????2013年,，投資級(jí)公司債的發(fā)行規(guī)模為1.1萬(wàn)億美元。也就是說(shuō),，中了簽的債券投資者獲得了近120億美元的收益,。這些資金本來(lái)有希望留在借款人的手里，但華爾街可能把由此產(chǎn)生的一筆巨資送給了自己的最佳客戶,，目的大概是為了隨后換來(lái)更多的生意,。

????有人指出，對(duì)承銷業(yè)務(wù)展開調(diào)查可能給華爾街帶來(lái)麻煩,，原因是債券發(fā)行量正在上升,，而監(jiān)管部門則開始整頓債券交易,。但重點(diǎn)并不在這里,。

????華爾街公司的債券交易收入仍遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)它們拿到的承銷費(fèi)，盡管二者的差距正在縮小,。以高盛為例,，2013年這家公司的債券承銷收入為24億美元，它的固定收益交易業(yè)務(wù)則實(shí)現(xiàn)收入87億美元,，其中包括大宗商品和貨幣交易,。這樣大家就可能明白，為什么高盛為了保證交易業(yè)務(wù)的順利運(yùn)作而愿意讓承銷業(yè)務(wù)客戶空手而歸,。在大型銀行中,，高盛在承銷方面的潛在損失可能最少——2013年它的投資級(jí)公司債承銷費(fèi)收入在這些銀行中排名第六——而它在交易領(lǐng)域的潛在獲利規(guī)模最大。這也許可以解釋為什么高盛第一個(gè)遭到調(diào)查,。同樣的,，花旗銀行在投資級(jí)債券發(fā)行方面也落后于摩根大通（JPMorgan Chase）和美銀（Bank of America）。

????那么,，為什么在這些做法可能已經(jīng)存在一段時(shí)間后才開始進(jìn)行調(diào)查呢,？原因之一是，由于利率處于歷史低點(diǎn),，債券投資者對(duì)大公司享有的不公平優(yōu)勢(shì)發(fā)出了更響亮的抱怨,。出于同樣的原因，認(rèn)購(gòu)?fù)鹕裙镜膶氋F債券有了風(fēng)險(xiǎn),，而這些債券的利率略微高一些,。

????同時(shí)，金融危機(jī)以來(lái),，由于那些“大得不能倒閉的”銀行進(jìn)一步擴(kuò)大了規(guī)模,，即使覺(jué)得受到了不公平待遇，企業(yè)借款人也可能更難找到其他公司來(lái)幫助自己發(fā)行債券。

????雖然大型債券基金受到優(yōu)待可能顯得不公平,，但這樣做是否違法尚不明朗,。彭博（Bloomberg）專欄作家馬特?萊文似乎認(rèn)為，某些債券投資者得到優(yōu)待似乎有很多看似合理而且合法的理由,。企業(yè)可能很重視把自己的債券交給少數(shù)幾名大型債券經(jīng)理人,。但債券價(jià)格持續(xù)上漲，這表明有人在不斷地買賣這些債券,，而且發(fā)行人最終面對(duì)的仍然有可能是一大堆投資者,。

????此外，在一級(jí)市場(chǎng),，將發(fā)行價(jià)定在市場(chǎng)價(jià)值以下是可以接受的做法,。而且，在經(jīng)歷了Facebook的慘痛教訓(xùn)后,，這種做法尤其得到提倡,。20世紀(jì)90年代末的IPO風(fēng)潮過(guò)后，華爾街公司因操縱IPO交易而遭到罰款和起訴,。然而,，按今天的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)衡量，這些罰款數(shù)額很少,。高盛和摩根士丹利（Morgan Stanley）都繳納了2000萬(wàn)美元的罰款,。華爾街公司一共花了5.86億美元，就了結(jié)了相關(guān)的集體訴訟,。

????在這項(xiàng)集體訴訟中,，監(jiān)管部門收集的證據(jù)顯示，華爾街公司在操縱IPO的過(guò)程中為部分投資者認(rèn)購(gòu)新股另辟蹊徑,，并且因此拿到了更高的傭金或其他形式的回扣,。要在債券市場(chǎng)證明這一點(diǎn)，難度要大很多,。原因是,，傭金經(jīng)常包含在投資者認(rèn)購(gòu)債券的資金之中，而且總的來(lái)說(shuō),，債市的不透明程度要高得多,。更重要的是，直接購(gòu)買債券的個(gè)人投資者極少,，因此可能很難集中動(dòng)用證券交易委員會(huì)或其他部門的資源,，特別是眼下促成調(diào)查的原因似乎是因?yàn)橐徊糠秩A爾街公司對(duì)另一部分同行感到不滿。

????所有這些都表明,，就算華爾街債券承銷業(yè)務(wù)的確需要整頓,，我們也絕不可能看到這項(xiàng)疑點(diǎn)重重的業(yè)務(wù)真的會(huì)得到整頓,。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

????譯者：Charlie

????

????Some suggest that an investigation into underwriting practices could pose a problem for Wall Street as bond sales are rising while regulators are cracking down on trading. But that misses the point.

????Wall Street firms still make far more money on their bond trading desks than they do from underwriting fees, even if that spread is narrowing. Goldman, for instance, generated $2.4 billion from debt underwriting in 2013. But it got $8.7 billion from its fixed-income trading business, which also includes commodities and currency trades. So you could see why Goldman would be willing to stiff its underwriting clients to keep its trading business flowing. And among the biggest banks, Goldman probably has the least to lose in the underwriting business -- it's ranked sixth in investment grade corporate bond fees in 2013 -- and the most to gain in its trading business, which could explain why it is the first to come under investigation. Citi, too, ranked behind JPMorgan Chase (JPM) and Bank of America (BAC) in investment-grade bond deals.

????So why is this being investigated now, when these practices have probably gone on for a while? For one, with interest rates at all-time lows, bond investors are complaining louder about the unfair edge that the bigger players enjoy. For the same reason, the stakes of getting into prized deals like Verizon's, which yield slightly higher interest rates. Also, as too-big-to-fail banks have gotten even bigger since the financial crisis, it may be harder for corporate borrowers to take their business elsewhere if they feel like they are getting a raw deal.

????While the preferential treatment to big bond funds may seem unfair, it's unclear it's illegal. Matt Levine seems to think there are a number of plausible and legit reasons certain bond investors get preferential treatment. Corporations might value placing their bonds in the hands of a fewer large bond managers. But the fact that prices are rising suggests there is buying and selling, and issuers probably end up with a jumble of investors anyway.

????What's more, underpricing deals is accepted in the IPO market and, after the Facebook (FB)debacle, practically encouraged. After the IPO boom of the late 1990s, Wall Street firms were fined and sued for manipulating IPO offerings. But the fines were small by today's standards. Goldman and Morgan Stanley (MS) paid a $20 million fine each. And Wall Street firms collectively paid $586 million to settle a class action suit on the matter.

????In the class action, regulators gathered evidence that Wall Street firms were receiving higher commissions or other forms of kickbacks in return for giving certain investors special access to rigged IPOs. That would be much harder to prove in the bond market, where commissions are often built into the price that investors pay for their bonds, and the market in general is much more opaque. On top of that, few individual investors directly buy bonds, so drumming up resources inside the SEC or another agency might be tough, especially when the impetus of the investigation appears to be one part of Wall Street complaining about another.

????All this suggests that we're not really all that likely to see a crackdown of Wall Street's shady bond underwriting practices, even if one is actually deserved.