當(dāng)今國際局勢復(fù)雜多變,，各國經(jīng)濟均面臨較大挑戰(zhàn),，中國似乎也不例外。但單偉建看法不同,。他認(rèn)為中國是一個蓬勃發(fā)展,、坐擁14億消費者的龐大市場。這個市場不會受到關(guān)稅爭端的影響,，是世界上最好的投資地點之一,。

在一個寒冷的夜晚，我們坐在曼哈頓上西城的一家梅森凱瑟咖啡店,。我點了一杯拿鐵和一份烤餅,，而單偉建只要了一杯熱水。現(xiàn)年66歲的他身材瘦削,，渾身上下散發(fā)著一種帶有禪意的平靜,。他執(zhí)掌的太盟投資集團（下文簡稱PAG）是亞洲最大的私募股權(quán)機構(gòu)。他準(zhǔn)備打電話參加PAG旗下一家公司的董事會,，后者在北京運營一家英語輔導(dǎo)機構(gòu),。“貿(mào)易爭端是圍繞昨天爆發(fā)的沖突,?！彼萌岷汀⒙詭Э谝舻挠⒄Z說,?！摆A得中國消費者才是真正的戰(zhàn)利品?！?/p>

20年來,，單偉建從這個戰(zhàn)利品中獲利頗豐。他的超凡能力反映了三種截然不同的特點,，由此讓他成為了一位對中國市場異常敏銳的觀察者：他是一位成功的實地交易撮合者,，管理著350億美元的資產(chǎn),；他也是一位曾經(jīng)在美國接受博士教育的經(jīng)濟學(xué)家、前商學(xué)院教授,；此外,，他的個人道路折射出他的祖國從極端貧困走向經(jīng)濟奇跡的變革歷程。早在單偉建讀博時就與他相識的芝加哥大學(xué)布斯商學(xué)院的退休經(jīng)濟學(xué)教授羅伯特·艾利伯對他贊嘆有加：“我想不出有誰能夠比他更清楚地看到中國各個市場的真實圖景,。這就是他如此成功的原因,。”

“成功”是一種保守的說法,。單偉建的公司運營一只房地產(chǎn)投資基金和一項企業(yè)貸款業(yè)務(wù),，但他的影響力主要體現(xiàn)在價值150億美元、由他親自操刀的PAG私募股權(quán)投資組合上,。他拒絕透露相關(guān)的投資者或回報信息,。但公共記錄和其他報告顯示，單偉建的客戶包括大型養(yǎng)老基金,、保險公司和捐贈基金,。他的私募股權(quán)投資者包括加州公務(wù)員退休基金、舊金山公共雇員退休體系,，以及新加坡和科威特的主權(quán)財富基金,。PAG去年還與黑石集團進行戰(zhàn)略合作，這家美國私募股權(quán)巨頭由此成為了PAG的少數(shù)股權(quán)股東,。盡管外界很難計算私募基金的回報率,，但對單偉建買賣過的公司，以及他目前投資組合的盈利能力所做的分析顯示,，10年來,，他平均每年從這些公司身上獲得大約30%的回報。

這些回報植根于中國高歌猛進的國內(nèi)經(jīng)濟,。單偉建信心滿滿地表示,，中美貿(mào)易爭端不會遏制這種態(tài)勢。在他看來,，美國總統(tǒng)特朗普的關(guān)稅攻勢“主要打擊的是業(yè)已下滑的出口部門,，而消費領(lǐng)域一直在蓬勃發(fā)展?！敝袊M市場展現(xiàn)了無限誘人的可能性,，因為它本身就是一個世界——美國和中國公司賣給中國消費者的很多產(chǎn)品也是在中國制造的。

在與《財富》雜志持續(xù)數(shù)月的對話中,，單偉建詳細(xì)闡述了這一命題,。我們的對話猶如一場流動的盛宴，但四處奔走的并非是《財富》雜志的記者，而是單偉建,。在位于香港中環(huán)（他也住在那里）的PAG總部,、在開車去家鄉(xiāng)餐廳吃飯的途中、在舊金山（他在那里開始了他的美國求學(xué)生涯）漫步時,，單偉建接受了我大約10小時的電話采訪,。一路上，他詳細(xì)描述了自己如何在日托中心,、約會網(wǎng)站和一大群奶牛身上發(fā)現(xiàn)了巨大的潛力,。

Most headlines today depict a China under siege, its long economic boom ominously waning as it duels with the U.S. in a volatile trade war. But Weijian Shan is talking about the other China, the thriving market of 1.4 billion customers that, he claims, stands shielded from tariff disputes—and is one of the world’s best places to invest.

On a wintry evening, we’re seated in a Maison Kayser coffee shop on Manhattan’s Upper West Side. I’m having a latte and scone, while Shan, a wiry 66-year-old who exudes Zen calm, orders hot water. Shan heads PAG, Asia’s largest private equity firm, and he’s about to phone in for the board meeting of a company PAG owns that runs an English-language tutoring school in Beijing. “The trade war is yesterday’s conflict,” he says, in soft, lightly accented English. “The prize is winning the Chinese consumer.”

Shan has been profiting from that prize for two decades. His prowess reflects three contrasting traits that have made him an unusually astute observer of China’s markets: He’s a successful on-the-ground dealmaker, managing $35 billion in assets; he’s a U.S.-trained Ph.D. economist and former business-school professor; and he’s a figure whose personal path mirrors his nation’s transition from repressive poverty to an economic miracle. Says Robert Aliber, a retired economics professor from the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business who’s known Shan since he was a doctoral student: “I can’t think of anyone who offers a better streetscape view of the individual markets in China. That’s why he’s been so successful.”

“Successful” is an understatement. Shan’s firm operates a real estate investment fund and a corporate lending franchise, but his impact shows most in PAG’s $15 billion private equity portfolio, which he directly manages. He declines to disclose information about his investors or returns. But public records and other reporting show that Shan’s clients include major pension funds, insurance companies, and endowments. Among his private equity investors are -Calpers, San Francisco’s public-employee retirement system, and the sovereign wealth funds of Singapore and Kuwait. PAG also took on U.S. private equity giant Blackstone as a minority partner last year. While returns of private funds are hard for outsiders to calculate, an analysis of the companies Shan has bought and sold and the profitability of his current portfolio indicate he’s been generating gains averaging about 30% a year on those companies—for a decade.

Those returns are rooted in China’s roaring domestic economy, and Shan expresses confidence that trade tensions won’t muffle that boom. In his view, President Trump’s tariff offensive “mainly hits an export sector that’s already in decline,” says Shan. “The consumer sector has kept thriving.” And that sector offers enticing possibilities because it is something of a world unto itself, since so much of what U.S. and Chinese companies sell to consumers in China is also made in China.

In conversations with Fortune over several months, Shan elaborated on that premise. It was a movable feast in which Shan did most of the moving, treating me to around 10 hours of phone interviews from PAG’s headquarters in central Hong Kong, where he also lives; from his car while driving to dinner at a hometown eatery; and while strolling in San Francisco, where he began his U.S. education. Along the way, Shan described how he spots megahit potential in the likes of day-care centers, dating websites, and a huge herd of dairy cows.

單偉建在北京長大，父親是一名海關(guān)官員,，母親從事文秘工作,。他小時候經(jīng)歷過貧困的生活。

1969年,，正值知青上山下鄉(xiāng)之際,，單偉建前往內(nèi)蒙古戈壁沙漠，成為廣大農(nóng)民中的一員,。他所在的單位負(fù)責(zé)在貧瘠的土地上種植小麥和玉米。單偉建還做過“赤腳醫(yī)生”,， 為其他工農(nóng)兵提供基本的醫(yī)療服務(wù),。在寒冷的冬天，燃燒冰凍的牛糞成了唯一的熱量來源,?！昂髞淼矫绹鴷r，我非常驚訝地發(fā)現(xiàn),，如果人們有不同意見時,，經(jīng)常將對方的觀點稱為‘牛屎’（bullshit），”單偉建告訴我,?！澳銦o法相信那玩意對我來說是多么珍貴!”

Shan grew up in Beijing, where his father worked as a customs official and his mother as a secretary.

In 1969, China’s government transplanted 16 million urban teenagers to the countryside. Shan’s destination was the Gobi Desert in Inner Mongolia, as part of a corps of farmers. His unit was tasked with growing wheat and corn in the barren soil. Shan also served as a “barefoot doctor,” supplying basic medical treatment to other soldiers. In the frigid winters, the only source of heat was burning frozen cow dung. “I was surprised that when people disagree in the U.S., one person calls the other’s argument ‘bullshit,’?” Shan told me. “You can’t believe how precious that stuff was to me!”

即使在這段困苦時期,，單偉建也顯示出了他善于提高效率的本領(lǐng)。在被分配到一個三人制磚小組后,，他發(fā)現(xiàn)專業(yè)化有助于提高產(chǎn)量,。他給每個隊員分配一項任務(wù)——一位負(fù)責(zé)攪拌泥沙；一位負(fù)責(zé)將攪拌好的泥沙裝進磨具,；一位負(fù)責(zé)把磚塊運到干燥區(qū),。這種安排推動他們的產(chǎn)量幾乎翻了一番。

在荒蕪的戈壁沙漠上，單偉建孜孜不倦地尋求廣闊世界的知識,。他堅持收聽英語廣播,，認(rèn)真研讀一本英文配圖字典。在中美關(guān)系改善后,，單偉建抓住了機會,。1980年，他獲得了一筆赴美留學(xué)的獎學(xué)金,。單偉建選擇了舊金山大學(xué),，而不是更加有名的斯坦福大學(xué)和加州大學(xué)伯克利分校，部分原因是舊金山的中文名字聽上去非常顯赫,?！八囊馑际恰爬系慕鸬V’，19世紀(jì)加入淘金熱的移民們都這么叫它,?！彼忉尩馈Ｔ讷@得MBA學(xué)位后,，單偉建于1982年進入伯克利大學(xué)攻讀博士學(xué)位,，他的導(dǎo)師包括未來的美聯(lián)儲主席珍妮特?耶倫。在單偉建的回憶錄中,，耶倫回憶稱：“他是一位很有魅力的年輕人,，但是很需要好好吃上一頓，然后換個新發(fā)型,?！?/p>

畢業(yè)后，單偉建曾經(jīng)在世界銀行工作過一段時間,，之后在沃頓商學(xué)院任教,。但事實證明，他無法抗拒中國經(jīng)濟的市場化進程所蘊含的無限商機,。1993年,，他加入摩根大通，成為一位常駐香港的投行家,，五年后轉(zhuǎn)投新橋投資,，后者彼時是私募股權(quán)巨頭德太投資集團（TPG）的亞洲分支。單偉建與傳奇交易撮合者,、TPG的創(chuàng)始合伙人龐德文合作,，拯救了兩家在亞洲債務(wù)危機中倒下的銀行。TPG向韓國第一銀行投資5億美元,，向深圳發(fā)展銀行注資1.5億美元,。隨著這兩家銀行重?zé)ɑ盍?，TPG分別以16.5億美元和22億美元的價格出售了它持有的韓國第一銀行和深發(fā)展股票。與此同時,，單偉建在發(fā)掘其他機會方面也表現(xiàn)得非常頑強,。“他告訴我,，他曾經(jīng)為了參觀一家工廠,，在中國內(nèi)地坐了36個小時沒有暖氣的火車?！卑淌诨貞浀?。

2010年，單偉建離開TPG,，隨后迅速籌集25億美元,，在一家名為PAG的現(xiàn)有公司啟動了自己的基金。事實證明,，他在中國和美國金融界高層的深厚人脈,，為他籌集資金和發(fā)現(xiàn)交易機會提供了莫大的幫助。但他的觀察技巧同樣至關(guān)重要,?！八錾獠皇强糠e極兜售，他是一位教授型交易撮合者,?！钡拉偹怪袊镜那笆紫瘓?zhí)行官、致力于幫助企業(yè)應(yīng)對中國監(jiān)管程序的咨詢師麥健陸說,。“單偉建非常善于分析和解釋他所投資領(lǐng)域的詳細(xì)機制,?！?/p>

Even amid hardship, Shan showed a knack for efficiencies. Assigned to a team of three to make bricks, Shan found that specialization hiked their output. He gave each teammate one task—mixing clay and sand, packing the compound into molds, or transporting bricks to the drying area—and the process nearly doubled their production.

In the wilds, Shan relentlessly sought knowledge about the wider world. He secretly listened to Voice of America broadcasts in English while studying a dictionary that matched English words with pictures. Later, when China began building ties to America under Deng Xiaoping, Shan seized his opportunity. In 1980, he won a scholarship to attend a U.S. university. Shan chose the University of San Francisco over Stanford and UC Berkeley, in part because the Chinese name for San Francisco had a prestigious ring. “It means ‘Old Gold Mountain,’ as it was called by the immigrants who joined the 19th-century gold rush,” he explains. After earning an MBA, Shan enrolled in 1982 as a doctoral student at Berkeley, where his advisers included Janet Yellen, the future chair of the Federal Reserve, who in Shan’s book recalls “a charming young man in need of a good meal and a new haircut.”

Upon graduating, Shan worked briefly at the World Bank, then taught at the Wharton School. But the chance to capitalize on China’s shift to a market-driven economy proved irresistible. In 1993, he joined J.P. Morgan as an investment banker in Hong Kong, switching five years later to Newbridge Capital, then the Asian arm of private equity firm TPG. Shan worked with legendary dealmaker David Bonderman to revive two banks felled by the Asian debt crisis. TPG invested $500 million in Korea First Bank and $150 million in Shenzhen Development Bank. As the lenders rebounded, TPG sold its shares in Korea First for $1.65 billion and in Shenzhen for $2.2 billion. Shan, meanwhile, was typically dogged in unearthing other opportunities. “He told me that he’d traveled 36 hours on a unheated train in China’s interior to visit a factory,” recalls Aliber, the professor.

In 2010, Shan left TPG and quickly raised $2.5 billion to start his own fund at an existing firm called PAG. His contacts in top echelons of the Chinese and American financial worlds proved invaluable in raising money and spotting deals. But his observational skills were just as potent. “The way he’s gotten business isn’t by being an aggressive salesman but by being a professor-dealmaker,” says James McGregor, former CEO of Dow Jones China and a consultant who helps companies navigate China’s regulatory process. Shan is “great at analyzing and explaining the detailed mechanics of the sectors he invests in.”

這只PAG基金的啟動時機，恰逢一場歷史性轉(zhuǎn)變,。單偉建說,，從那時起，“中國已經(jīng)從世界工廠轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)槭澜缡袌??！?/p>

中國經(jīng)濟最近增勢放緩，這幾乎完全歸因于出口和制造業(yè)的下滑——換句話說,，這是“工廠”的衰落所致,。單偉建指出，這在很大程度上反映了政府推動的去杠桿化運動：從2017年開始,，中國政府采取一系列激進措施,，以期收縮臃腫的國有工業(yè),，并將過剩的信貸擠出銀行體系和房地產(chǎn)市場。

這種減速更核心的原因是,，從長期趨勢看,，中國經(jīng)濟正在從出口導(dǎo)向型制造業(yè)向消費導(dǎo)向型轉(zhuǎn)變。隨著中國工資水平持續(xù)攀升,，無數(shù)家庭將更多的收入用在醫(yī)療,、娛樂、餐飲和消費品上面,。通常情況下,，向消費社會的轉(zhuǎn)變會抑制整體增長率?！爸圃鞓I(yè)能夠產(chǎn)生乘數(shù)效應(yīng),。”單偉建解釋說,?！耙患倚鹿S開工，雇傭員工,，然后從其他生產(chǎn)商購買供應(yīng)品和電力,，而這些生產(chǎn)商也會雇傭更多的工人，從而創(chuàng)造更多的工資來購買商品,?！钡M支出“是一美元換一美元，它所創(chuàng)造的經(jīng)濟增長率相對較低,?！?/p>

單偉建強調(diào)稱，早在貿(mào)易爭端爆發(fā)之前,，出口和制造業(yè)就開始下滑,。自2010年以來，中國出口額占GDP的比重從36%降至18%,。這意味著,，美國加征的關(guān)稅對中國造成的傷害遠(yuǎn)沒有以前那么大：對美出口占中國國民收入的比例，已經(jīng)從10年前的三分之一降至區(qū)區(qū)4%,。今年,，中國輸美商品預(yù)計將下降約600億美元。但正如單偉建所指出的那樣,，中國向世界其他地區(qū)的出口額要多得多,，從而削弱了對美出口下降帶來的負(fù)面影響。

隨著制造業(yè)步入衰退,，中國的消費水平不斷走高,。如今,，中國消費支出正在以每年10%的速度持續(xù)增長，是美國增速的2.5倍,。令人驚訝的是,，今年8月，中國零售行業(yè)（意指消費品市場,，但不包括服務(wù)業(yè)）折合成年率增長至6.22萬億美元,，首次超過美國。

這場消費革命并非完全不受貿(mào)易爭端的影響,?！靶睦矸矫娴挠绊懣赡芎艽蟆,！眴蝹ソň嬲f,。他回憶稱，當(dāng)美國在2018年年中實施第一輪關(guān)稅時,，市場一片恐慌,，中國股市暴跌25%，盡管此后有所反彈,。

盡管如此,，單偉建認(rèn)為，迅速增長的中國居民收入將抵消對貿(mào)易爭端的擔(dān)憂,。從這種增長中獲利良多的企業(yè),，包括一批美國公司——去年，美國公司在中國的銷售額高達4000億美元,。盡管針鋒相對的關(guān)稅戰(zhàn)已經(jīng)傷害了美國農(nóng)民和制造商,，但迄今為止，那些在中國生產(chǎn),，并在中國銷售的公司并未受到多大影響,。正如單偉建所言，這類公司不勝枚舉,。

為了服務(wù)迅速增長的中國客戶群體，特斯拉在上海建設(shè)了Gigafactory 3,，后者是全球最大的汽車工廠之一,。蘋果在中國的iPhone用戶比美國還多，通用汽車的在華銷量早已經(jīng)超越美國本土,。星巴克去年雄心勃勃地宣稱,，要將在華收入增加兩倍以上——目前估計占總銷售額的20%。麥當(dāng)勞承諾到2022年新增2000家餐廳,?？偛吭O(shè)在上海,，但在得克薩斯州注冊的百勝中國是中國最大的餐飲企業(yè)。旗下的餐飲品牌肯德基和必勝客分別是中國首屈一指的快餐和休閑餐廳,。百盛中國正在追尋一個長期發(fā)展目標(biāo),，即將門店數(shù)量從目前的8900家擴大到20000家。

The PAG fund launched just in time to capitalize on a historic transition. Since then, Shan says, “China has gone from the factory of the world to the market for the world.”

The recent slowdown in China’s growth is attributable almost entirely to a decline in exports and manufacturing—to the “factory,” in other words. Much of that, Shan notes, reflects government-driven deleveraging: Starting in 2017, Beijing took radical steps to shrink bloated, state-owned industrial enterprises and squeeze excess credit out of the banking system and housing market.

Even more central to the deceleration is China’s long-term shift from export-led manufacturing to consumption. As Chinese wages rise, families spend a higher proportion of their income on health care, entertainment, restaurants, and consumer goods. The shift to a consumer society, as a rule, dampens the overall growth rate. “In manufacturing, you have a multiplier effect,” explains Shan. “A new plant starts and hires people, then buys supplies and power from producers that hire more people, who generate more wages to buy things.” But consumer spending, “dollar for dollar, creates less growth.”

Shan emphasizes that exports and manufacturing started falling long before the trade war began. Since 2010, the value of goods China ships abroad dropped from 36% of GDP to 18%. That means U.S.-imposed tariffs sting less: Exports to the U.S. now represent only 4% of China’s national income, around one-third the level of a decade ago. This year, China’s shipments to America are expected to drop by around $60 billion. But as Shan points out, China has been exporting far more goods to the rest of the world, blunting that decline’s impact.

As manufacturing retreated, Chinese consumption rose. At 10% a year, Chinese consumer spending is growing 2.5 times as fast as the equivalent U.S. figure. Amazingly, China’s retail sector—defined as the market for consumer goods, but excluding services—grew to an annualized $6.22 trillion this August, surpassing the U.S. for the first time.

This consumer revolution isn’t completely immune to the trade war. “The psychological impact could be large,” Shan warns. He recalls that when the U.S. unleashed its first round of tariffs in mid-2018, panic reigned, and Chinese stocks dropped 25%, though they have since bounced back.

Still, Shan reckons that fast-rising Chinese incomes will triumph over trade fears. Among the businesses capitalizing on that growth are a host of U.S. companies—to the tune of $400 billion in sales inside China each year. While tariff tit-for-tats have hurt U.S. farmers and -manufacturers, they’re so far sparing companies that make goods in China to sell in China—and those, as Shan notes, are plentiful.

Tesla is building Gigafactory 3, one of the world’s largest auto plants, in Shanghai, to serve a burgeoning Chinese customer base. Apple has more iPhone users in China than in the U.S., and GM sells more cars in China than stateside. Last year, Starbucks announced plans to more than triple its revenues in China—currently estimated at around 20% of total sales. McDonald’s promises 2,000 new restaurants by 2022. And Yum China—headquartered in Shanghai but incorporated in Texas—is China’s largest restaurant company. Its Kentucky Fried Chicken and Pizza Hut brands are the country’s leading quick-service and casual-dining eateries, respectively, and Yum is pursuing a long-term goal of expanding its store count from its current 8,900 to 20,000.

那么,，單偉建收獲的戰(zhàn)利品來自何方,？從一開始，PAG就專注于投資那些迎合消費者需求,、所需成長資金相對較少的企業(yè),。它最早的一些成功源自中國之外。例如,，PAG是位于日本大阪的環(huán)球影城主題公園的重要投資者,。單偉建解釋說，日本自身的增長并沒有那么激動人心,，“但我們篤信,，這個主題公園肯定會大火特火，因為中國和其他亞洲國家的游客數(shù)量將爆炸式增長,。后來的事實就是這樣,。” PAG最初的投資是1.2億美元,。2016年,，該公司以12.5億美元的價格出售了所持股份。

數(shù)字音樂是單偉建最成功的投資領(lǐng)域之一,。他早早就發(fā)現(xiàn)了音樂版權(quán)所有者海洋音樂集團（CMC）的巨大潛力,。“這是一個購買歌曲,、歌詞版權(quán)和唱片公司的平臺,。”單偉建解釋說,?！八鼡碛兄袊?0%的數(shù)字版權(quán)?！眴栴}是：彼時的流媒體平臺并不需要支付版稅,。但單偉建預(yù)計，打擊音樂盜版將是中國法律的大勢所趨,。2014年,，PAG向CMC投資1億美元，以資助它收購兩家頗有人氣的流媒體服務(wù)商,。也就是說,，PAG成功實現(xiàn)了一家音樂版權(quán)持有者和兩大傳播平臺的垂直整合,。2016年，在他的精心策劃下,，CMC與科技巨頭騰訊控股旗下的流媒體平臺QQ音樂完成合并,，合并后的公司被命名為“騰訊音樂”。如今,，騰訊音樂已經(jīng)在中國音樂流媒體領(lǐng)域占據(jù)主導(dǎo)地位,，擁有高達8億活躍用戶。鑒于中國正在采取強有力的手段保護音樂版權(quán),，騰訊音樂預(yù)計將獲得巨額收入,。2018年年底，騰訊音樂登陸紐交所,，PAG的1億美元投資現(xiàn)在價值約20億美元,。只不過，這個主打流行音樂的流媒體平臺的主顧并不包括單偉建自己,?！拔抑宦牴诺湟魳罚紶柭犅牼羰繕芬矡o妨,?！彼f。

單偉建的投資組合目前包括20多家公司,，其中多數(shù)為私營企業(yè),，PAG通常持有100%的股份或者控股權(quán)。中國的醫(yī)療保健業(yè)是單偉建尤為重視的投資領(lǐng)域之一,。他說：“隨著人們變得越來越富裕,，他們會越來越多地接受一些高端醫(yī)療服務(wù)，其復(fù)雜程度是我當(dāng)年做赤腳醫(yī)生時無法想象的,?！盤AG投資的醫(yī)療企業(yè)包括中國領(lǐng)先的心臟和中樞神經(jīng)系統(tǒng)藥物制造商吉林英聯(lián)生物技術(shù)有限公司。

PAG還深信,，隨著中國變得更加富裕,，老百姓會更加追求吃的品味。它在這一領(lǐng)域投資的公司包括富友聯(lián)合食品,。這家北歐乳制品供應(yīng)商正在將它的酸奶和冰淇淋帶到中國,。在中國，這類食品往往被視為高端美食,。PAG還擁有中國最大的牛奶生產(chǎn)商優(yōu)然牧業(yè)的多數(shù)股權(quán)。單偉建說：“我們擁有10多萬頭牛,，是中國最大的牛群之一,！”他指出,，其中數(shù)千頭徜徉在他早年生活的地方——內(nèi)蒙古大草原。

面向消費者的技術(shù)也是單偉建的重要投資領(lǐng)域,。PAG參與的一家中國財團擁有總部位于肯塔基州的利盟公司,；這家公司在中國的銷售增勢迅猛，因為中國家庭和辦公室打印機市場的增長速度遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)快于西方,。單偉建的基金還持有約會網(wǎng)站珍愛網(wǎng)的多數(shù)股權(quán),。這家迅速崛起的婚配服務(wù)平臺號稱擁有1.4億會員，2018年的銷售額約為4億美元,。其模式精確迎合了中國父母的一個熱切目標(biāo)：為女兒找到一位如意郎君,。一些父母愿意支付每年高達數(shù)千美元的VIP會員費?！爸袊朔浅Ｖ匾暭s會,。”單偉建解釋說,。一對男女通過珍愛網(wǎng)相識后,，一位女性監(jiān)護人會對該男子進行審查，并監(jiān)督他們的首次約會,?！八窃谀抢锕芾眍A(yù)期的?！眴蝹ソㄕf,。

PAG還押注于另一項造福社會的業(yè)務(wù)：中國的私立學(xué)校?！爸袊改笇ψ优哪鐞凼浅隽嗣?。”單偉建說,?！霸谥袊^60%的幼兒園是私營的,?！彼プ∵@一趨勢，收購了金蘋果學(xué)前教育集團,。這家連鎖教育機構(gòu)在成都經(jīng)營60所幼兒園,，總注冊人數(shù)達1.57萬人。此外,，PAG擁有的另一家教育公司,，總部位于北京的LILY英語學(xué)校，致力于為4至12歲的兒童提供沉浸式英語課外教育。對單偉建來說,，教育是那種典型的“以小博大”業(yè)務(wù),，即只需用一小部分收入進行再投資就能產(chǎn)生巨額收益。今年前八個月,，金蘋果的Ebitda（即息稅折舊攤銷前利潤）飆漲42%,，達到3100萬美元，利潤率超過30%,。

單偉建說,，去北京的時候，他有時會去拜訪一些當(dāng)年在戈壁沙漠與自己共患難的老朋友,。盡管他們幾乎總是用黑色幽默的口吻追憶昔日的戈壁歲月,，但每當(dāng)這些老伙伴說起他們的子女是如何受惠于新中國的學(xué)校、娛樂,、醫(yī)療和其他服務(wù)時,，他總是非常開心。畢竟,，這些領(lǐng)域正是他的風(fēng)險投資生涯賴以成功的基石,。“那時候,，我們被關(guān)在籠子里,，哪兒都去不了?！彼缡腔貞涍^去的日子,。

“后來，籠子漸漸打開,，人們開始展翅高飛,。當(dāng)經(jīng)濟體制變得更加開放時,，一切都隨之改變,?！爆F(xiàn)在，那些在商場購物,、在餐廳就餐、在私立學(xué)校學(xué)習(xí)的人,，才是中國經(jīng)濟最大的推動力。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

本文另一版本登載于《財富》雜志2019年12月刊，標(biāo)題為《走在前面的中國人》,，是“2020年投資者指南”專題的一部分。

譯者：任文科

So where has Shan been reaping his gains? From the start, PAG has focused on businesses that cater to consumers and require relatively little capital to grow. Some of its earliest successes were outside China. PAG was a big investor in the Universal Studios theme park in Osaka, Japan, for example. Japan’s own growth was tepid, Shan explains, “but we thought [the park] would take off because of the explosive growth of visitors from China and other Asian countries. And that’s what happened.” PAG’s original investment was $120 million. In 2016, it sold its stake for $1.25 billion.

One of Shan’s biggest scores has been in digital music. Shan saw huge potential in an owner of music copyrights called China Music Corp. “It was a vehicle for purchasing the rights to songs, lyrics, and music labels,” Shan explains, “and it owned 70% of all the digital rights in China.” The problem: The streaming platforms at the time were paying no royalties. But Shan anticipated that legal trends in China would turn against music piracy. In 2014, PAG invested $100 million in CMC, enabling it to buy two popular streaming services—vertically integrating a musical rights holder with a means of transmission. And in 2016, he helped orchestrate a merger between CMC and QQ Music, the streaming platform of tech conglomerate Tencent, to create Tencent Music Entertainment. Today, that service’s dominant position has swelled its audience to 800 million active users—and strong copyright enforcement means it’s earning huge revenue. Late in 2018, Tencent Music went public on the New York Stock Exchange, and PAG’s $100 million investment is now worth around $2 billion. Tencent Music’s pop-oriented patrons don’t include Shan himself, who says, “I only listen to classical music, and I don’t mind jazz.”

Shan’s portfolio currently consists of over 20 companies, most of them private, in which PAG usually owns either 100% or a controlling interest. Health care in China is one of Shan’s themes. “As people become more affluent, they consume more and more of the sophisticated treatment I could never supply as a barefoot doctor,” he says. PAG’s health care investments include Jilin Yinglian, a leading maker of cardiac and central nervous system drugs.

PAG has also bet on the expanding culinary tastes of a more affluent nation. One holding is Food Union, a Northern European dairy-products purveyor that’s bringing its yogurt and ice cream to China, where such treats are considered high-end delicacies. PAG also owns a majority stake in China’s largest milk producer, China Youran Dairy. “We own more than 100,000 cows, one of the biggest herds in China!” says Shan, noting that thousands of them graze in the pastures of his old haunt, Inner Mongolia.

Consumer-facing technology also fuels Shan’s strategy. PAG is part of a Chinese consortium that owns Kentucky-based Lexmark; its sales have taken off in China, where the market for home and office printers is growing far faster than in the West. Shan’s fund also holds a majority stake in Zhenai, a dating website. The mushrooming matchmaker boasts 140 million members, and it posted roughly $400 million in 2018 sales. It tailors its model to a fervent goal for Chinese parents: finding an acceptable spouse for their daughters, a service for which some parents are willing to pay thousands of dollars a year for VIP memberships. “In China, dating is taken very seriously,” explains Shan. After a man and woman meet online through Zhenai, a female chaperone vets the man and oversees the couple’s first meeting. “She’s there to manage expectations,” Shan says.

PAG is also betting on another social--betterment business: China’s private schools. “Chinese parents spoil their kids,” says Shan. “More than 60% of the kindergartens in China are private.” He seized on the trend by purchasing Golden Apple, a chain in Chengdu that runs 60 kindergarten centers, with total enrollment of 15,700. Another PAG-owned academy, Lily English in Beijing, educates children from ages 4 to 12 in after-school courses conducted exclusively in English. For Shan, education is a model business that reinvests only small dollops of earnings to generate big gains. Through the first eight months of this year, Golden Apple’s Ebitda has soared 42%, to $31 million, with margins exceeding 30%.

When he visits Beijing, Shan says, he sometimes meets with friends from his years in the Gobi. Although they mostly recall the black comedy of their life in the wilderness, Shan is delighted when his old comrades talk about how their children are benefiting from the schools, entertainment, medical care, and other choices in the New China, the panoply he’s built a career around funding. “We were put in a cage, and we couldn’t fly anywhere,” he says of the old days.

“The cage gradually opened, and the people started to fly. It’s a more open system that makes the difference.” And it’s the folks in the malls and restaurants and private schools who are now proving to be that system’s greatest strength.?

A version of this article appears in the December 2019 issue of Fortune as part of the 2020 Investor’s Guide with the headline “Ahead of China’s Herd.”