????人們很可能會(huì)說,，他們之所以做這些事情,，是因?yàn)閭€(gè)人的軟弱和貪婪,。畢竟,，在我們創(chuàng)造的體系中，高管們得到的大部分薪酬都是以股權(quán)激勵(lì)形式發(fā)放的,。股價(jià)上漲,，他們的薪酬也水漲船高。但關(guān)注于短期股價(jià)而不是長期實(shí)際增長的原因并不僅限于個(gè)人貪婪,。事實(shí)上,，這些高管只是在按照股東的要求行事。

????正是代表股東的董事會(huì)提供了這些股權(quán)激勵(lì)式薪酬,。通過提供這種激勵(lì),，董事會(huì)明白無誤地告訴高管們，什么東西才是最重要的,。那就是股價(jià),。董事會(huì)提供股權(quán)激勵(lì)式薪酬的時(shí)候，他們便發(fā)出了直接指令,，要求高管們把提高現(xiàn)有股價(jià)水平作為其首要工作目標(biāo),。這種機(jī)制無關(guān)乎提升公司業(yè)績，無關(guān)乎長遠(yuǎn)思考,，更無關(guān)乎使世界變得更美好,。如果某高管一邊拿著大量的股權(quán)激勵(lì)式薪酬，一邊卻不致力于提高現(xiàn)有股價(jià)水平,，他們就違抗了把這種激勵(lì)作為最重要獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)的董事會(huì),。高管們不會(huì)說：“雖然他們給了我這么多的股權(quán)獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)，但實(shí)際上他們不是這個(gè)意思,。他們其實(shí)并不希望我做些必要的事情來回報(bào)這種獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)?！边@不是軟弱,，而是服從領(lǐng)導(dǎo)?？偠灾?，我們所創(chuàng)造的高管激勵(lì)機(jī)制專注于提高股價(jià)，而犧牲了所有其他的目標(biāo),。因此,，當(dāng)高管們依照這種機(jī)制行事的時(shí)候，我們?yōu)槭裁催€要感到震驚呢？

????這是否意味著,，道德缺失,、貪婪肆虐的時(shí)候，我們應(yīng)該原諒個(gè)別高管的行為,，不必讓他們承擔(dān)責(zé)任,？不，絕對(duì)不是這個(gè)意思,。我們希望并期待高管們行為良好,，并達(dá)到較高的道德標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。我們希望內(nèi)部人士揭露違法行為,，就像安然公司的謝林?沃特金斯和煙草行業(yè)的杰弗里?威根德那樣,。但我們也應(yīng)該意識(shí)到，我們?yōu)檫@些高管設(shè)置了多么艱難的任務(wù),。要求高管們真正違背命令以遵守道德準(zhǔn)則的時(shí)候,，這是個(gè)非常高的要求。相反,，如果我們設(shè)計(jì)一個(gè)用明確的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)來鼓勵(lì)長遠(yuǎn)思考,、價(jià)值創(chuàng)造和社會(huì)貢獻(xiàn)的系統(tǒng)，這樣是不是更好呢,？現(xiàn)在的挑戰(zhàn)在于我們拋棄現(xiàn)有的激勵(lì)機(jī)制,，創(chuàng)造更合理的新機(jī)制。

????羅杰?馬丁是多倫多大學(xué)羅特曼管理學(xué)院院長（Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto）,，他曾經(jīng)入選最優(yōu)秀的50位商業(yè)管理思想家和全球最具影響力的10位商業(yè)教授,。他著有《修復(fù)游戲：泡沫，倒閉,，以及資本主義可以向NFL學(xué)習(xí)些什么》（Fixing the Game: Bubbles, Crashes, and What Capitalism Can Learn from the NFL）一書,。他是湯森路透（Thomson Reuters）和黑莓手機(jī)生產(chǎn)商RIM的董事。珍妮弗?瑞爾是羅特曼管理學(xué)院（Rotman School）德所特斯整合思維中心（Desautels Centre for Integrative Thinking）的副董事,，同時(shí)也是《修復(fù)游戲》一書的編輯,。

????譯者：千牛絮

????Defenders of the corporate world argue, as we have, that the problem is not so much with individual executives as with a system that creates an unwinnable game. Executives are asked to focus on increasing shareholder value. This is a profoundly difficult task. Shareholder value, as reflected in stock price is a measure of other people's expectations. And while these may be based in part on the fundamentals of the business, they are also fueled by macro-factors, systemic biases and, well, hype. It's hard for executives to influence share price in the short-term through the real, difficult work of improving the company. So, they work on investor expectations instead. They provide guidance, they hype the stock, they undertake foolhardy acquisitions and divestitures, all to spur upward momentum in the stock price.

????It is easy to argue that they do all of this due to personal weakness and greed. After all, we've created a system wherein most of the compensation executives receive is in the form of stock-based incentive compensation. When the stock price goes up, so does their compensation. But the reasons for focusing on the short-term stock price rather than long-term real growth are not limited to personal greed. In fact, these executives are doing what we as shareholders have demanded that they do.

????The board of directors, our representative as shareholders, provides all of that stock-based incentive compensation. And by providing that incentive, the board is explicitly telling the executives what matters above all else -- and that is the stock price. When boards provide stock-based incentive compensation, they issue a direct instruction to work first and foremost on raising the stock price from the current level. It is not about improving the company, not about thinking long-term, not about bettering the world. If an executive with considerable stock-based incentive compensation focuses on anything but raising the stock from its current level, he or she is being insubordinate to the board that provided that as the central incentive. It is not for the executive to say: "They gave me this big stock-based incentive but they really don't mean it. They don't really want me to attempt to do what would be necessary to reap the rewards of this incentive." It is not about being craven; it is about obeying your superiors. In short, we have built a system of incentives for executives focused on raising the stock price at the expense of all other goals. Why then should we be surprised when executives act in accordance with this system?

????Does that mean we should excuse the behavior of individual executives and let them off the hook when ethical lapses occur and when greed runs rampant? No, absolutely not. We want and expect executives to behave well and live up to a high ethical standard. We want insiders to shine a light on illegality, as Sherrin Watkins did at Enron or Jeffrey Wigand did in the tobacco industry. But it is important to recognize just how hard a task we are setting for these individuals. It is a very high bar when we ask executives to be genuinely insubordinate in order to be moral. Would we not be better off to design a system in which the explicit incentives encourage long-term thinking, value creation and contribution to society? The challenge is to do away with our current incentives and create new and better ones.

????Roger Martin is dean of the Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto. He has been named one of the top fifty management thinkers and ten most influential business professors in the world. He is the author of "Fixing the Game: Bubbles, Crashes, and What Capitalism Can Learn from the NFL." He serves on the Thomson Reuters and Research in Motion boards of directors. Jennifer Riel is Associate Director of the Desautels Centre for Integrative Thinking at the Rotman School and editor for Fixing the Game.