????限制任期年限,，但不限制任期屆數(shù),。

????這意味著建立相應(yīng)機(jī)制，吸引具有部分技能組合的長期股東成為新董事,，同時(shí)確立董事解聘機(jī)制,，以便催生新思維、促進(jìn)多元化,、增加女性董事數(shù)量,。

????對于解聘董事，維權(quán)投資者往往主張實(shí)行嚴(yán)格的任期限制,。作為替代方案,，許多公司通常是對董事設(shè)定退休年齡。我對這兩種方案都不太贊同,。為何要建立一個(gè)機(jī)制,，迫使那些出色的董事讓位？

????話又說回來,，大多數(shù)董事會(huì)至少都有那么一位甚或好幾位董事,，創(chuàng)造的價(jià)值小于引入新董事可能帶來的價(jià)值，導(dǎo)致了“機(jī)會(huì)成本”,。一旦某人進(jìn)入公司董事會(huì),，要想將其解聘決非易事,，正所謂請神容易送神難。即便天時(shí)地利,，炒朋友的魷魚都很難,，在沒有經(jīng)濟(jì)激勵(lì)的情況下，更是難上加難,。

????感情上,，更容易的做法是“干等著”。而且,，當(dāng)首席執(zhí)行官面對的董事會(huì),，成員全都是由前任首席執(zhí)行官挑選并推薦，其技能組合不能滿足企業(yè)新戰(zhàn)略的需求時(shí),，事態(tài)將更加復(fù)雜,。

????我認(rèn)為，董事會(huì)應(yīng)確立相應(yīng)程序,，明確規(guī)定新董事輪換機(jī)制,，并確保該規(guī)定得到理解和執(zhí)行。換言之,，限制任期年限,，但對任期屆數(shù)不做統(tǒng)一限制。僅對新任董事適用上述改變,，能有效規(guī)避來自于現(xiàn)任董事的阻力,，從而使新規(guī)更易推行。

????我傾向于這樣一個(gè)體系：每位新任董事都同意,，每六至八年遞交一次辭呈,。如果有些董事在幫助首席執(zhí)行官和企業(yè)創(chuàng)造價(jià)值方面，能發(fā)揮無可替代的作用,，會(huì)被請求連任,。至于那些沒有突出作用的董事，將在企業(yè)對他們此前的服務(wù)表示感謝后,，就此離開董事會(huì),。

????是否接受某位董事的辭呈，可由一位指定的董事,，或其余董事絕對保密且具有約束力的多數(shù)票來決定,。后一種做法可能更易實(shí)行。

????像維權(quán)投資者那樣思考,。

????董事們必須堅(jiān)決要求企業(yè)管理層像維權(quán)投資者一樣分析戰(zhàn)略選擇：審視在首席執(zhí)行官推薦的戰(zhàn)略之外,，有何替代方案。這種做法十分罕見。通常的做法是,，首席執(zhí)行官在權(quán)衡各種戰(zhàn)略后,，僅向董事會(huì)介紹自己認(rèn)為最好的戰(zhàn)略,。

????維權(quán)投資者主張的,，必然是企業(yè)未采用的戰(zhàn)略。因此,，董事會(huì)必須提前分析所有替代方案,。這意味著弄清與首席執(zhí)行官推薦的戰(zhàn)略相比，放棄業(yè)績不佳的公司,、分拆企業(yè),、評(píng)估測量和處理過剩現(xiàn)金的各種替代方案意味著什么,。如果董事會(huì)沒有討論上述選擇,，將在闡明和捍衛(wèi)自身戰(zhàn)略方面準(zhǔn)備不足。

????重要的是,，分析顯示某企業(yè)的拆分或私人交易價(jià)值大于其股票市值,，并不表示企業(yè)必須出售。歷史上,，由于宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境或其他條件,，導(dǎo)致當(dāng)前股市和私人交易價(jià)值偏離企業(yè)內(nèi)在價(jià)值的例子并不鮮見。董事會(huì)的職責(zé),，是提升企業(yè)內(nèi)在價(jià)值,，行使審慎職責(zé)，充分理解企業(yè)做出的戰(zhàn)略決策,，以及做出決策的理由,。

????通過主動(dòng)利用手中權(quán)力，積極配合創(chuàng)造長期股東價(jià)值,，董事會(huì)可以幫助企業(yè)避免維權(quán)投資者的短期議程將帶來的混亂,。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

????Sue Decker是伯克希爾哈撒韋、好市多以及英特爾公司的董事,。她此前曾擔(dān)任雅虎公司總裁兼首席財(cái)務(wù)官,。本文節(jié)選自Sue的一篇博客文章，原文發(fā)表于她的博客deckposts.net,。本文僅代表Sue的個(gè)人觀點(diǎn),，并不代表她所任職的公司以及相關(guān)公司其他董事的觀點(diǎn)。

????譯者：Hunter

????審稿：李翔

????Limit terms, but don’t install terms limits.

????This means setting up a mechanism for both attracting new directors with some of the skill sets of long-term shareholders, as well as a mechanism for rotation off the board to create room for new thinking, more diversity, and women.

????For removing directors, the solution that activists primarily advocate is a hard term-limit. As an alternative, many companies instead opt for a retirement age. I am not a fan of either. Why create a system that force out good board members?

????Then again, most boards have at least one or maybe a few directors who are not adding as much value as a new member might bring and therefore represent an “opportunity cost.” Once directors are on a board, it can be extremely difficult to naturally rotate them off. Firing a friend is tough under the best conditions, and even more so because there is no economic incentive.

????It’s emotionally easier just to “wait it out.” This is even more complicated when a CEO inherits a board that was picked and groomed by her predecessor and doesn’t have the collective skills for her new strategy.

????My view is that boards would be well served to adopt a process that specifically outlines the rotation process and that is understood and implemented for new directors. In other words, limited terms, but not unified term-limits. By making this change for all new directors, it side-steps the issue of those already on the board, making it easier to implement on a go forward basis.

????I lean toward a system in which each new member of the board agrees to hand in their resignation every six to eight years, with the idea being that some directors will be asked to serve multiple terms it they are uniquely qualified to help the CEO and company build value, but many will be thanked for their service and move on after that time frame.

????The decision regarding whose resignations to keep, or whose to accept, could be made either by an appointed director, or by an absolutely confidential and binding majority vote of the other board members. This latter approach might be easier socially.

????Think like an activist.

????Directors must insist on asking management to analyze strategic choices as an activist would: by looking at alternatives to the strategies the CEO is recommending. This is not typical. The more common pattern is for the CEO to consider options and present only the recommended one to the board.

????The road not taken is the one the activist will surface so the board must have analyzed these alternatives. This means understanding what it would mean to get out of underperforming operations, split up the company and evaluate varying alternatives for measuring and handling excess cash versus the ones being recommended. If these choices are not discussed, the board will be poorly prepared to articulate and defend its alternative course.

????Importantly, an analysis of the break-up or private transaction value of a company that shows a higher value than where the stock is trading does not oblige a company to make a sale. There have been many times in history where macro-economic or other conditions have made the current stock market and private transaction values poor indicators of intrinsic value. The board’s duty is to enhance the latter, exercising its duty of care, by fully understanding what strategic choices the company is making and why.

????By proactively using their power to align with long-term shareholder value creation, boards can help companies avoid the disruption that a shorter-term activist agenda will bring.

????Sue Decker serves on the boards of Berkshire Hathaway, Costco and Intel. She previously served as president and chief financial officer at Yahoo. This article is an excerpt from a more detailed version published on Sue’s blog, deckposts.net. The opinions expressed are her own and not necessarily those of the companies on whose boards she serves or her colleagues on those boards.