging workforce can trigger spiraling problems in economies where growth has peaked. Aging reduces the supply of workers and slows down productivity as investment in new machines declines. Financial promises—pensions and health care—divert increasing chunks of national income to an older population. As jobs move abroad and robots proliferate, advanced economies employ fewer workers who must support growing ranks of retirees.
If the trend continues, and I see no reason it won’t, we can forget a future that continues centuries of social progress from one generation to the next. Instead of buying goods and building nest eggs for young families, the paychecks of active workers will be more and more devoted to maintaining safety nets for the elderly. Lower rates of spending and savings by younger generations will pump the brakes on economic growth.
Nobel laureate Milton Friedman, an economist fiercely opposed to government intervention, sounded one of the first warnings. Way back in 1980, he railed against a looming crisis when we had more time to avert it.
What you have is a system under which people are being taxed today to pay benefits to the people who are receiving them. What’s puzzling is that nothing has changed, despite mounting evidence over decades that the threat is real. In 2012, The Clash of Generations authors Laurence Kotlikoff and Scott Burns calculated for the United States the difference between official public debt and true indebtedness when unfunded obligations are included. They call this difference the fiscal gap. Official debt, they determined, was then $11 trillion. True debt was a whopping $211 trillion. They sounded the alarm, but policymakers did nothing.
In the United States today, a decade after The Clash of Generations was published, the fiscal gap measures 14 times GDP. More stunning still, they found, the fiscal gap “is 22 times the official debt that now has everyone’s attention.” This does not bode well.
Giant fiscal gaps are now part of the global economic landscape. “Aging is a Europe-wide phenomenon,” the World Bank has warned. Consider one example: Poland. In 1950, half the population was less than 26 years old, still youthful. Today the median age is approaching 40 and on its way to 51 in 2050. A graying population is also shrinking. Poland is projected to have 32 million people in 2050, 6 million fewer than in 1995.
Across developed nations, statistics expose a treacherous imbalance. Instead of going to young workers, an increasing share of the national income must preserve standards of living for retirees. The skewing gets worse every year as payrolls and working-age populations shrink and old-age liabilities balloon. If young workers do not yet resent surrendering their futures in order to bankroll retirees, they eventually will. Watch for headlines declaring generational conflict between young and old.
Instead of moving forward, we have slipped backward. In 1960, there were five active workers for every retired and disabled worker in the United States. The ratio slipped below three to one in 2009 and is headed toward two to one by 2030, according to the Social Security Administration.
The situation in the United States was dire, but not as dire as in Europe, thanks to immigration that until recently helped to increase the U.S. labor supply. The total U.S. population is not yet decreasing, even though birth rates are well below the so-called replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman. The continuing influx of immigrants from Asia, Central, and Latin America, and elsewhere, helped the total population to grow, albeit very modestly. Nonetheless, more retirees in the United States will swell Social Security rolls to 73 million beneficiaries, nearly twice the number that received payments in 2010. The value today of unfunded obligations that will come due in the future exceeds $5 trillion, more than two and a half times the ambitious jobs bill proposed in 2021 by the Biden administration.
Japan has one of the oldest populations in the world, as birth rates are very low and life expectancy is very high. Legacies of comprehensive social welfare programs leave Europe and Japan with the steepest hills to climb. Aging in those regions is occurring faster than in the United States while pension promises are overall more generous than in America. Safety nets that were the envy of workers a generation ago heap mountains of debt on current and future generations.
The United States is close behind Europe and Japan in a race that bestows no glory on its winners. The problem isn’t just with the federal government. A crucial measure of implicit debt highlights the difference between the assets all 50 states collectively hold in their pension systems and how much they owe.
Right now, underfunded private sector plans could leave taxpayers on the hook for $185 billion, and that’s a best-case scenario.
National health expenditures are climbing even faster than pension commitments. In 2020, spending on Medicare, Medicaid, private insurance, hospitals, physicians and clinical services, out-of-pocket costs, and prescription drugs grew by nearly 10% to $5.4 trillion. That’s $12,530 per person, or almost 20% of the U.S. gross domestic product.
These financial pressures are destined to increase. Through 2028, national health spending in the United States is on pace to grow at an average annual rate exceeding 5%.
A 2010 paper published by the National Bureau of Economic Research exposed one land mine that is poised to explode. The Growth in the Social Security Disability Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis Unfolding, by David Autor and Mark Duggan, found that Social Security insures more than 80% of non-elderly U.S. adults against the risk of disabling physical or mental illness, a much higher number than in the past. They attribute the rapid expansion in payments to three factors: Legislation lowered the benefits threshold for workers with back pain, arthritis, and mental illness. Added tax benefits for disability income added incentives for workers to seek benefits. And a steep increase in working women expands the pool of insured workers.
Thus, the unfunded liabilities deriving from aging and a pay-as-you-go welfare system for the elderly—pension, health care, disability benefits, and other services—are huge and exploding over time, especially in advanced economies but now also in some aging emerging markets. Clearly, implicit debt is a major time bomb.
Nouriel Roubini is a professor of economics at New York University’s Stern School of Business and a former White House and U.S. Treasury official. He is also the founder and chairman of economic and financial consulting firm RGE Monitor and is an adviser to central bankers around the world.
Excerpted from the book MEGATHREATS by Nouriel Roubini. Copyright ? 2022 by Nouriel Roubini. Reprinted with permission of Little, Brown and Company. All rights reserved.