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入市須謹(jǐn)慎,!當(dāng)前美股估值水平太高,史上只出現(xiàn)過(guò)三次

Shawn Tully
2020-08-12

不管看多者如何解釋都繞不過(guò)一個(gè)基本事實(shí):當(dāng)股票價(jià)格過(guò)高,,企業(yè)要想提供豐厚的收益得靠奇跡降臨;如果在股價(jià)便宜時(shí)混一混,反而能提供可觀的回報(bào)。

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8月5日,著名的席勒市盈率達(dá)到31.1,,是近兩年來(lái)最高,。那么,問(wèn)題來(lái)了:價(jià)格如此之高時(shí)買入的投資者結(jié)局會(huì)怎樣,?

過(guò)去幾天,,華爾街分析師和商業(yè)新聞主播一直警告稱,股票價(jià)格越來(lái)越高,,可能沒(méi)有太多運(yùn)作空間,。各路消息當(dāng)中,蘋果公司股價(jià)驚人飆升的新聞讓人們不由得關(guān)注警告,。8月5日,,美國(guó)銀行的分析師沃姆西·莫漢罕見(jiàn)地下調(diào)了蘋果公司的評(píng)級(jí),引發(fā)大爭(zhēng)論,。電視主持人和嘉賓們唇槍舌劍,驚嘆蘋果市值從去年6月的9000億美元翻了一番還多,,達(dá)到了1.95萬(wàn)億美元,,市盈率也從16.9倍飆升至35倍。

突然間,,投資者眼中的蘋果從潛在價(jià)值很高的股票變?yōu)榘嘿F的高價(jià)股,,而且可能是大盤股市場(chǎng)上漲過(guò)高過(guò)快的先兆。這讓人擔(dān)心,,如果在當(dāng)今高位買入,,或許只能獲得微薄收益,遭受嚴(yán)重?fù)p失的可能性更大,。為了判斷在蘋果激起普遍懷疑的當(dāng)下投資者是否有機(jī)會(huì)大賺,,一如華爾街絕多數(shù)策略師的預(yù)測(cè),我們要觀察下按今天估值大舉入市的人們和基金投資組合接下來(lái)幾年表現(xiàn)如何,。對(duì)于已經(jīng)持有美國(guó)大盤股的人來(lái)說(shuō),,面臨的是同樣問(wèn)題:如果過(guò)去幾個(gè)月已從股市暴漲中獲利,繼續(xù)持有期待未來(lái)上漲是否明智,?

為比較股票目前與過(guò)去一段時(shí)間從便宜到昂貴的情況,,我們將使用CAPE指標(biāo),即耶魯大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家羅伯特·希勒提出的周期調(diào)整市盈率,。CAPE計(jì)算方法中將當(dāng)前利潤(rùn)調(diào)整為通脹調(diào)整后按美國(guó)通用會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則算每股收益10年平均值,。因此,,衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)可平滑每股收益,如此一來(lái)經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退中利潤(rùn)遠(yuǎn)低于歷史標(biāo)準(zhǔn),,或因利潤(rùn)泡沫達(dá)到不可持續(xù)的高點(diǎn)讓標(biāo)普指數(shù)顯得較低時(shí),,市盈率不會(huì)人為夸大。

利用CAPE指標(biāo)分析從未像疫情期間一樣直觀,。因?yàn)槔麧?rùn)暴跌導(dǎo)致標(biāo)普500指數(shù)看起來(lái)比實(shí)際貴得多,。分母即2020年的預(yù)期每股收益,表現(xiàn)得嚴(yán)重低迷,,低估了大盤股在正常經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況下(未遭受百年一遇災(zāi)難重創(chuàng))的潛在盈利能力,。暫時(shí)性大幅下跌導(dǎo)致市盈率膨脹,使得用來(lái)判斷當(dāng)前與之前一段時(shí)間的估值比較變得不太可靠,。

CAPE指標(biāo)消除了不穩(wěn)定因素導(dǎo)致的扭曲,,就像現(xiàn)在的情況。根據(jù)8月5日標(biāo)普500指數(shù)3327點(diǎn)的股價(jià),,今天調(diào)整后的市盈率為31.1倍,。這個(gè)數(shù)字已經(jīng)很高,是2018年9月以來(lái)CAPE首次觸及的峰值,。事實(shí)上,,在席勒收集數(shù)據(jù)涵蓋的132年里,CAPE只有三次達(dá)到31.1倍并在隨后一段時(shí)期保持在更高位,。第四次觸及31.1是我寫下本文的日子,。

市盈率達(dá)到31.1之后的兩年、五年和10年里,,標(biāo)普指數(shù)的表現(xiàn)相當(dāng)有指導(dǎo)意義,。相關(guān)結(jié)果可能會(huì)供線索,告訴人們從此刻開始,,相同時(shí)間內(nèi)的收益情況,。

結(jié)果雖然比較悲觀,但并未提供確鑿證據(jù)證明以當(dāng)前價(jià)格買入必然賠錢,。如果考慮另外兩個(gè)因素帶來(lái)的挑戰(zhàn),,即歷史上每股收益緩慢增長(zhǎng)以及市盈率登高必跌的趨勢(shì),華爾街“知更鳥”的樂(lè)觀預(yù)測(cè)則更像臆想,。

市盈率第一次達(dá)到當(dāng)前的31.1是1929年8月,,當(dāng)時(shí)正值大蕭條之前的狂熱時(shí)期。兩年后,,標(biāo)普指數(shù)下跌了30%,,五年后跌幅擴(kuò)大到54%。到1939年夏天,標(biāo)普指數(shù)的十年跌幅仍然達(dá)到42%,。順便說(shuō)一句,,1929年標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾的席勒倍數(shù)超過(guò)31的時(shí)間只保持了兩個(gè)月。

58年之后,,直到1997年6月CAPE才再次達(dá)到31.1,。當(dāng)月,標(biāo)普500指數(shù)創(chuàng)下876點(diǎn)的歷史新高,。令人驚奇的是,,CAPE從此上升。1998年2月到2001年2月,,一直保持在33倍或更高,,且令人震驚地保持了三年。其中有21個(gè)月里,,CAPE超過(guò)了40,,這是空前絕后的紀(jì)錄。正是當(dāng)年臭名昭著的科技股狂熱,,才推動(dòng)市盈率膨脹到如此高的水平,。

即使從31.1的高點(diǎn)算起,一段時(shí)間內(nèi)股市也表現(xiàn)出色,。兩年后的1999年6月,,標(biāo)普指數(shù)收于1322點(diǎn),上漲51%,。但漲勢(shì)并未持續(xù),。觸及31.1倍的五年時(shí)間里,指數(shù)總收益為15.3%,,也就是每年漲幅3%。三個(gè)月后,,互聯(lián)網(wǎng)泡沫破滅,,投資者蒙受巨虧。

到了2007年6月,,也就是10年后,,總收益為73%,每年達(dá)到5.8%,,可以說(shuō)相當(dāng)出色,。一年之內(nèi)到2008年年中,標(biāo)普指數(shù)又回到了起點(diǎn),,2007年6月的市盈率31.1倍,。剛好10年多一點(diǎn)時(shí)間里,市場(chǎng)經(jīng)歷了完整的周期,抹去了一路漲幅,。

第三次是在2017年11月,,當(dāng)時(shí)CAPE是近17年里首次達(dá)到該倍數(shù)。11個(gè)月里,,市盈率保持在31以上,,但從未超過(guò)33.3。接下來(lái)兩年里,,標(biāo)普指數(shù)上漲了20%,。當(dāng)然,要等到2022年年底才能完成五年的考驗(yàn),。自2017年年底倍數(shù)達(dá)到31.1以來(lái),,標(biāo)普指數(shù)上漲了28%,年化增長(zhǎng)率為8.5%,。

CAPE第四次觸達(dá)31.1,,則是在2020年8月5日。

那么,,通過(guò)過(guò)去從同一起點(diǎn)獲得的收益情況如何預(yù)測(cè)未來(lái),?我們從過(guò)往經(jīng)驗(yàn)可得出以下結(jié)論。

首先,, CAPE達(dá)到30以上時(shí),,短期收益可能相當(dāng)豐厚,但從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看,,回報(bào)往往會(huì)扭頭向下,。1997年市盈率達(dá)到31.1的五年后,指數(shù)幾乎沒(méi)有跑贏過(guò)通脹水平,。10年后,,年增長(zhǎng)率低于6%,此后不到12個(gè)月,,金融危機(jī)中增長(zhǎng)率變成了負(fù)數(shù),。

2017年11月以來(lái),8.5%的回報(bào)率相當(dāng)不錯(cuò),,但現(xiàn)在下結(jié)論說(shuō)能持續(xù)還為時(shí)過(guò)早,。從明確證據(jù)來(lái)看很難。

其次,,短期飆升主要原因是CAPE觸及31點(diǎn)并繼續(xù)走高,,就像2000年到2001年科技泡沫形成的幾個(gè)月里一樣。1999年年末到2002年,,CAPE上升幅度遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)31.1,,而且停留了很長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)間,,這是唯一一次。換言之,,CAPE不斷創(chuàng)下新高,,標(biāo)普指數(shù)才會(huì)大漲。我們可以得出結(jié)論,,想在倍數(shù)更高時(shí)獲利更多雖然有可能,,但機(jī)會(huì)并不大。

第三,,CAPE達(dá)到31.1,,尤其是達(dá)到之后繼續(xù)上升時(shí),就會(huì)開始走下坡路,。正是因?yàn)楫?dāng)年CAPE前所未有地達(dá)到40,,才引發(fā)了恐慌性拋售,推動(dòng)標(biāo)普指數(shù)跌至三年前首次觸及基準(zhǔn)點(diǎn)以下的點(diǎn)位,。

大蕭條時(shí)期,,CAPE從超過(guò)30下降到個(gè)位數(shù)。2002年,,倍數(shù)下降三分之一達(dá)到21,。即使2017年末達(dá)到31.1,在4月的拋售中CAPE也降到25,。似乎CAPE一旦超過(guò)30,,很可能接下來(lái)跌到25左右或更低,上漲的可能性小得多,,除非只是短期觸達(dá)高點(diǎn),。

第四,由于CAPE達(dá)到31.1后不太可能繼續(xù)上升,,投資者面臨兩個(gè)問(wèn)題,。首先,倍數(shù)收縮比保持穩(wěn)定的可能性大得多,,可能會(huì)打擊未來(lái)回報(bào)率,。其次,即使CAPE保持在31.1,,未來(lái)所有收益也都取決于盈利增長(zhǎng)。事實(shí)上,,近年來(lái)利潤(rùn)增長(zhǎng)是資本收益的主要因素,。隨著美國(guó)從2010年年初到2019年逐漸走出金融危機(jī),每股收益以每年8%的速度增長(zhǎng),。

然而,,該增速并不尋常,。1965年到2019年的55年間,經(jīng)通脹調(diào)整后每股收益增長(zhǎng)率為2.1%,。大約比國(guó)民收入增長(zhǎng)低一個(gè)百分點(diǎn),。雖然長(zhǎng)期來(lái)看總收益與整體經(jīng)濟(jì)掛鉤,但由于公司發(fā)行新股擴(kuò)張,,利潤(rùn)分散在龐大數(shù)量的股票上,,反映到每股收益有所滯后。新的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手也會(huì)進(jìn)入市場(chǎng)發(fā)行股票,,或者當(dāng)企業(yè)保持私有化,,攫取一部分利潤(rùn),留給市場(chǎng)原有參與方的蛋糕就會(huì)更小,。

第五,,CAPE往往與利率漲跌相反。多數(shù)情況下,,10年期國(guó)債收益率越低,,CAPE越高,反之亦然,。上世紀(jì)80年代初,,利率走高沖擊股市,如今創(chuàng)下歷史新低的收益率似乎正提振標(biāo)普,。購(gòu)買股票的最佳時(shí)機(jī)是利率處于高位或平均水平且CAPE較低時(shí),,比如1980年和2008年。最糟糕的時(shí)機(jī)則是相反情況,,比如1966年和2000年,。隨后幾年里買入者虧損相當(dāng)可怕,原因很簡(jiǎn)單,,全世界恢復(fù)正常時(shí)利率水平更高,,CAPE不斷下降拉動(dòng)股價(jià)走低。如今的高CAPE低利率環(huán)境與之前兩個(gè)狂熱時(shí)期比較相似,。

結(jié)論:在CAPE達(dá)到31.1倍之際買入股票相當(dāng)危險(xiǎn),。之后投資者愿意為每一美元收益支付的價(jià)格可能會(huì)不斷減少。現(xiàn)在每股收益因疫情封鎖受到重創(chuàng),,如果有此預(yù)估經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇時(shí)利潤(rùn)能大幅增長(zhǎng)彌補(bǔ)倍數(shù)下降,,可能有些牽強(qiáng)。

以歷史標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來(lái)看,,CAPE達(dá)到25倍仍然很高,,對(duì)應(yīng)的標(biāo)普指數(shù)為2950點(diǎn)左右,比當(dāng)前低11%,。更好的選擇是20倍的CAPE,,但有點(diǎn)可怕,。如果下跌到20倍,標(biāo)普500指數(shù)將下跌25%,,跌破2500點(diǎn),。不管看多者如何解釋都繞不過(guò)一個(gè)基本事實(shí):當(dāng)股票價(jià)格過(guò)高,企業(yè)要想提供豐厚的收益得靠奇跡降臨,;如果在股價(jià)便宜時(shí)混一混,,反而能提供可觀的回報(bào)。請(qǐng)記住,,2017年蘋果的市盈率僅為11倍,。對(duì)此,你更愿意當(dāng)時(shí)買入,,還是現(xiàn)在35倍時(shí)買入,?前一項(xiàng)選擇無(wú)需考慮,后一項(xiàng)則是賭博,。蘋果的故事正是整個(gè)市場(chǎng)發(fā)展的縮影,。你必須“相信”某個(gè)故事才會(huì)買入,如果兩種選擇都很劃算,,還用聽什么故事呢,。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

譯者:馮豐

審校:夏林

8月5日,著名的席勒市盈率達(dá)到31.1,,是近兩年來(lái)最高,。那么,問(wèn)題來(lái)了:價(jià)格如此之高時(shí)買入的投資者結(jié)局會(huì)怎樣,?

過(guò)去幾天,,華爾街分析師和商業(yè)新聞主播一直警告稱,股票價(jià)格越來(lái)越高,,可能沒(méi)有太多運(yùn)作空間,。各路消息當(dāng)中,蘋果公司股價(jià)驚人飆升的新聞讓人們不由得關(guān)注警告,。8月5日,,美國(guó)銀行的分析師沃姆西·莫漢罕見(jiàn)地下調(diào)了蘋果公司的評(píng)級(jí),引發(fā)大爭(zhēng)論,。電視主持人和嘉賓們唇槍舌劍,,驚嘆蘋果市值從去年6月的9000億美元翻了一番還多,達(dá)到了1.95萬(wàn)億美元,,市盈率也從16.9倍飆升至35倍,。

突然間,投資者眼中的蘋果從潛在價(jià)值很高的股票變?yōu)榘嘿F的高價(jià)股,,而且可能是大盤股市場(chǎng)上漲過(guò)高過(guò)快的先兆,。這讓人擔(dān)心,如果在當(dāng)今高位買入,,或許只能獲得微薄收益,,遭受嚴(yán)重?fù)p失的可能性更大。為了判斷在蘋果激起普遍懷疑的當(dāng)下投資者是否有機(jī)會(huì)大賺,,一如華爾街絕多數(shù)策略師的預(yù)測(cè),,我們要觀察下按今天估值大舉入市的人們和基金投資組合接下來(lái)幾年表現(xiàn)如何。對(duì)于已經(jīng)持有美國(guó)大盤股的人來(lái)說(shuō),,面臨的是同樣問(wèn)題:如果過(guò)去幾個(gè)月已從股市暴漲中獲利,,繼續(xù)持有期待未來(lái)上漲是否明智?

為比較股票目前與過(guò)去一段時(shí)間從便宜到昂貴的情況,,我們將使用CAPE指標(biāo),,即耶魯大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家羅伯特·希勒提出的周期調(diào)整市盈率。CAPE計(jì)算方法中將當(dāng)前利潤(rùn)調(diào)整為通脹調(diào)整后按美國(guó)通用會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則算每股收益10年平均值,。因此,,衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)可平滑每股收益,如此一來(lái)經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退中利潤(rùn)遠(yuǎn)低于歷史標(biāo)準(zhǔn),,或因利潤(rùn)泡沫達(dá)到不可持續(xù)的高點(diǎn)讓標(biāo)普指數(shù)顯得較低時(shí),,市盈率不會(huì)人為夸大。

利用CAPE指標(biāo)分析從未像疫情期間一樣直觀,。因?yàn)槔麧?rùn)暴跌導(dǎo)致標(biāo)普500指數(shù)看起來(lái)比實(shí)際貴得多,。分母即2020年的預(yù)期每股收益,表現(xiàn)得嚴(yán)重低迷,,低估了大盤股在正常經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況下(未遭受百年一遇災(zāi)難重創(chuàng))的潛在盈利能力,。暫時(shí)性大幅下跌導(dǎo)致市盈率膨脹,使得用來(lái)判斷當(dāng)前與之前一段時(shí)間的估值比較變得不太可靠,。

CAPE指標(biāo)消除了不穩(wěn)定因素導(dǎo)致的扭曲,,就像現(xiàn)在的情況。根據(jù)8月5日標(biāo)普500指數(shù)3327點(diǎn)的股價(jià),,今天調(diào)整后的市盈率為31.1倍,。這個(gè)數(shù)字已經(jīng)很高,是2018年9月以來(lái)CAPE首次觸及的峰值,。事實(shí)上,,在席勒收集數(shù)據(jù)涵蓋的132年里,CAPE只有三次達(dá)到31.1倍并在隨后一段時(shí)期保持在更高位,。第四次觸及31.1是我寫下本文的日子,。

市盈率達(dá)到31.1之后的兩年、五年和10年里,,標(biāo)普指數(shù)的表現(xiàn)相當(dāng)有指導(dǎo)意義,。相關(guān)結(jié)果可能會(huì)供線索,,告訴人們從此刻開始,相同時(shí)間內(nèi)的收益情況,。

結(jié)果雖然比較悲觀,,但并未提供確鑿證據(jù)證明以當(dāng)前價(jià)格買入必然賠錢。如果考慮另外兩個(gè)因素帶來(lái)的挑戰(zhàn),,即歷史上每股收益緩慢增長(zhǎng)以及市盈率登高必跌的趨勢(shì),,華爾街“知更鳥”的樂(lè)觀預(yù)測(cè)則更像臆想。

市盈率第一次達(dá)到當(dāng)前的31.1是1929年8月,,當(dāng)時(shí)正值大蕭條之前的狂熱時(shí)期,。兩年后,標(biāo)普指數(shù)下跌了30%,,五年后跌幅擴(kuò)大到54%,。到1939年夏天,標(biāo)普指數(shù)的十年跌幅仍然達(dá)到42%,。順便說(shuō)一句,,1929年標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾的席勒倍數(shù)超過(guò)31的時(shí)間只保持了兩個(gè)月。

58年之后,,直到1997年6月CAPE才再次達(dá)到31.1,。當(dāng)月,標(biāo)普500指數(shù)創(chuàng)下876點(diǎn)的歷史新高,。令人驚奇的是,,CAPE從此上升。1998年2月到2001年2月,,一直保持在33倍或更高,,且令人震驚地保持了三年。其中有21個(gè)月里,,CAPE超過(guò)了40,,這是空前絕后的紀(jì)錄。正是當(dāng)年臭名昭著的科技股狂熱,,才推動(dòng)市盈率膨脹到如此高的水平,。

即使從31.1的高點(diǎn)算起,一段時(shí)間內(nèi)股市也表現(xiàn)出色,。兩年后的1999年6月,,標(biāo)普指數(shù)收于1322點(diǎn),上漲51%,。但漲勢(shì)并未持續(xù),。觸及31.1倍的五年時(shí)間里,指數(shù)總收益為15.3%,也就是每年漲幅3%,。三個(gè)月后,,互聯(lián)網(wǎng)泡沫破滅,投資者蒙受巨虧,。

到了2007年6月,,也就是10年后,總收益為73%,,每年達(dá)到5.8%,可以說(shuō)相當(dāng)出色,。一年之內(nèi)到2008年年中,,標(biāo)普指數(shù)又回到了起點(diǎn),2007年6月的市盈率31.1倍,。剛好10年多一點(diǎn)時(shí)間里,,市場(chǎng)經(jīng)歷了完整的周期,抹去了一路漲幅,。

第三次是在2017年11月,,當(dāng)時(shí)CAPE是近17年里首次達(dá)到該倍數(shù)。11個(gè)月里,,市盈率保持在31以上,,但從未超過(guò)33.3。接下來(lái)兩年里,,標(biāo)普指數(shù)上漲了20%,。當(dāng)然,要等到2022年年底才能完成五年的考驗(yàn),。自2017年年底倍數(shù)達(dá)到31.1以來(lái),,標(biāo)普指數(shù)上漲了28%,年化增長(zhǎng)率為8.5%,。

CAPE第四次觸達(dá)31.1,,則是在2020年8月5日。

那么,,通過(guò)過(guò)去從同一起點(diǎn)獲得的收益情況如何預(yù)測(cè)未來(lái),?我們從過(guò)往經(jīng)驗(yàn)可得出以下結(jié)論。

首先,, CAPE達(dá)到30以上時(shí),,短期收益可能相當(dāng)豐厚,但從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看,,回報(bào)往往會(huì)扭頭向下,。1997年市盈率達(dá)到31.1的五年后,指數(shù)幾乎沒(méi)有跑贏過(guò)通脹水平。10年后,,年增長(zhǎng)率低于6%,,此后不到12個(gè)月,金融危機(jī)中增長(zhǎng)率變成了負(fù)數(shù),。

2017年11月以來(lái),,8.5%的回報(bào)率相當(dāng)不錯(cuò),但現(xiàn)在下結(jié)論說(shuō)能持續(xù)還為時(shí)過(guò)早,。從明確證據(jù)來(lái)看很難,。

其次,短期飆升主要原因是CAPE觸及31點(diǎn)并繼續(xù)走高,,就像2000年到2001年科技泡沫形成的幾個(gè)月里一樣,。1999年年末到2002年,CAPE上升幅度遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)31.1,,而且停留了很長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)間,,這是唯一一次。換言之,,CAPE不斷創(chuàng)下新高,,標(biāo)普指數(shù)才會(huì)大漲。我們可以得出結(jié)論,,想在倍數(shù)更高時(shí)獲利更多雖然有可能,,但機(jī)會(huì)并不大。

第三,,CAPE達(dá)到31.1,,尤其是達(dá)到之后繼續(xù)上升時(shí),就會(huì)開始走下坡路,。正是因?yàn)楫?dāng)年CAPE前所未有地達(dá)到40,,才引發(fā)了恐慌性拋售,推動(dòng)標(biāo)普指數(shù)跌至三年前首次觸及基準(zhǔn)點(diǎn)以下的點(diǎn)位,。

大蕭條時(shí)期,,CAPE從超過(guò)30下降到個(gè)位數(shù)。2002年,,倍數(shù)下降三分之一達(dá)到21,。即使2017年末達(dá)到31.1,在4月的拋售中CAPE也降到25,。似乎CAPE一旦超過(guò)30,,很可能接下來(lái)跌到25左右或更低,上漲的可能性小得多,,除非只是短期觸達(dá)高點(diǎn),。

第四,,由于CAPE達(dá)到31.1后不太可能繼續(xù)上升,投資者面臨兩個(gè)問(wèn)題,。首先,,倍數(shù)收縮比保持穩(wěn)定的可能性大得多,可能會(huì)打擊未來(lái)回報(bào)率,。其次,,即使CAPE保持在31.1,未來(lái)所有收益也都取決于盈利增長(zhǎng),。事實(shí)上,,近年來(lái)利潤(rùn)增長(zhǎng)是資本收益的主要因素。隨著美國(guó)從2010年年初到2019年逐漸走出金融危機(jī),,每股收益以每年8%的速度增長(zhǎng),。

然而,該增速并不尋常,。1965年到2019年的55年間,經(jīng)通脹調(diào)整后每股收益增長(zhǎng)率為2.1%,。大約比國(guó)民收入增長(zhǎng)低一個(gè)百分點(diǎn),。雖然長(zhǎng)期來(lái)看總收益與整體經(jīng)濟(jì)掛鉤,但由于公司發(fā)行新股擴(kuò)張,,利潤(rùn)分散在龐大數(shù)量的股票上,,反映到每股收益有所滯后。新的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手也會(huì)進(jìn)入市場(chǎng)發(fā)行股票,,或者當(dāng)企業(yè)保持私有化,,攫取一部分利潤(rùn),留給市場(chǎng)原有參與方的蛋糕就會(huì)更小,。

第五,,CAPE往往與利率漲跌相反。多數(shù)情況下,,10年期國(guó)債收益率越低,,CAPE越高,反之亦然,。上世紀(jì)80年代初,,利率走高沖擊股市,如今創(chuàng)下歷史新低的收益率似乎正提振標(biāo)普,。購(gòu)買股票的最佳時(shí)機(jī)是利率處于高位或平均水平且CAPE較低時(shí),,比如1980年和2008年。最糟糕的時(shí)機(jī)則是相反情況,,比如1966年和2000年,。隨后幾年里買入者虧損相當(dāng)可怕,原因很簡(jiǎn)單,全世界恢復(fù)正常時(shí)利率水平更高,,CAPE不斷下降拉動(dòng)股價(jià)走低,。如今的高CAPE低利率環(huán)境與之前兩個(gè)狂熱時(shí)期比較相似。

結(jié)論:在CAPE達(dá)到31.1倍之際買入股票相當(dāng)危險(xiǎn),。之后投資者愿意為每一美元收益支付的價(jià)格可能會(huì)不斷減少?,F(xiàn)在每股收益因疫情封鎖受到重創(chuàng),如果有此預(yù)估經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇時(shí)利潤(rùn)能大幅增長(zhǎng)彌補(bǔ)倍數(shù)下降,,可能有些牽強(qiáng),。

以歷史標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來(lái)看,CAPE達(dá)到25倍仍然很高,,對(duì)應(yīng)的標(biāo)普指數(shù)為2950點(diǎn)左右,,比當(dāng)前低11%。更好的選擇是20倍的CAPE,,但有點(diǎn)可怕,。如果下跌到20倍,標(biāo)普500指數(shù)將下跌25%,,跌破2500點(diǎn),。不管看多者如何解釋都繞不過(guò)一個(gè)基本事實(shí):當(dāng)股票價(jià)格過(guò)高,企業(yè)要想提供豐厚的收益得靠奇跡降臨,;如果在股價(jià)便宜時(shí)混一混,,反而能提供可觀的回報(bào)。請(qǐng)記住,,2017年蘋果的市盈率僅為11倍,。對(duì)此,你更愿意當(dāng)時(shí)買入,,還是現(xiàn)在35倍時(shí)買入,?前一項(xiàng)選擇無(wú)需考慮,后一項(xiàng)則是賭博,。蘋果的故事正是整個(gè)市場(chǎng)發(fā)展的縮影,。你必須“相信”某個(gè)故事才會(huì)買入,如果兩種選擇都很劃算,,還用聽什么故事呢,。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

譯者:馮豐

審校:夏林

The famous Shiller P/E hit 31.1 on Aug. 5, the biggest number in almost two years. So the question naturally arises: How have investors who bought at these what look to be rich prices fared in the past?

In the last few days, Wall Street analysts and business news anchors have been cautioning that stocks are getting pricey—so pricey that they may not have much room to run. More than any other news, it's Apple's spectacular rise that's brought these warnings front and center. On Aug. 5, Bank of America analyst Wamsi Mohan stoked the debate by issuing a rare downgrade on Apple, citing its "rapid multiple expansion." TV hosts and their guests picked up the beat, marveling that the iPhone maker's valuation has more than doubled from $900 billion in June of last year to $1.95 trillion, driven almost entirely by a jump in its price/earnings multiple from 16.9 to 35.

Suddenly, investors are viewing Apple's sudden metamorphosis from a deep value stock to an expensive high-flier as a possible bellwether that the entire big-cap market has zoomed too far, too fast. That's raising fears that if you buy at today's lofty levels, you're likely to garner at best puny gains and, more likely, suffer stiff losses. To assess the probability that investors can pocket strong returns from here—as the vast majority of Wall Street's market strategists still predict, despite the doubts sown by Apple—let's see how the portfolios of the folks and funds who jumped in at today's valuations performed in the years that followed. It's the same question for those who already own U.S. big-caps: Were the people who profited from a run-up like the boom over the past few months wise to keep all of their shares in hopes of more upside to come?

To compare where stocks stand today versus past periods on the continuum from cheap to expensive, we'll use the CAPE, or cyclically adjusted price/earnings ratio developed by Yale economist Robert Shiller. The CAPE methodology restates current profits as a 10-year average of trailing GAAP earnings per share, adjusted for inflation. Thus, the yardstick smooths EPS so that P/Es aren't artificially inflated when a recession, say, drives profits well below their historic norm, or the S&P looks like a bargain because profits bubble to unsustainable highs.

The value of deploying the CAPE has never been clearer than during the pandemic crisis. That's because the collapse in profits is making the S&P 500 appear much more expensive than it actually is. The denominator, projected EPS for 2020, is severely depressed and way understates the underlying earnings power of big-cap stocks in a normal economy that isn't wracked by a once-in-a-century calamity. That big, temporary drop inflates the P/E, making the multiple an unreliable gauge of today's valuations versus past periods.

The CAPE eliminates the distortions caused by lurching swings like the one we're now seeing. It puts today's adjusted P/E at 31.1, based on the S&P 500 price of 3327 on Aug. 5. That's a big number, a peak that the CAPE reached for the first time since September 2018. In fact, the CAPE has only hit 31.1, and stayed there or higher for subsequent periods, during three episodes over the 132 years covered by the Shiller data. The fourth time it reached 31.1 is the day I'm writing this story.

It's instructive to examine how the S&P has performed in the two-, five-, and 10-year periods that following the month when the multiple reached 31.1. Those results may provide clues to where returns will settle over the same interludes starting now.

The results are downbeat, but they don't provide conclusive evidence that purchasing at these prices is anything like a sure loser. It's when you add the challenges posed by two other factors that drive returns—historically slow growth in EPS and the tendency of lofty multiples to drop—that Wall Street's bluebird forecasts look like fantasies.

The first time the P/E reached the current 31.1 was in August 1929, amid the craze preceding the Great Depression. It's hardly surprising that two years later, the S&P had dropped 30%, and after five years the loss had swelled to 54%. By the summer of 1939, the index was still nursing a 42% loss over the past decade. By the way, the S&P's Shiller multiple was over 31 for only two months in 1929.

It didn't reach 31.1 again for 58 years, until June 1997. That month, the S&P 500 hit a record of 876. Amazingly the CAPE ballooned from there. It hovered at 33 or higher for the astounding span of three years, from February 1998 to February 2001. For 21 of those months, the CAPE exceeded 40, a number that it has never recorded before or since. Those gigantic P/Es were driven by the infamous frenzy in tech stocks.

Even from a lofty starting point of 31.1, stocks did great—for a while. After two years, in June 1999, the S&P stood at 1322, registering a gain of 51%. But the bounty didn't last. Five years from reaching a CAPE of 31.1, the index had delivered a total gain of 15.3% or a teeny 3% a year. Three months after that, investors were sitting on a loss as the dotcom bubble exploded.

By June 2007, a decade hence, the total gain was 73%, or a less-than-terrific 5.8% a year. And within a year, by mid-2008, the S&P was back to where we started, at a 31.1 P/E in June 2007. The market had made a complete roundtrip in just over a decade, erasing all the gains along the way.

The third bell-ringer came in November 2017, when the CAPE reached our mark for the first time in almost 17 years. The P/E, in fact, stayed over 31 for 11 months but never exceeded 33.3. Over the following two years, the S&P waxed by 20%. Of course, we won't reach the five-year test until late 2022. But as of today, the S&P's increase since hitting 31.1 in late 2017 is 28%, or 8.5% annualized.

The fourth time the CAPE made 31.1 was Aug. 5, 2020.

So what do the past returns from the same starting point tell us about what to expect? We can draw the following conclusions from those episodes.

First, short-term gains can be fabulous after starting at a 30-plus CAPE, but over a longer horizon, those returns tend to reverse. Five years after our P/E reached 31.1 in 1997, the index had barely beaten inflation. After 10 years, the annual increase was under 6%, and less than 12 months after that, went negative in the financial crisis.

The 8.5% returns we've seen since November 2017 are good, but it's too early to conclude that they'll last. Strong evidence suggests that they won't.

Second, the short-term jumps arise mainly when the CAPE hits 31 and runs higher, as it did for many months in the build-up to the 2000–2001 tech bubble. But the span from late 1999 to 2002 is the only episode in which the CAPE rose well above 31.1 and stayed there for an extended period. In other words, the S&P got a big boost only from a CAPE that kept notching new heights on one occasion. We can conclude that getting more juice from an even higher multiple, though possible, is unlikely.

Third, when the CAPE reaches 31.1, and especially when it keeps climbing from there, it topples from the mountaintop. It was the CAPE's never-before-witnessed flights into the 40s that triggered the panic selloff and sent the S&P below where it first hit our benchmark three years before.

In the Great Depression, the CAPE dropped from 30-plus to single digits. In 2002, it slid by one-third to 21. Even after hitting 31.1 in late 2017, the CAPE shrank to 25 in the April selloff. It appears that a CAPE of over 30 is much more likely to revert to the mid-20s or lower than to go higher, except in a short-lived spike.

Fourth, since an even higher CAPE is unlikely when starting at 31.1, investors face two problems. First, the multiple is a lot more likely to contract than even to remain steady, potentially hammering future returns. Second, even if the CAPE stays at 31.1, all future gains will depend on earnings growth. Indeed, expanding profits have been a big contributor to capital gains in recent years. As the U.S. emerged from the financial crisis in early 2010 through 2019, EPS increased at an 8% annual pace.

That record, however, is extremely unusual. Over the 55 years from 1965 to 2019, EPS advanced at 2.1%, adjusted for inflation. That's around one point slower than growth in national income. Although total earnings track the overall economy over long periods, earnings per share lag because companies issue new stock to expand, spreading profits over larger numbers of shares. And new competitors enter the market, issuing their own shares, or if they remain private, grabbing part of the profit pool and leaving less for the old guard.

Fifth, the CAPE tends to go in the opposite direction from interest rates. At most times, the lower the 10-year Treasury yield, the higher the CAPE, and vice versa. Rising rates pounded stocks in the early 1980s, and yields at record lows appear to be buoying the S&P now. But the best time to buy equities is when rates are high or average, and the CAPE is low, periods such as 1980 and 2008. The worst time is when the opposite conditions prevail, as in 1966 and 2000. People who bought then got terrible returns over the succeeding years, simply because the world returned to normal at higher rates—and falling CAPEs that shrank prices. Today's high-CAPE, low-rate climate resembles both of those heady periods.

Conclusion: A 31.1 CAPE is a dangerously high starting point for buying stocks. The price investors are willing to pay for each dollar of earnings will probably shrink from here. And EPS is already getting pounded by the COVID-19 lockdown, and the idea profits will soar in the recovery to compensate for the fall in multiples, and then some, is far-fetched.

A CAPE of 25, still extremely high by historical standards, would put the S&P around 2950, 11% lower than today. A better bet is a CAPE of 20, and that's scary. A drop to that benchmark would push the S&P under 2500 for a decline of 25%. All the bulls' rationalizations can't get past this basic truth: Companies have to practically perform miracles to give you big returns when their stocks are pricey, and can reward you richly if they just muddle along if they're cheap. Keep in mind that in 2017, Apple was selling at an 11 P/E. Would you rather buy it there, or at the current 35? One's a no-brainer, the other's a gamble. The story of Apple epitomizes the course of the whole market. You've got to "believe" a story to be a buyer here—and you wouldn't need a story if either were a bargain.

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