????穆巴拉克倒臺后,，埃及人相信繁榮和民主觸手可及。然而在穆巴拉克下臺后的過渡期中,，掌權(quán)的武裝部隊最高委員會（Supreme Council of the Armed Forces）不僅沒有解決曠日持久的經(jīng)濟問題,，用他們自己的話說，也沒能“為民主鋪平道路”,。穆罕默德?穆爾西——埃及第一位民選領(lǐng)袖掌權(quán)后,，他一心想將穆斯林兄弟會（Muslim Brotherhood）的權(quán)力制度化，結(jié)果在這個過程中幾乎導(dǎo)致國家經(jīng)濟全盤崩潰,。一年之后,，全體埃及人走上街頭示威，要求罷黜穆爾西——對于這一要求,，軍方似乎非常樂意效勞,。

????埃及人在社交媒體上表示，他們的經(jīng)歷對于烏克蘭人民具有警示意義,。如果在當(dāng)時,，埃及的領(lǐng)袖們——先是軍隊指揮官，后是穆斯林兄弟會——能夠創(chuàng)造機會,，使得埃及人可以用民主的方式表達他們的不滿,，那么埃及現(xiàn)階段不確定的政治局面、不穩(wěn)定的國家形勢，以及時斷時續(xù)的暴力事件或許都可以得到避免,。2011年埃及人的起義不單單是對經(jīng)濟不滿,，但2013年6月末及7月初的大規(guī)模游行，至少有一部分原因是埃及人對當(dāng)時惡化的經(jīng)濟條件的回應(yīng)：燃料短缺,、滾動式燈火管制,、通貨膨脹、關(guān)鍵基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的迅速惡化,，以及穆爾西明顯的獨裁傾向,。如果埃及人知道，他們本可保留向領(lǐng)袖們追責(zé)的權(quán)利,，或許就不會讓軍隊回到政治家手里了,。然而當(dāng)時他們還相信，總統(tǒng)穆爾西正努力扭轉(zhuǎn)經(jīng)濟崩潰的局勢,，并為此負起責(zé)任,。

????當(dāng)然，烏克蘭與埃及不同,，但并非完全不同,。烏克蘭的新領(lǐng)袖們——如果稱得上是領(lǐng)袖的話——不僅需要頒布一系列政策以挽救國家經(jīng)濟，還需要建立一種機制,，確保民眾在領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人有負重托時有權(quán)追究他們的責(zé)任,。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

????史蒂文?A?庫克是外交關(guān)系協(xié)會Hasib J. Sabbagh中東問題資深研究員,著有《為埃及而奮斗--從納賽爾到解放廣場》（牛津大學(xué)出版社出版）。

????譯者：朱毓芬/汪皓

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????Following Mubarak's fall, Egyptians believed that prosperity and democracy were within their grasp. Yet the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which held power in the immediate post-Mubarak period, did little to address Egypt's yawning economic challenges nor -- in the officers' own words -- did they "pave the way for democracy." When the country's first democratically elected leader, Mohammed Morsi, came to power he presided over a near economic collapse while seeking to institutionalize the power of his Muslim Brotherhood. After a year, Egyptians took to the streets en masse to demand Morsi's ouster -- a call the military seemed only too happy to oblige.

????As Egyptians have made clear on social media, their experience is a cautionary tale for Ukrainians. Egypt's present political uncertainty, its instability, and its spasms of violence might have been avoided had the country's leaders -- first military commanders and then the Muslim Brothers -- provided an opportunity for Egyptians to process their grievances through democratic institutions. The uprising in 2011 was not solely about economics, but the enormous demonstrations of late June and early July 2013 were at least in part a response to worsening economic conditions such as fuel shortages, rolling blackouts, inflation, the rapid deterioration of critical infrastructure, and Morsi's clear authoritarian tendencies. Had Egyptians understood that they would be able to hold their leaders accountable, they likely would not have supported the return of the armed forces to politics, yet they believed that President Morsi was working to make it impossible to hold him responsible for the country's near economic collapse.

????Ukraine is different from Egypt of course, but not all that different. The country's new leaders -- if they are actually leaders -- not only need to pursue policies that will pull the country from the economic brink, but they need to establish the mechanisms for citizens to hold them accountable should they fail.

????Steven A. Cook is the Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square(Oxford University Press).