用傳統(tǒng)的方法,要想讓一家公司上市,,其實(shí)很簡單,。首先展示一些早期的成功案例,然后賣股權(quán)換取繼續(xù)擴(kuò)張的資本,。今年有好幾家電動(dòng)汽車初創(chuàng)公司都是用這個(gè)路數(shù)上市圈錢的,,比如電池開發(fā)商QuantumScape和貨運(yùn)車輛電動(dòng)總成制造商Hyliion都獲得了幾十億美元的估值。
電動(dòng)汽車在當(dāng)下是一個(gè)炙手可熱的概念,,以至于這些初創(chuàng)公司就算并沒有什么金光閃閃的點(diǎn)子,,也能夠拉到不少投資,。在現(xiàn)在的資本市場(chǎng)上,,沒有盈利就融資已經(jīng)不是什么新鮮事了,,但對(duì)于電動(dòng)汽車這樣一個(gè)連續(xù)多年賠本賺吆喝的新生事物,,一些投資者仍然抱以充分的寬容,倒也算是一大奇景,。
本月初,,電動(dòng)汽車初創(chuàng)公司法拉第未來(沒錯(cuò),,就是賈躍亭的法拉第未來)在美宣布,,該公司正在談判通過“特殊目的收購公司”(SPAC)的形式上市,。法拉第未來謀求融資8.5億美元,以正式推出該公司的首款商用電動(dòng)汽車,。SPAC又被稱為“空白支票公司”,,是一種走捷徑的上市融資公司,。SPAC模式今年大受歡迎,,特別是在電動(dòng)汽車領(lǐng)域,,很大程度上是因?yàn)樗纳鲜兴俣瓤煊趥鹘y(tǒng)的IPO模式。
速度雖然有了,,但SPAC容易被人詬病的地方,,就是它的財(cái)務(wù)透明度和公眾監(jiān)督度不如傳統(tǒng)的IPO模式,因此對(duì)投資者來說未必是最佳選擇,。畢竟由于眾所周知的各種財(cái)務(wù)和運(yùn)營問題,,法拉第未來連一輛車還沒有造出來,就已經(jīng)燒掉20億美元了,。
不過法拉第未來并不是一個(gè)人在戰(zhàn)斗,,另外兩家命運(yùn)多舛的電動(dòng)汽車公司——菲斯克(Fisker)和卡瑪汽車(Karma Automotive),也已經(jīng)拉到了融資或者正在融資,。這是一個(gè)值得注意的現(xiàn)象,,說明投資者認(rèn)為電動(dòng)汽車的概念還是很有希望的——抑或這又是金融市場(chǎng)一次不切實(shí)際的狂歡。
法拉第未來的失敗
這時(shí)又不得不提法拉第未來的創(chuàng)始人——賈躍亭了。如果法拉第未來真的上市了,,它不可避免地將要承擔(dān)賈躍亭的一系列管理問題和誠信問題所引發(fā)的惡果,。
法拉第未來是賈躍亭在2014年創(chuàng)辦的。眾所周知,,它的注冊(cè)資本來自賈躍亭的樂視生態(tài),。不過早在2016年,法拉第未來就暴露出了拖欠款項(xiàng),、取消建廠,、與樂視的電動(dòng)車項(xiàng)目的關(guān)系曖昧不清等問題。據(jù)說樂視的電動(dòng)車項(xiàng)目就動(dòng)用了法拉第未來的不少資源,。
此外還有賈躍亭在國內(nèi)欠下的賬——當(dāng)時(shí),,野蠻擴(kuò)張的樂視已經(jīng)欠下了巨額債務(wù),,其中很大的一部分與中國國內(nèi)的“影子銀行”有關(guān)。事實(shí)證明,,這場(chǎng)豪賭的結(jié)局是很難看的:樂視此后進(jìn)行了大規(guī)模的裁員,并且砍掉了很多子公司,。
最讓人震驚的是,,由于樂視帝國的崩盤,賈躍亭個(gè)人也背上了高達(dá)36億美元的債務(wù),。這直接導(dǎo)致他個(gè)人宣告破產(chǎn),,不過他的債權(quán)人仍然指控他采取各種欺詐手段隱藏資產(chǎn)和逃避債務(wù)。
菲斯克的厄運(yùn)
菲斯克倒還沒有經(jīng)歷過法拉第未來那樣的混亂,,不過菲斯克的失利本可避免,。今年7月,菲斯克宣布將以29億美元的估值,,通過SPAC模式上市融資10億美元,。不過現(xiàn)在的菲斯克已經(jīng)是其創(chuàng)始人亨里克?菲斯克創(chuàng)辦的第二家電動(dòng)汽車公司了。它的前身“菲斯克汽車”則以失敗告終,。
菲斯克汽車公司成立于2007年,,在其首款豪華混動(dòng)車型菲斯克Karma遭遇失敗后,公司也于2013年倒閉,。Karma的設(shè)計(jì)雖然廣受贊譽(yù),,但它卻遭到了生產(chǎn)質(zhì)量不穩(wěn)定以及供應(yīng)鏈和技術(shù)方面的問題,最終只生產(chǎn)了2,000臺(tái)左右,。
菲斯克汽車的剩余資產(chǎn)被賣給了中國的一家汽車零部件廠商,,后又被拆分為Karma汽車公司。自那以后,Karma汽車又生產(chǎn)了一版換湯不換藥的菲斯克Karma,,起名叫做Karma Revero,,不過產(chǎn)量較少,據(jù)報(bào)道,,2019年該車型只售出了1,000臺(tái)左右,。不過Karma汽車也宣布了上市計(jì)劃,其目標(biāo)是通過IPO融資3億美元,。
時(shí)代變了,?
那么,究竟是發(fā)生了哪些變化,,讓投資者決定忽略這些公司的一些根源性問題,?
在談到公司前景時(shí),法拉第未來的發(fā)言人約翰?席林說:“盡管我們?cè)庥隽烁鞣N內(nèi)部和外部壓力,,但我們?nèi)匀辉谇斑M(jìn),。”他表示,,迄今為止的20億美元投資讓法拉第未來已經(jīng)做好了面向未來的準(zhǔn)備,。“我們有自己的技術(shù)……和強(qiáng)大的制造能力,,可以迅速開始生產(chǎn),。”
對(duì)于法拉第未來來說,,這家公司最大的變化,,就是賈躍亭不再持股。很多投資人之所以對(duì)法拉第未來望而卻步,,一個(gè)重要的原因就是擔(dān)心賈躍亭,。不過隨著賈躍亭個(gè)人宣告破產(chǎn),他已經(jīng)放棄了自己的所有股,。但作為法拉第未來的“首席產(chǎn)品和用戶生態(tài)官”,,賈躍亭目前仍然在這家公司里扮演著一個(gè)重要的角色。
Karma轎車雖然失敗了,,但菲斯克卻沒有那么重的歷史包袱,。Karma可以說是電動(dòng)汽車市場(chǎng)真正的先驅(qū)者,它打入市場(chǎng)還在特斯拉的Model S之前,。菲斯克的一位發(fā)言人強(qiáng)調(diào):“我們今天創(chuàng)辦的公司已經(jīng)吸取了過去的所有教訓(xùn),。”
菲斯克學(xué)到的教訓(xùn)之一,,就是將重點(diǎn)從高端轎跑轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)槊嫦蛑卸耸袌?chǎng)的全電動(dòng)SUV,,這款新車型預(yù)計(jì)將在2022年上市,。菲斯克最近已經(jīng)與麥格納斯太爾公司(Magna Steyr)簽訂了生產(chǎn)合同——該公司也為梅賽德斯-奔馳(Mercedes-Benz)和豐田(Toyota)等公司代工生產(chǎn)電動(dòng)汽車。與法拉第未來不同的是,,菲斯克表示,,它已經(jīng)有了足夠的資金來生產(chǎn)全新車型,而此次融資“只是另一種去風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的手段”,。
今年9月,,Karma汽車宣布了公司的重大轉(zhuǎn)型計(jì)劃。該公司計(jì)劃從2021年起推出新的全電動(dòng)汽車產(chǎn)品線,,包括皮卡和SUV等車型,。該公司還招募了一些業(yè)界知名的人才,比如麥格納斯太爾公司的前首席運(yùn)營官凱文?巴甫洛夫等,。
市場(chǎng)大環(huán)境的變化也是使投資者更加關(guān)注電動(dòng)汽車的原因之一,。今年9月,美國加州政府宣布,,到2035年前,,加州的所有汽車要全部實(shí)現(xiàn)零排放——差不多就是電動(dòng)化。屆時(shí),,加州的電動(dòng)汽車市場(chǎng)將大幅擴(kuò)大,。而電池成本的持續(xù)下降,也讓電動(dòng)汽車不久就將在價(jià)格上與燃油車有一戰(zhàn)之力,,并使整個(gè)市場(chǎng)迅速向電動(dòng)汽車轉(zhuǎn)型,。
不過說到底,菲斯克和法拉第未來之所以還能夠圈到錢,,還得感謝特斯拉。由于大家普遍預(yù)期汽車電動(dòng)化的大趨勢(shì)不可避免,,在過去12個(gè)月里,,特斯拉的股價(jià)漲勢(shì)驚人。菲斯克,、法拉第未來和Karma汽車都承認(rèn),,活躍的投資市場(chǎng)是影響了它們上市決策的重要原因。只要電動(dòng)汽車的增長勢(shì)頭良好,,投資者就很可能愿意把錢投給其他電動(dòng)汽車廠商,,即使它們的光環(huán)相對(duì)失色。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:樸成奎
用傳統(tǒng)的方法,,要想讓一家公司上市,,其實(shí)很簡單。首先展示一些早期的成功案例,,然后賣股權(quán)換取繼續(xù)擴(kuò)張的資本,。今年有好幾家電動(dòng)汽車初創(chuàng)公司都是用這個(gè)路數(shù)上市圈錢的,,比如電池開發(fā)商QuantumScape和貨運(yùn)車輛電動(dòng)總成制造商Hyliion都獲得了幾十億美元的估值。
電動(dòng)汽車在當(dāng)下是一個(gè)炙手可熱的概念,,以至于這些初創(chuàng)公司就算并沒有什么金光閃閃的點(diǎn)子,,也能夠拉到不少投資。在現(xiàn)在的資本市場(chǎng)上,,沒有盈利就融資已經(jīng)不是什么新鮮事了,,但對(duì)于電動(dòng)汽車這樣一個(gè)連續(xù)多年賠本賺吆喝的新生事物,一些投資者仍然抱以充分的寬容,,倒也算是一大奇景,。
本月初,電動(dòng)汽車初創(chuàng)公司法拉第未來(沒錯(cuò),,就是賈躍亭的法拉第未來)在美宣布,,該公司正在談判通過“特殊目的收購公司”(SPAC)的形式上市。法拉第未來謀求融資8.5億美元,,以正式推出該公司的首款商用電動(dòng)汽車,。SPAC又被稱為“空白支票公司”,是一種走捷徑的上市融資公司,。SPAC模式今年大受歡迎,,特別是在電動(dòng)汽車領(lǐng)域,很大程度上是因?yàn)樗纳鲜兴俣瓤煊趥鹘y(tǒng)的IPO模式,。
速度雖然有了,,但SPAC容易被人詬病的地方,就是它的財(cái)務(wù)透明度和公眾監(jiān)督度不如傳統(tǒng)的IPO模式,,因此對(duì)投資者來說未必是最佳選擇,。畢竟由于眾所周知的各種財(cái)務(wù)和運(yùn)營問題,法拉第未來連一輛車還沒有造出來,,就已經(jīng)燒掉20億美元了,。
不過法拉第未來并不是一個(gè)人在戰(zhàn)斗,另外兩家命運(yùn)多舛的電動(dòng)汽車公司——菲斯克(Fisker)和卡瑪汽車(Karma Automotive),,也已經(jīng)拉到了融資或者正在融資,。這是一個(gè)值得注意的現(xiàn)象,說明投資者認(rèn)為電動(dòng)汽車的概念還是很有希望的——抑或這又是金融市場(chǎng)一次不切實(shí)際的狂歡,。
法拉第未來的失敗
這時(shí)又不得不提法拉第未來的創(chuàng)始人——賈躍亭了,。如果法拉第未來真的上市了,它不可避免地將要承擔(dān)賈躍亭的一系列管理問題和誠信問題所引發(fā)的惡果,。
法拉第未來是賈躍亭在2014年創(chuàng)辦的,。眾所周知,它的注冊(cè)資本來自賈躍亭的樂視生態(tài),。不過早在2016年,,法拉第未來就暴露出了拖欠款項(xiàng),、取消建廠、與樂視的電動(dòng)車項(xiàng)目的關(guān)系曖昧不清等問題,。據(jù)說樂視的電動(dòng)車項(xiàng)目就動(dòng)用了法拉第未來的不少資源,。
此外還有賈躍亭在國內(nèi)欠下的賬——當(dāng)時(shí),野蠻擴(kuò)張的樂視已經(jīng)欠下了巨額債務(wù),,其中很大的一部分與中國國內(nèi)的“影子銀行”有關(guān),。事實(shí)證明,這場(chǎng)豪賭的結(jié)局是很難看的:樂視此后進(jìn)行了大規(guī)模的裁員,,并且砍掉了很多子公司,。
最讓人震驚的是,由于樂視帝國的崩盤,,賈躍亭個(gè)人也背上了高達(dá)36億美元的債務(wù),。這直接導(dǎo)致他個(gè)人宣告破產(chǎn),不過他的債權(quán)人仍然指控他采取各種欺詐手段隱藏資產(chǎn)和逃避債務(wù),。
菲斯克的厄運(yùn)
菲斯克倒還沒有經(jīng)歷過法拉第未來那樣的混亂,,不過菲斯克的失利本可避免。今年7月,,菲斯克宣布將以29億美元的估值,,通過SPAC模式上市融資10億美元。不過現(xiàn)在的菲斯克已經(jīng)是其創(chuàng)始人亨里克?菲斯克創(chuàng)辦的第二家電動(dòng)汽車公司了,。它的前身“菲斯克汽車”則以失敗告終,。
菲斯克汽車公司成立于2007年,在其首款豪華混動(dòng)車型菲斯克Karma遭遇失敗后,,公司也于2013年倒閉,。Karma的設(shè)計(jì)雖然廣受贊譽(yù),但它卻遭到了生產(chǎn)質(zhì)量不穩(wěn)定以及供應(yīng)鏈和技術(shù)方面的問題,,最終只生產(chǎn)了2,000臺(tái)左右,。
菲斯克汽車的剩余資產(chǎn)被賣給了中國的一家汽車零部件廠商,后又被拆分為Karma汽車公司,。自那以后,Karma汽車又生產(chǎn)了一版換湯不換藥的菲斯克Karma,,起名叫做Karma Revero,,不過產(chǎn)量較少,據(jù)報(bào)道,,2019年該車型只售出了1,000臺(tái)左右,。不過Karma汽車也宣布了上市計(jì)劃,其目標(biāo)是通過IPO融資3億美元,。
時(shí)代變了,?
那么,,究竟是發(fā)生了哪些變化,讓投資者決定忽略這些公司的一些根源性問題,?
在談到公司前景時(shí),,法拉第未來的發(fā)言人約翰?席林說:“盡管我們?cè)庥隽烁鞣N內(nèi)部和外部壓力,但我們?nèi)匀辉谇斑M(jìn),?!彼硎荆駷橹沟?0億美元投資讓法拉第未來已經(jīng)做好了面向未來的準(zhǔn)備,?!拔覀冇凶约旱募夹g(shù)……和強(qiáng)大的制造能力,可以迅速開始生產(chǎn),?!?/p>
對(duì)于法拉第未來來說,這家公司最大的變化,,就是賈躍亭不再持股,。很多投資人之所以對(duì)法拉第未來望而卻步,一個(gè)重要的原因就是擔(dān)心賈躍亭,。不過隨著賈躍亭個(gè)人宣告破產(chǎn),,他已經(jīng)放棄了自己的所有股。但作為法拉第未來的“首席產(chǎn)品和用戶生態(tài)官”,,賈躍亭目前仍然在這家公司里扮演著一個(gè)重要的角色,。
Karma轎車雖然失敗了,但菲斯克卻沒有那么重的歷史包袱,。Karma可以說是電動(dòng)汽車市場(chǎng)真正的先驅(qū)者,,它打入市場(chǎng)還在特斯拉的Model S之前。菲斯克的一位發(fā)言人強(qiáng)調(diào):“我們今天創(chuàng)辦的公司已經(jīng)吸取了過去的所有教訓(xùn),?!?/p>
菲斯克學(xué)到的教訓(xùn)之一,就是將重點(diǎn)從高端轎跑轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)槊嫦蛑卸耸袌?chǎng)的全電動(dòng)SUV,,這款新車型預(yù)計(jì)將在2022年上市,。菲斯克最近已經(jīng)與麥格納斯太爾公司(Magna Steyr)簽訂了生產(chǎn)合同——該公司也為梅賽德斯-奔馳(Mercedes-Benz)和豐田(Toyota)等公司代工生產(chǎn)電動(dòng)汽車。與法拉第未來不同的是,,菲斯克表示,,它已經(jīng)有了足夠的資金來生產(chǎn)全新車型,而此次融資“只是另一種去風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的手段”,。
今年9月,,Karma汽車宣布了公司的重大轉(zhuǎn)型計(jì)劃。該公司計(jì)劃從2021年起推出新的全電動(dòng)汽車產(chǎn)品線,,包括皮卡和SUV等車型,。該公司還招募了一些業(yè)界知名的人才,,比如麥格納斯太爾公司的前首席運(yùn)營官凱文?巴甫洛夫等。
市場(chǎng)大環(huán)境的變化也是使投資者更加關(guān)注電動(dòng)汽車的原因之一,。今年9月,,美國加州政府宣布,到2035年前,,加州的所有汽車要全部實(shí)現(xiàn)零排放——差不多就是電動(dòng)化,。屆時(shí),加州的電動(dòng)汽車市場(chǎng)將大幅擴(kuò)大,。而電池成本的持續(xù)下降,,也讓電動(dòng)汽車不久就將在價(jià)格上與燃油車有一戰(zhàn)之力,并使整個(gè)市場(chǎng)迅速向電動(dòng)汽車轉(zhuǎn)型,。
不過說到底,,菲斯克和法拉第未來之所以還能夠圈到錢,還得感謝特斯拉,。由于大家普遍預(yù)期汽車電動(dòng)化的大趨勢(shì)不可避免,,在過去12個(gè)月里,特斯拉的股價(jià)漲勢(shì)驚人,。菲斯克,、法拉第未來和Karma汽車都承認(rèn),活躍的投資市場(chǎng)是影響了它們上市決策的重要原因,。只要電動(dòng)汽車的增長勢(shì)頭良好,,投資者就很可能愿意把錢投給其他電動(dòng)汽車廠商,即使它們的光環(huán)相對(duì)失色,。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:樸成奎
The conventional path to taking a company public is pretty simple: demonstrate some early success, then sell shares for capital that can be used to expand. This year, electric vehicle startups have gone public in droves on those terms, with multibillion-dollar valuations doled out to innovators like QuantumScape, a battery developer, and Hyliion, which makes electrified powertrains for freight trucks.
EVs are so hot right now that startups don’t need to be particularly promising or novel to nab funding. Raising money before turning a profit is no longer particularly notable, but when it comes to EVs, years of outright failure are apparently just fine by some investors.
The latest example came early this month when EV startup Faraday Future announced that it is negotiating to go public via a Special Purpose Acquisition Company or SPAC. The company aims to raise $850 million to fund its first commercial electric car. SPACs, also known as “blank check companies,” are a quick path to public fundraising that has seen a massive surge in popularity this year, particularly in the EV realm, largely because the method is faster than a conventional initial public offering.
But that speed—which entails somewhat less financial transparency and public scrutiny than a traditional IPO—may not serve investors well. After all, Faraday has already burned through $2 billion without producing a vehicle, thanks to a variety of financial and operational problems.
But Faraday wouldn’t be alone: Two other EV companies with checkered histories, Fisker and Karma Automotive, have secured or are pursuing major new funding. It’s a remarkable indicator of the promise investors see in EVs—or, maybe, of a market craze that has lost touch with reality.
Faraday’s failure
If and when Faraday Future hits public markets, it will bear a huge legacy of mismanagement and alleged deceptive behavior by its founder, Jia Yueting.
Jia started Faraday Future in 2014 using funds from his massive China-based conglomerate, LeEco. But as early as 2016, Faraday was wracked by problems including unpaid bills, canceled factories, and an opaque relationship with LeEco’s EV effort that reportedly drew resources away from Faraday’s own work.
Some of those problems stemmed from problems at Jia’s other company; LeEco was at the time relying on huge debt, much of it drawn from China’s “shadow banking” sector, to fund aggressive expansion. That bet went very badly: LeEco has since gone through massive layoffs and shed many of its subsidiaries.
Most shocking of all, it soon became clear that Jia was personally on the hook for a staggering $3.6 billion worth of liabilities stemming from LeEco’s collapse. That led Jia to declare personal bankruptcy, but his creditors accused him of using a variety of deceptions to hide assets and escape his debts.
Fisker’s bad Karma
Fisker hasn’t dealt with anything like the chaos at Faraday, but it is tarnished by arguably avoidable failure. The company in July announced plans to go public via a SPAC and raise around $1 billion at a $2.9 billion valuation. But Fisker is the second electric vehicle startup from founder Henrik Fisker—and the first, Fisker Automotive, was a flop.
Fisker Automotive was founded in 2007 and collapsed by 2013 after the failure of its first model, the luxury gasoline-electric hybrid Fisker Karma. Though widely praised for its design, the vehicle suffered from inconsistent production quality, supply chain problems, and technical issues. Only about 2,000 were ever produced.
The remains of Fisker Automotive were sold to a Chinese auto-parts maker and spun out as Karma Automotive. Karma Automotive has since produced a rebranded version of the Fisker Karma, now known as the Karma Revero, though in small quantities; only about 1,000 Karma Reveros were reportedly sold in 2019. But Karma Automotive, too, recently announced plans to go public, aiming to raise $300 million in an IPO.
What changed?
So what has changed to help investors look past these companies’ troubled roots?
“Even with all of the internal and external forces we’ve encountered, we are still moving forward,” said John Schilling, a spokesperson for Faraday Future, of the company’s prospects. The $2 billion invested so far, he says, positions Faraday well for the future: “We have our own technology…robust manufacturing capabilities, and can begin production quickly.”
But the most significant change at Faraday is that Jia Yueting no longer owns shares in the company. Jia’s power had been cited as a significant deterrent to new investors, given his track record, but he gave up his ownership stake as part of his personal bankruptcy. He does still have a significant role at Faraday, though, as its “chief product and user-eco officer.”
Despite the failure of the Karma, Fisker’s baggage isn’t nearly so heavy. The Karma was a real trailblazer, hitting the market before the Tesla Model S. And a Fisker spokesperson emphasized that “the company we’re building today draws on all of the lessons learned from the past.”
Among other things, that has meant shifting focus from a high-end sports sedan to a mid-market all-electric SUV, expected to go on sale in 2022. Fisker recently signed up contract builder Magna Steyr, which also produces EVs for the likes of Mercedes-Benz and Toyota, to produce the car. And unlike Faraday, Fisker says it already has enough funding to produce its debut vehicle, describing its fundraising as “another way to de-risk.”
In September, Karma Automotive announced a major transition of its own. It plans to roll out a new slate of fully electric vehicles, including a pickup and SUV, starting in 2021. It has also added some notable talent, including chief operating officer Kevin Pavlov, formerly of Magna.
Broader market changes have also made EVs generally more appealing to investors. In September, California declared that all cars sold in the state must be zero-emission—primarily meaning electric—by 2035, which can be expected to expand the EV market substantially. And continued declines in the cost of batteries could soon make EVs price-competitive with gas-burning cars and trigger a rapid, market-wide shift to EVs.
But really, Fisker’s and Faraday’s ability to raise money hinges on one word: Tesla. Elon Musk’s company has seen a staggering stock run-up over the past 12 months, as the idea of an EV-dominated future catches on. Fisker, Faraday Future, and Karma Automotive all acknowledge that the active investment market influenced their decision to pursue a public offering right now. As long as the EV growth story holds up, investors will likely be happy to hand over money to other EV makers, even if their halos are slightly tarnished.