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如果沒(méi)有這5只股票,,美國(guó)股市會(huì)很慘

Shawn Tully
2020-06-03

標(biāo)普500目前已經(jīng)成為了少數(shù)高市值明星股的天下,。

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圖片來(lái)源:視覺(jué)中國(guó)

標(biāo)普500目前已經(jīng)成為了少數(shù)高市值明星股的天下,,這是自上個(gè)世紀(jì)90年代末科技股泡沫以來(lái)從來(lái)沒(méi)有出現(xiàn)過(guò)的情況,,而當(dāng)時(shí)的主角陣容則包括思科、朗訊和IBM,。如今,,這些紅得發(fā)紫的公司構(gòu)成了一個(gè)五強(qiáng)的驚艷陣容:微軟(亦是1999年的駐客)、蘋(píng)果,、亞馬遜,、谷歌和Facebook。

它們?cè)跇?biāo)普500的市值比重從去年開(kāi)始躍升,,然后在2020年新冠疫情危機(jī)中逆勢(shì)爆發(fā)增長(zhǎng),。這個(gè)驚艷五強(qiáng)的股價(jià)與Netflix和Salesforce.com一樣變得愈發(fā)高不可攀,但其他公司的股價(jià)卻在大幅下跌,。因此大多數(shù)高市值股基金都會(huì)攬入這些一路高歌的明星股,,并大幅減持那些淪為白菜價(jià)的股票,例如金融和能源,。Research Affiliates的首席投資官克里斯?布萊特曼說(shuō):“購(gòu)買(mǎi)那些由高價(jià)股引領(lǐng),、頭重腳輕的指數(shù)存在風(fēng)險(xiǎn),我們以前曾經(jīng)看到過(guò)這種模式,,通常會(huì)以悲劇收?qǐng)?。”Research Affiliates負(fù)責(zé)監(jiān)管1450億美元的共同基金和ETF(交易所交易基金)策略,。

標(biāo)普指數(shù)基金存在的問(wèn)題

標(biāo)普500指數(shù)基金以及大多數(shù)傳統(tǒng)的高市值股資產(chǎn)組合,,通常會(huì)進(jìn)行“市值加權(quán)”操作。以標(biāo)普500指數(shù)為例,,這意味著你在每只股票的投資配額會(huì)直接與某家公司市值占標(biāo)普500總市值的比例掛鉤,。如果微軟1.38萬(wàn)億美元的市值占標(biāo)普500 26.7萬(wàn)億美元總市值的5.5%,而Facebook 6600億美元的市值占標(biāo)普總市值的0.25%,,那么基金會(huì)自動(dòng)將你資金的5.5%投入微軟,,0.25%投入Facebook。

那么問(wèn)題來(lái)了:當(dāng)少數(shù)備受追捧股票的價(jià)格增幅遠(yuǎn)高于其營(yíng)收時(shí),,那么投資者越來(lái)越多地的資產(chǎn)組合將投入這類高價(jià)股造勢(shì)運(yùn)動(dòng),,而流向擁有最佳議價(jià)權(quán)的低價(jià)股的資金將越來(lái)越少。你已經(jīng)陷入了賣(mài)低買(mǎi)高的策略,。與此同時(shí),,你看到的是所投基金的整體市盈率以及你所投資金的收益都在上漲,。你在基金中的更多投資都流向了高價(jià)股,,原因很簡(jiǎn)單,因?yàn)樗鼈兊墓蓛r(jià)越來(lái)越高,。

當(dāng)指數(shù)加倍押注那些不斷上漲的高價(jià)股時(shí),,市值加權(quán)法看似是最優(yōu)選擇。然而在大多數(shù)案例中,利潤(rùn)的增幅往往趕不上那些殷切期許,,擁躉們逐漸離開(kāi),,然后這些曇花一現(xiàn)的明星企業(yè)在接下來(lái)幾年中的回報(bào)乏善可陳。另一方面,,那些并不被指數(shù)看好的股票通常有著十分不俗的業(yè)績(jī),,因?yàn)橐呀?jīng)跌至谷底的它們即便只是實(shí)現(xiàn)了盈利的溫和增長(zhǎng),也能給人們帶來(lái)驚喜,。

Research Affiliates為《財(cái)富》雜志分析的數(shù)據(jù)顯示了擁有巨型市值的少數(shù)股票是如何逐漸奪取了標(biāo)普500的統(tǒng)治權(quán),,其中的大多數(shù)都擁有高得嚇人的市值。疫情封鎖擴(kuò)大了高價(jià)股與低價(jià)股之間的差距,,并以此加速了這一趨勢(shì),。誠(chéng)然,少數(shù)高大上企業(yè)股價(jià)的激增緩沖了市值加權(quán)基金在今年的虧損,。然而,,它在未來(lái)卻是兇多吉少:盡管這些超低價(jià)股票在此之后可能會(huì)跑贏大盤(pán),而各大基金卻拋棄了它們,,轉(zhuǎn)而追逐那些最熱門(mén)和最脆弱的股票,。

在2019年結(jié)束之際,標(biāo)普中市值最高的5只股票與當(dāng)前陣容無(wú)異:微軟,、蘋(píng)果,、Alphabet、亞馬遜和Facebook,。它們共計(jì)占到了指數(shù)總市值的16.1%,,意味著如果你購(gòu)買(mǎi)了標(biāo)普指數(shù)基金或ETF,或大多數(shù)其他高市值股基金,,那么在12月31日那天,,你的資金有16.1%都流向了驚艷五強(qiáng)公司。值得注意的是,,在2017年,,這些科技巨頭也占據(jù)了前五的位置,但僅占指數(shù)總市值的11.5%,。

16.1%的比例大大高于平均水平:自1999年以來(lái),,市值最高的5只股票的平均占比為13.2%。今年,,優(yōu)勝者與失敗者之間的差距大幅擴(kuò)大,。讓我們退一步,比較一下一年前的情形,。在2019年5月底,,標(biāo)普500總市值達(dá)到了24.7萬(wàn)億美元,,驚艷五強(qiáng)的總市值為4萬(wàn)億美元,剛好與2019年年底16.1%的占比一致,。自那之后的12個(gè)月中,,盡管2020年遭遇了過(guò)山車(chē)式的波動(dòng),但標(biāo)普500的總市值依然增至26.7萬(wàn)億美元,,增幅達(dá)到了2萬(wàn)億美元或8.1%,。作為對(duì)比,驚艷五強(qiáng)的市值則上升了1.56萬(wàn)億美元,,或40%,,達(dá)到了5.56萬(wàn)億美元。在增加的2萬(wàn)億美元總市值中,,有78%都來(lái)自于驚艷五強(qiáng),。

在5月底,驚艷五強(qiáng)占到了標(biāo)普總市值的21.1%,,幾乎是2017年的兩倍,,較5個(gè)月前高了5個(gè)百分點(diǎn),也就是三分之一的增幅,。這個(gè)數(shù)字讓過(guò)去二十多年的最高紀(jì)錄16.4%相形見(jiàn)絀,,也就是1999年底科技泡沫時(shí)出現(xiàn)的最高點(diǎn)。那個(gè)時(shí)候,,前五包括思科,、通用電氣、??松?,以及唯一重復(fù)出現(xiàn)的微軟。

不妨看看過(guò)去一年中這五家科技公司的占比都發(fā)生了什么變化,。微軟在標(biāo)普市值的占比從3.9%增至5.2%,,蘋(píng)果從3.3%增至5.2%,亞馬遜從3.7%增至4.6%,。這五家公司的占比至少都增長(zhǎng)了三分之一,。

這五位市值最大的成員在一片哀鴻聲中的驚人進(jìn)步令人感到不安,原因很簡(jiǎn)單,。推動(dòng)驚艷五強(qiáng)達(dá)到新高的并非是營(yíng)收增長(zhǎng),,而是源于投資者有鑒于公司利潤(rùn)爭(zhēng)相為高價(jià)股買(mǎi)單的行為。自去年5月以來(lái),,蘋(píng)果,、微軟、亞馬遜,、Alphabet和Facebook的總凈利潤(rùn)與最近的4個(gè)季度相比略有下滑,,從148.8億美元降至147.5億美元。然而,,由于其市值大漲了40%,,其合并市盈率亦是水漲船高,從不俗的27增至驚艷的38,。在過(guò)去12個(gè)月中,,這五家公司的股價(jià)增長(zhǎng)了30%,而你為它們注入的資金也多了30%,。

驚艷五強(qiáng)并非是各大基金競(jìng)相追捧的唯一超高價(jià)股票組,。第二大陣營(yíng)則由備受矚目的科技大拿組成,它們?cè)谑兄导訖?quán)游戲中的戲份也是越來(lái)越大,,其股價(jià)甚至比驚艷五強(qiáng)更高,,而且是高出一大截。自2019年結(jié)束以來(lái),,英偉達(dá),、Netflix、 Salesforce.com和PayPal的總市值躍升了2000億美元,,或39%,,達(dá)到了7290億美元。但由于我們稱之為神奇四強(qiáng)的收益遠(yuǎn)不及驚艷五強(qiáng)強(qiáng)勁,,因此其合并市盈率是五強(qiáng)的三倍,,高達(dá)109。與驚艷五強(qiáng)對(duì)比,,市值加權(quán)基金購(gòu)買(mǎi)神奇四強(qiáng)的股票更多,。今年,神奇四強(qiáng)在標(biāo)普的比重從約2%升至3%,。如果把這兩組加起來(lái),,那么它們?cè)跇?biāo)普的占比將從18.1%飆升至24.1%,9家公司的合并市盈率則達(dá)到了41,。

如果你不必將自己四分之一的資金放在市盈率超過(guò)40的少數(shù)股票中,,標(biāo)普指數(shù)本身這個(gè)選擇則要好得多。

更好的方式:基本面指數(shù)

Research Affiliates創(chuàng)建了一種避免將更多的資金流入熱股的方式,,它能夠?qū)⒋罅康馁Y金投入那些折價(jià),、被忽略或不受待見(jiàn)的股票,它們都有一個(gè)共同的特征——便宜,。這種方法稱之為“基本面指數(shù)化”,,它的投資決策基于被投資公司在整個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)中的比重,而不是占標(biāo)普總市值的比重,。它采用了四個(gè)指標(biāo)來(lái)定義這一比重:銷售,、現(xiàn)金流,、分紅和當(dāng)前的賬面價(jià)值。前三個(gè)指標(biāo)采用的是五年的平均數(shù),。每個(gè)指標(biāo)的權(quán)重是均等的,。布萊德曼解釋說(shuō):“如果我們僅看營(yíng)收,我們便會(huì)過(guò)度看重零售商和航空公司,。如果我們僅看賬面價(jià)值,,我們就會(huì)忽視科技公司,因?yàn)樗鼈儗⒋罅康馁Y金用于不會(huì)在賬面上體現(xiàn)的研發(fā)工作,,或因此過(guò)度看重工業(yè),。使用這四個(gè)基準(zhǔn)能夠提供合理的平衡?!?

作為市值加權(quán)法的唯一衡量因素——市值,,并不在這一方法的考慮之列。簡(jiǎn)單來(lái)說(shuō),,你通過(guò)基本面基金投資的每一美元所獲得的現(xiàn)金流,、銷售和分紅信息要比市值加權(quán)方法多得多。最基本的對(duì)比就是市盈率,。如今,,對(duì)于按市值加權(quán)的標(biāo)普指數(shù)基金來(lái)說(shuō),這一數(shù)字約為27.5,。順便說(shuō)一下,,考慮到驚艷五強(qiáng)的巨大收益,這個(gè)數(shù)字在很大程度上過(guò)于高冷,。到目前為止,,這種方法一直是投資者的福音,然而,,這種始終一邊倒的方法也預(yù)示著前方存在危險(xiǎn),。

對(duì)于使用Research Affiliates方法的基本面指數(shù),其市盈率要比上述方法低40%還要多,,只有16,。由于將價(jià)格與賬面價(jià)值掛鉤,它的流動(dòng)方向則大幅趨近于廉價(jià)股票:在市值加權(quán)基金中,,投資者將支付10倍的賬面價(jià)值,,而基本面基金只有約兩倍。在基本面指數(shù)化方法中,,每一美元的投資會(huì)多出3倍的現(xiàn)金流,,多出7倍的銷售額?!盎久妗狈椒ǖ姆旨t收益為3%,,對(duì)比加權(quán)指數(shù)的0.9%則是高下立判,。

Research Affiliates負(fù)責(zé)監(jiān)管眾多門(mén)類的基本面基金,涵蓋廣泛的資產(chǎn)組合,,包括國(guó)際大市值,、美國(guó)小市值、新興市場(chǎng)大小市值,,當(dāng)然還有基于標(biāo)普500的美國(guó)大市值。使用其方法的各大基金管理方包括景順集團(tuán),、嘉信理財(cái)和貝萊德,,其中最受歡迎的則是嘉信美國(guó)大公司基本面指數(shù)基金(SFLNX),它管理著44億美元的資金,。由于它按照公司在經(jīng)濟(jì)中的比重而不是其市值來(lái)分配資金,,SFLNX最大和最小金額的走向與市值加權(quán)基金完全不同。

如今,,市值加權(quán)指數(shù)將22.8%的資金額放在了紅得發(fā)紫的信息科技領(lǐng)域,。作為對(duì)比,SFLNX在科技領(lǐng)域的投資僅占其總資金的19.7%,,原因很簡(jiǎn)單,,它的指標(biāo)為其打上了“太貴”的標(biāo)簽。SFLNX還下調(diào)了在商業(yè)服務(wù)領(lǐng)域的投資,,也就是Alphabet和亞馬遜所在的行業(yè),。作為對(duì)比,SFLNX在受重創(chuàng)的金融,、消費(fèi)必需品,,尤其是最不被看好的能源領(lǐng)域投入了更多的資金。在這三個(gè)領(lǐng)域里,,SFLNX與市值加權(quán)基金的投資比例分別為10.2%與8%,、9.7%與7.9%,以及7.1%與2.9%,。

就投資分配額最多的前五家或前六家公司而言,,兩種類型基金的選擇也會(huì)讓人大吃一驚。有意思的是,,蘋(píng)果是SFLNX最大的投資對(duì)象,,就加權(quán)基金而言,蘋(píng)果和微軟平起平坐,。事實(shí)上,,SFLNX給蘋(píng)果分配的資金比例與其市值比重幾乎完全一樣:5.65%。原因如下:蘋(píng)果擁有巨大的現(xiàn)金流,、分紅和賬面價(jià)值,。布萊特曼說(shuō):“蘋(píng)果看起來(lái)還不算貴的離譜,。”另一方面,,嘉信理財(cái)基金給微軟的資金配額僅有2.5%,,還不到其市值比重的一半,原因在于蘋(píng)果來(lái)自運(yùn)營(yíng)的現(xiàn)金流和營(yíng)收遠(yuǎn)高于微軟,,而兩家的分紅和賬面價(jià)值則相當(dāng),。至于Netflix、Salesforce.com,、英偉達(dá)和Netflix組成的神奇四強(qiáng),,SFLNX僅向其分配了0.37%的資金,是其市值加權(quán)基金配資比例的八分之一,。

今年以來(lái),,市值加權(quán)型競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手的業(yè)績(jī)遠(yuǎn)超SFLNX,后者業(yè)績(jī)下滑了12.6%,,但如果按照市值加權(quán)型模式,,其總回報(bào)率將約為-5%。確實(shí),,基本面指數(shù)是一個(gè)價(jià)值策略,,然而價(jià)值型股票在近些年來(lái)的增速一直低于增長(zhǎng)型股票。

然而在歷史上,,價(jià)值型策略的業(yè)績(jī)則要好得多,,這一點(diǎn)我們可以看看其支持者伯克希爾-哈撒韋的沃倫?巴菲特的業(yè)績(jī)。市值在過(guò)去幾年中向這五家超級(jí)公司集中的巨大轉(zhuǎn)變,,再加上疫情危機(jī)的推波助瀾,,已經(jīng)讓人們迫不及待地要摒棄這一策略。贏家在封鎖期間已經(jīng)擺脫了基本面的束縛,,而且創(chuàng)下了一個(gè)又一個(gè)紀(jì)錄,。輸家則遭到了重創(chuàng)。如何才能從這些炙手可熱的股票中分一杯羹,,選擇投資方法的時(shí)候到了,。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

譯者:Feb

標(biāo)普500目前已經(jīng)成為了少數(shù)高市值明星股的天下,這是自上個(gè)世紀(jì)90年代末科技股泡沫以來(lái)從來(lái)沒(méi)有出現(xiàn)過(guò)的情況,,而當(dāng)時(shí)的主角陣容則包括思科,、朗訊和IBM。如今,,這些紅得發(fā)紫的公司構(gòu)成了一個(gè)五強(qiáng)的驚艷陣容:微軟(亦是1999年的駐客),、蘋(píng)果、亞馬遜、谷歌和Facebook,。

它們?cè)跇?biāo)普500的市值比重從去年開(kāi)始躍升,,然后在2020年新冠疫情危機(jī)中逆勢(shì)爆發(fā)增長(zhǎng)。這個(gè)驚艷五強(qiáng)的股價(jià)與Netflix和Salesforce.com一樣變得愈發(fā)高不可攀,,但其他公司的股價(jià)卻在大幅下跌,。因此大多數(shù)高市值股基金都會(huì)攬入這些一路高歌的明星股,并大幅減持那些淪為白菜價(jià)的股票,,例如金融和能源,。Research Affiliates的首席投資官克里斯?布萊特曼說(shuō):“購(gòu)買(mǎi)那些由高價(jià)股引領(lǐng)、頭重腳輕的指數(shù)存在風(fēng)險(xiǎn),,我們以前曾經(jīng)看到過(guò)這種模式,,通常會(huì)以悲劇收?qǐng)觥,!盧esearch Affiliates負(fù)責(zé)監(jiān)管1450億美元的共同基金和ETF(交易所交易基金)策略,。

標(biāo)普指數(shù)基金存在的問(wèn)題

標(biāo)普500指數(shù)基金以及大多數(shù)傳統(tǒng)的高市值股資產(chǎn)組合,,通常會(huì)進(jìn)行“市值加權(quán)”操作,。以標(biāo)普500指數(shù)為例,這意味著你在每只股票的投資配額會(huì)直接與某家公司市值占標(biāo)普500總市值的比例掛鉤,。如果微軟1.38萬(wàn)億美元的市值占標(biāo)普500 26.7萬(wàn)億美元總市值的5.5%,,而Facebook 6600億美元的市值占標(biāo)普總市值的0.25%,那么基金會(huì)自動(dòng)將你資金的5.5%投入微軟,,0.25%投入Facebook,。

那么問(wèn)題來(lái)了:當(dāng)少數(shù)備受追捧股票的價(jià)格增幅遠(yuǎn)高于其營(yíng)收時(shí),那么投資者越來(lái)越多地的資產(chǎn)組合將投入這類高價(jià)股造勢(shì)運(yùn)動(dòng),,而流向擁有最佳議價(jià)權(quán)的低價(jià)股的資金將越來(lái)越少,。你已經(jīng)陷入了賣(mài)低買(mǎi)高的策略。與此同時(shí),,你看到的是所投基金的整體市盈率以及你所投資金的收益都在上漲,。你在基金中的更多投資都流向了高價(jià)股,原因很簡(jiǎn)單,,因?yàn)樗鼈兊墓蓛r(jià)越來(lái)越高,。

當(dāng)指數(shù)加倍押注那些不斷上漲的高價(jià)股時(shí),市值加權(quán)法看似是最優(yōu)選擇,。然而在大多數(shù)案例中,,利潤(rùn)的增幅往往趕不上那些殷切期許,擁躉們逐漸離開(kāi),,然后這些曇花一現(xiàn)的明星企業(yè)在接下來(lái)幾年中的回報(bào)乏善可陳,。另一方面,那些并不被指數(shù)看好的股票通常有著十分不俗的業(yè)績(jī),,因?yàn)橐呀?jīng)跌至谷底的它們即便只是實(shí)現(xiàn)了盈利的溫和增長(zhǎng),,也能給人們帶來(lái)驚喜,。

Research Affiliates為《財(cái)富》雜志分析的數(shù)據(jù)顯示了擁有巨型市值的少數(shù)股票是如何逐漸奪取了標(biāo)普500的統(tǒng)治權(quán),其中的大多數(shù)都擁有高得嚇人的市值,。疫情封鎖擴(kuò)大了高價(jià)股與低價(jià)股之間的差距,,并以此加速了這一趨勢(shì)。誠(chéng)然,,少數(shù)高大上企業(yè)股價(jià)的激增緩沖了市值加權(quán)基金在今年的虧損,。然而,它在未來(lái)卻是兇多吉少:盡管這些超低價(jià)股票在此之后可能會(huì)跑贏大盤(pán),,而各大基金卻拋棄了它們,,轉(zhuǎn)而追逐那些最熱門(mén)和最脆弱的股票。

在2019年結(jié)束之際,,標(biāo)普中市值最高的5只股票與當(dāng)前陣容無(wú)異:微軟,、蘋(píng)果、Alphabet,、亞馬遜和Facebook,。它們共計(jì)占到了指數(shù)總市值的16.1%,意味著如果你購(gòu)買(mǎi)了標(biāo)普指數(shù)基金或ETF,,或大多數(shù)其他高市值股基金,,那么在12月31日那天,你的資金有16.1%都流向了驚艷五強(qiáng)公司,。值得注意的是,,在2017年,這些科技巨頭也占據(jù)了前五的位置,,但僅占指數(shù)總市值的11.5%,。

16.1%的比例大大高于平均水平:自1999年以來(lái),市值最高的5只股票的平均占比為13.2%,。今年,,優(yōu)勝者與失敗者之間的差距大幅擴(kuò)大。讓我們退一步,,比較一下一年前的情形,。在2019年5月底,標(biāo)普500總市值達(dá)到了24.7萬(wàn)億美元,,驚艷五強(qiáng)的總市值為4萬(wàn)億美元,,剛好與2019年年底16.1%的占比一致。自那之后的12個(gè)月中,,盡管2020年遭遇了過(guò)山車(chē)式的波動(dòng),,但標(biāo)普500的總市值依然增至26.7萬(wàn)億美元,增幅達(dá)到了2萬(wàn)億美元或8.1%。作為對(duì)比,,驚艷五強(qiáng)的市值則上升了1.56萬(wàn)億美元,,或40%,達(dá)到了5.56萬(wàn)億美元,。在增加的2萬(wàn)億美元總市值中,,有78%都來(lái)自于驚艷五強(qiáng)。

在5月底,,驚艷五強(qiáng)占到了標(biāo)普總市值的21.1%,,幾乎是2017年的兩倍,較5個(gè)月前高了5個(gè)百分點(diǎn),,也就是三分之一的增幅,。這個(gè)數(shù)字讓過(guò)去二十多年的最高紀(jì)錄16.4%相形見(jiàn)絀,也就是1999年底科技泡沫時(shí)出現(xiàn)的最高點(diǎn),。那個(gè)時(shí)候,,前五包括思科、通用電氣,、??松约拔ㄒ恢貜?fù)出現(xiàn)的微軟,。

不妨看看過(guò)去一年中這五家科技公司的占比都發(fā)生了什么變化,。微軟在標(biāo)普市值的占比從3.9%增至5.2%,,蘋(píng)果從3.3%增至5.2%,,亞馬遜從3.7%增至4.6%。這五家公司的占比至少都增長(zhǎng)了三分之一,。

這五位市值最大的成員在一片哀鴻聲中的驚人進(jìn)步令人感到不安,,原因很簡(jiǎn)單。推動(dòng)驚艷五強(qiáng)達(dá)到新高的并非是營(yíng)收增長(zhǎng),,而是源于投資者有鑒于公司利潤(rùn)爭(zhēng)相為高價(jià)股買(mǎi)單的行為,。自去年5月以來(lái),蘋(píng)果,、微軟,、亞馬遜、Alphabet和Facebook的總凈利潤(rùn)與最近的4個(gè)季度相比略有下滑,,從148.8億美元降至147.5億美元,。然而,由于其市值大漲了40%,,其合并市盈率亦是水漲船高,,從不俗的27增至驚艷的38。在過(guò)去12個(gè)月中,這五家公司的股價(jià)增長(zhǎng)了30%,,而你為它們注入的資金也多了30%,。

驚艷五強(qiáng)并非是各大基金競(jìng)相追捧的唯一超高價(jià)股票組。第二大陣營(yíng)則由備受矚目的科技大拿組成,,它們?cè)谑兄导訖?quán)游戲中的戲份也是越來(lái)越大,,其股價(jià)甚至比驚艷五強(qiáng)更高,而且是高出一大截,。自2019年結(jié)束以來(lái),,英偉達(dá)、Netflix,、 Salesforce.com和PayPal的總市值躍升了2000億美元,,或39%,達(dá)到了7290億美元,。但由于我們稱之為神奇四強(qiáng)的收益遠(yuǎn)不及驚艷五強(qiáng)強(qiáng)勁,,因此其合并市盈率是五強(qiáng)的三倍,高達(dá)109,。與驚艷五強(qiáng)對(duì)比,,市值加權(quán)基金購(gòu)買(mǎi)神奇四強(qiáng)的股票更多。今年,,神奇四強(qiáng)在標(biāo)普的比重從約2%升至3%,。如果把這兩組加起來(lái),那么它們?cè)跇?biāo)普的占比將從18.1%飆升至24.1%,,9家公司的合并市盈率則達(dá)到了41,。

如果你不必將自己四分之一的資金放在市盈率超過(guò)40的少數(shù)股票中,標(biāo)普指數(shù)本身這個(gè)選擇則要好得多,。

更好的方式:基本面指數(shù)

Research Affiliates創(chuàng)建了一種避免將更多的資金流入熱股的方式,,它能夠?qū)⒋罅康馁Y金投入那些折價(jià)、被忽略或不受待見(jiàn)的股票,,它們都有一個(gè)共同的特征——便宜,。這種方法稱之為“基本面指數(shù)化”,它的投資決策基于被投資公司在整個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)中的比重,,而不是占標(biāo)普總市值的比重,。它采用了四個(gè)指標(biāo)來(lái)定義這一比重:銷售、現(xiàn)金流,、分紅和當(dāng)前的賬面價(jià)值,。前三個(gè)指標(biāo)采用的是五年的平均數(shù)。每個(gè)指標(biāo)的權(quán)重是均等的,。布萊德曼解釋說(shuō):“如果我們僅看營(yíng)收,,我們便會(huì)過(guò)度看重零售商和航空公司,。如果我們僅看賬面價(jià)值,我們就會(huì)忽視科技公司,,因?yàn)樗鼈儗⒋罅康馁Y金用于不會(huì)在賬面上體現(xiàn)的研發(fā)工作,,或因此過(guò)度看重工業(yè)。使用這四個(gè)基準(zhǔn)能夠提供合理的平衡,?!?

作為市值加權(quán)法的唯一衡量因素——市值,并不在這一方法的考慮之列,。簡(jiǎn)單來(lái)說(shuō),,你通過(guò)基本面基金投資的每一美元所獲得的現(xiàn)金流、銷售和分紅信息要比市值加權(quán)方法多得多,。最基本的對(duì)比就是市盈率,。如今,對(duì)于按市值加權(quán)的標(biāo)普指數(shù)基金來(lái)說(shuō),,這一數(shù)字約為27.5,。順便說(shuō)一下,考慮到驚艷五強(qiáng)的巨大收益,,這個(gè)數(shù)字在很大程度上過(guò)于高冷,。到目前為止,這種方法一直是投資者的福音,,然而,,這種始終一邊倒的方法也預(yù)示著前方存在危險(xiǎn)。

對(duì)于使用Research Affiliates方法的基本面指數(shù),,其市盈率要比上述方法低40%還要多,,只有16。由于將價(jià)格與賬面價(jià)值掛鉤,,它的流動(dòng)方向則大幅趨近于廉價(jià)股票:在市值加權(quán)基金中,,投資者將支付10倍的賬面價(jià)值,,而基本面基金只有約兩倍,。在基本面指數(shù)化方法中,每一美元的投資會(huì)多出3倍的現(xiàn)金流,,多出7倍的銷售額,。“基本面”方法的分紅收益為3%,,對(duì)比加權(quán)指數(shù)的0.9%則是高下立判,。

Research Affiliates負(fù)責(zé)監(jiān)管眾多門(mén)類的基本面基金,涵蓋廣泛的資產(chǎn)組合,,包括國(guó)際大市值,、美國(guó)小市值,、新興市場(chǎng)大小市值,當(dāng)然還有基于標(biāo)普500的美國(guó)大市值,。使用其方法的各大基金管理方包括景順集團(tuán),、嘉信理財(cái)和貝萊德,其中最受歡迎的則是嘉信美國(guó)大公司基本面指數(shù)基金(SFLNX),,它管理著44億美元的資金,。由于它按照公司在經(jīng)濟(jì)中的比重而不是其市值來(lái)分配資金,SFLNX最大和最小金額的走向與市值加權(quán)基金完全不同,。

如今,,市值加權(quán)指數(shù)將22.8%的資金額放在了紅得發(fā)紫的信息科技領(lǐng)域。作為對(duì)比,,SFLNX在科技領(lǐng)域的投資僅占其總資金的19.7%,,原因很簡(jiǎn)單,它的指標(biāo)為其打上了“太貴”的標(biāo)簽,。SFLNX還下調(diào)了在商業(yè)服務(wù)領(lǐng)域的投資,,也就是Alphabet和亞馬遜所在的行業(yè)。作為對(duì)比,,SFLNX在受重創(chuàng)的金融,、消費(fèi)必需品,尤其是最不被看好的能源領(lǐng)域投入了更多的資金,。在這三個(gè)領(lǐng)域里,,SFLNX與市值加權(quán)基金的投資比例分別為10.2%與8%、9.7%與7.9%,,以及7.1%與2.9%,。

就投資分配額最多的前五家或前六家公司而言,兩種類型基金的選擇也會(huì)讓人大吃一驚,。有意思的是,,蘋(píng)果是SFLNX最大的投資對(duì)象,就加權(quán)基金而言,,蘋(píng)果和微軟平起平坐,。事實(shí)上,SFLNX給蘋(píng)果分配的資金比例與其市值比重幾乎完全一樣:5.65%,。原因如下:蘋(píng)果擁有巨大的現(xiàn)金流,、分紅和賬面價(jià)值。布萊特曼說(shuō):“蘋(píng)果看起來(lái)還不算貴的離譜,?!绷硪环矫妫涡爬碡?cái)基金給微軟的資金配額僅有2.5%,,還不到其市值比重的一半,,原因在于蘋(píng)果來(lái)自運(yùn)營(yíng)的現(xiàn)金流和營(yíng)收遠(yuǎn)高于微軟,,而兩家的分紅和賬面價(jià)值則相當(dāng)。至于Netflix,、Salesforce.com,、英偉達(dá)和Netflix組成的神奇四強(qiáng),SFLNX僅向其分配了0.37%的資金,,是其市值加權(quán)基金配資比例的八分之一,。

今年以來(lái),市值加權(quán)型競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手的業(yè)績(jī)遠(yuǎn)超SFLNX,,后者業(yè)績(jī)下滑了12.6%,,但如果按照市值加權(quán)型模式,其總回報(bào)率將約為-5%,。確實(shí),,基本面指數(shù)是一個(gè)價(jià)值策略,然而價(jià)值型股票在近些年來(lái)的增速一直低于增長(zhǎng)型股票,。

然而在歷史上,,價(jià)值型策略的業(yè)績(jī)則要好得多,這一點(diǎn)我們可以看看其支持者伯克希爾-哈撒韋的沃倫?巴菲特的業(yè)績(jī),。市值在過(guò)去幾年中向這五家超級(jí)公司集中的巨大轉(zhuǎn)變,,再加上疫情危機(jī)的推波助瀾,已經(jīng)讓人們迫不及待地要摒棄這一策略,。贏家在封鎖期間已經(jīng)擺脫了基本面的束縛,,而且創(chuàng)下了一個(gè)又一個(gè)紀(jì)錄。輸家則遭到了重創(chuàng),。如何才能從這些炙手可熱的股票中分一杯羹,,選擇投資方法的時(shí)候到了。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

譯者:Feb

Not since the tech bubble of the late 1990s has the S&P 500 been so dominated by a handful of richly valued glamour stocks—a cast that in those days starred the likes of Cisco, Lucent, and IBM. Today, the superhot names are the Fab Five: Microsoft (a stalwart in ’99 as well), Apple, Amazon, Google, and Facebook.

Starting last year, their weight in the S&P 500 jumped, then exploded in 2020 as they defied the COVID-19 crisis: The Fab Five, along with the likes of Netflix and Salesforce.com, got much more expensive while the rest of the market got a lot cheaper. So most big-cap funds load you up on the hot names that have been soaring, and go light on what's beaten down to dirt cheap—think financials and energy. "People risk buying into indexes that are top-heavy with these high-priced stocks," says Chris Brightman, chief investment officer at Research Affiliates, a firm that oversees strategies for $145 billion in mutual funds and ETFs. "We've seen these patterns before, and they usually end in tears."

The problem with S&P index funds

S&P 500 index funds, and most traditional big-cap portfolios, are usually "cap weighted." That means the portion of your dollars allocated to each stock simply tracks the market value of each company in, say, the S&P 500 index as a percentage of the total capitalization of 500. If Microsoft's $1.38 trillion valuation is 5.5% of the S&P total of $26.7 trillion and Facebook's $660 billion market cap represents 0.25%, the fund puts automatically 5.5% of your money in Microsoft, and 0.25% in Facebook.

The problem: When prices of a few ultra-fashionable stocks rocket far faster than their earnings, a bigger and bigger part of your portfolio will skew toward those pricey momentum plays, and a shrinking portion will go to laggards that offer the best bargains. You're stuck with a strategy that's always selling low and buying high. Meanwhile, you're watching the overall price-to-earnings ratio on your fund, the dollars you're pocketing in earnings for every dollar you've invested, keep rising. The fund is parking more and more of your money in expensive stocks just because they're getting pricier.

The cap-weighed approach looks like a winner when the index is doubling down on high-fliers that keep climbing. But in most cases, profits don't wax fast enough to meet those great expectations, fans depart, and the shooting stars deliver poor returns over the next several years. On the other hand, the outcasts the index dumped often do great, because they're so downtrodden that even if their earnings grow modestly, they'll deliver an upside surprise.

Research Affiliates ran numbers for Fortune showing how a few stocks with gigantic market caps—most of them boasting king's ransom valuations—have grabbed a bigger and bigger slice of the S&P 500. By widening the gap between the haves and have-nots, the pandemic lockdown has hastened the trend. To be sure, the big run-up in a handful of marquee names has cushioned losses in cap-weighted funds this year. But it bodes ill for the future: The trampled "value" stocks likely to outperform from here are precisely the ones those funds are ditching to chase what's hottest, and most vulnerable.

At the close of 2019, the stocks with the five largest market caps in the S&P 500 were the same group as today: Microsoft, Apple, Alphabet, Amazon, and Facebook. They accounted for 16.1% of the index's total valuation, meaning that if you owned an S&P index fund or ETF, or most other big-cap funds for that matter, you had 16.1% of your money in the Fab Five on Dec. 31. It's worth noting that in 2017, those tech giants also occupied the top five spots but accounted for just 11.5% of the index's total value.

The 16.1% concentration was well above the average: Since 1999 the five biggest names have made up 13.2%. This year, the winners-losers divide widened vastly. Let's step back and compare the picture to a year ago. In the last days of May 2019, the S&P 500 had a total market cap of $24.7 trillion, and the Fab Five had a combined value of $4 trillion, exactly the same 16.1% share they held at year-end. In the 12 months since, despite the roller-coaster ride in 2020, the index has risen to $26.7 trillion, for an increase of $2.0 trillion or 8.1%. By contrast, the valuations of the Fab Five rose by $1.56 trillion, or 40%, to $5.56 trillion. No less than 78% of the entire $2 trillion increase came from those top names.

By the end of May, the Fab Five constituted 21.1% of the S&P's total valuation. That's almost twice their share in 2017, and five points, or one-third, higher than their position just five months ago. That number easily eclipses the highest reading in the past two-plus decades, 16.4% marking the height of the tech bubble at the end of 1999. Then, Cisco, General Electric, and Exxon ranked in the top five, with Microsoft the only repeat.

Look what happened to the weights of the five tech champs in the past year. Microsoft's share of the S&P has gone from 3.9% to 5.2%, Apple from 3.3% to 5.2%, and Amazon from 3.7% to 4.6%. All of the five saw their shares rise by at least one-third.

The astounding advance for the five biggest-cap members, amid a general retreat, is troubling for a basic reason. It's not an earnings surge that's driving the Fab Five to new heights, but investors' stampede to pay ever higher prices for each dollar in profits. Since late May of last year, the total net profits for Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, Alphabet, and Facebook, over their most recent four quarters, have declined slightly, from $148.8 billion to $147.5 billion. But since their valuations have mushroomed 40%, their combined P/E has followed, rising from a lofty 27 to a vertiginous 38. Over the 12 months in which these five companies got 30% more expensive, your fund beefed up on 30% more of them.

The Fab Five aren't the only super-pricey shares the funds are piling into. A second group, made up of four high-profile tech luminaries, are also taking a bigger and bigger share of cap-weighted holdings, and they're even more richly priced than the five leaders, by a lot. Since the close of 2019, the combined market caps of Nvidia, Netflix, Salesforce.com, and PayPal have jumped by $200 billion, or 39%, to $729 billion. But since their earnings for what we'll call the Fantastic Four aren't nearly as robust as the Fab Five's, their combined P/E is three times as high at 109. As with the Fab Five, cap-weighted funds bought more and more of the Fantastic Four. This year, their weight in the S&P has jumped from roughly 2% to 3%. Put the Fab Five and Fantastic Four together, and their share in five months catapulted from 18.1% to 24.1%, and the combined P/E for the nine stands at 41.

The S&P would be a far better deal if you didn't have to park over one-fourth of your money in a handful of players selling at over 40 times earnings.

A better way: fundamental indexing

Research Affiliates pioneered an approach that avoids piling more and more into hot stocks, and instead channels the lion's share into the distressed, overlooked, and unloved with one feature in common—they're cheap. The methodology is called "fundamental indexing." The formula invests dollars based on the company's size in the overall economy, not its market value as a share of the entire S&P. It deploys four metrics to establish those weights: sales, cash flow, and dividends, each averaged over five years, and current book value. Each metric is given equal importance. "If we only looked at revenues, we'd overweight retailers and airlines," explains Brightman. "If we used only book value, you'd underweight tech, because they spend a lot on R&D not counted in book, and overweight industrials. Using the four benchmarks gives the right balance."

Market cap, the only factor that counts in cap weighing, isn't part of the formula. Put simply, you get a lot more in cash flow, sales, and dividends in a fundamental fund for each dollar invested than in a cap-weighted rival. The most basic comparison is the P/E. Today, the multiple for the cap-weighted S&P index fund is around 27.5. By the way, it's so lofty in large part because of the huge gains in the Fab Five. That's been a boon to investors until now, but the ever-more-lopsided approach signals danger ahead.

For the fundamental indexes using Research Affiliates methodology, the P/E is over 40% lower at just 16. Measured in price to book value, the tilt toward bargain stocks is even sharper: In cap-weighted funds, investors are paying 10 times book value, versus around two times in a fundamental fund. Fundamental indexing delivers three times more in cash flow per dollar of investment, and seven times more sales. The "fundamental" dividend yield is 3%, dwarfing the 0.9% from a cap-weighted index.

Research Affiliates oversees a broad family of fundamental funds covering a wide range of portfolios, including international large-cap, U.S. small-cap, large and small for emerging markets, and of course, U.S. large-cap based on the S&P 500. Funds using its formula are managed by Invesco, Charles Schwab, and BlackRock. Among the most popular offerings is the Schwab Fundamental U.S. Large Company Index Fund (SFLNX), which manages $4.4 billion. Because it allocates dollars based on companies' heft in the economy and not their valuations, the SFLNX places its biggest and smallest weights in totally different places than cap-weighted funds.

Right now, cap-weighted indexes allocate 22.8% of their overall dollars to the on-fire infotech sector. By contrast, SFLNX puts just 19.7% in tech simply because its metrics tag the sector as highly expensive. SFLNX is also underweight in commercial services, home to Alphabet and Amazon. By contrast, it's far more heavily invested in battered financials (10.2% to 8%), consumer staples (9.7% to 7.9%) and especially the most despised sector of all, energy (7.1% to 2.9%).

The difference in the top five or six companies getting the biggest allocations is also striking. It's interesting that the SFLNX awards Apple the biggest allocation, and under cap weighting, Apple is tied for first with Microsoft. In fact, SFLNX gives Apple almost exactly the same weight as its cap share, around 5.65%. The reason: Apple's giant cash flow, dividends, and book value. "Apple doesn't look all that expensive," notes Brightman. On the other hand, the Schwab fund puts only 2.5% in Microsoft, less than half its cap footprint, since Apple's cash flow from operations and revenues is much larger than Microsoft's, while dividends and book value are similar. As for the Fantastic Four, Netflix, Salesforce.com, Nvidia, and Netflix, SFLNX awards them just 0.37% of its investment dollars, one-eighth their position in cap-weighted funds.

So far this year, cap-weighting competitors have far outperformed the SFLNX. It's down 12.6%, versus a negative total return of around 5% when following the cap-weighted model. Indeed, fundamental indexing is a value strategy, and value stocks have been lagging growth stocks for a number of years.

But over history, value has a much better record, as demonstrated by the performance of its champion Warren Buffett at Berkshire Hathaway. The huge shift in concentration to those five superstars in the past couple of years, accelerated by the pandemic crisis, has made dumping that strategy more urgent than ever. The winners have broken loose of the fundamentals during the lockdown and notched record after record. The losers got pounded. It's time to choose the formula that gets the royal share of those screaming buys.

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