????美聯(lián)儲聲稱沒有救助雷曼兄弟的權(quán)利，這一點(diǎn)更可疑,，而上周五上午公布的美聯(lián)儲2008年會議紀(jì)要進(jìn)一步削弱了這種說法,。對雷曼袖手旁觀的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)借口是，對面臨流動性緊縮但仍具有償還能力的銀行,，央行是最后的救助手段,。也就是說，對于任何擁有抵押品的銀行,，美聯(lián)儲都應(yīng)該出資救助,。為什么不出手救助雷曼,？伯南克曾經(jīng)這樣為自己的決定辯護(hù)，他說,，他無法提供任何救助,，因?yàn)槔茁值芤呀?jīng)喪失了償還能力：

????雷曼兄弟本身可能是太大而不能倒，在某種意義上說,，雷曼的倒閉會對全球金融體系產(chǎn)生巨大的負(fù)面影響,，但我們卻束手無策，因?yàn)槔茁值鼙举|(zhì)上已資不抵債,。

????但一家公司是資不抵債還是流動性不足,，這兩種情況之間并沒有涇渭分明的區(qū)別，而是取決于對一群神秘資產(chǎn)的評估方式,。近期公布的會議紀(jì)要中美聯(lián)儲公開市場委員會成員的意見顯示,，讓雷曼倒閉的決定似乎緣于反對政府干預(yù)的意識形態(tài)，而不是其他原因,。下面是圣路易斯聯(lián)邦儲備銀行行長詹姆斯?布拉德于9月16日（雷曼破產(chǎn)后的第二天）發(fā)布的意見：

????我的政策立場是,，維持聯(lián)邦基金利率目標(biāo)在當(dāng)前的水平，等過段時間再來評估雷曼兄弟申請破產(chǎn)保護(hù)對國民經(jīng)濟(jì)的影響（如果確實(shí)有響的話）,。美聯(lián)儲拒絕為雷曼兄弟的競購者提供資金擔(dān)保,，由此已經(jīng)開始重新確立一種意識，即市場不能每次一碰到苦難的關(guān)鍵時刻就指望政府的救助,。眼下變更利率會混淆這個重要信號,，抵消之前決策的大部分積極成果。

????當(dāng)然,，事后諸葛亮是好當(dāng),，但美聯(lián)儲成員認(rèn)為雷曼兄弟破產(chǎn)對經(jīng)濟(jì)幾乎沒有影響，這個觀點(diǎn)令人震驚,。而且布拉德認(rèn)為,，不救助雷曼兄弟的決定并非迫不得已，而是主動選擇的結(jié)果,。

????波士頓聯(lián)邦儲備銀行總裁羅森格倫也許是2008年美聯(lián)儲理事會中最有見地的一位成員,，因?yàn)樗菫閿?shù)不多的贊成從9月份就開始降息的人之一，而且,，他還質(zhì)疑過任由雷曼兄弟倒閉的決定：

????我認(rèn)為,，現(xiàn)在就判斷關(guān)于雷曼兄弟的決策是否正確還言之過早。鑒于財(cái)政部不愿意提供資金,，我們別無選擇,。但我們采取了經(jīng)過精心計(jì)算的策略。如果貨幣市場基金出現(xiàn)擠兌,，或者說,，如果非政府第三方回購市場關(guān)閉,，這個辦法的效果就會打折扣。

????羅森格倫的說法是有點(diǎn)模糊不清,。他認(rèn)為讓雷曼倒閉是“經(jīng)過精心計(jì)算的策略”,，但又說美聯(lián)儲“別無選擇”。但是這種似是而非的說法也有點(diǎn)正當(dāng)?shù)睦碛?。從金融危機(jī)調(diào)查委員會發(fā)現(xiàn)的電子郵件來看,，我們認(rèn)為美聯(lián)儲當(dāng)時顯然在考慮用2000億美元貸款來保住雷曼兄弟。這些電子郵件稱這種方式為“一場賭博”,，也許值得一試,。

????但美聯(lián)儲從來沒有真正嘗試過這種方式，而且似乎其中包含意識形態(tài)的原因,。這就更加令人困惑,，因?yàn)樵谶^去30年中，聯(lián)邦政府都會在危機(jī)時刻進(jìn)行干預(yù),，以防止金融體系崩潰產(chǎn)生破壞性影響,。有鑒于此，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家艾倫?梅爾策稱這項(xiàng)決定是“美聯(lián)儲歷史上最嚴(yán)重的錯誤之一”,。5年之后的今天,，從最近發(fā)布的會議紀(jì)要來看，我們沒有理由不同意梅爾策的評價,。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

????譯者：Lina

????

????The Fed's claim that it didn't have the power to save Lehman is much more dubious, and is further weakened by transcripts released Friday morning of the central bank's 2008 meetings. The standard excuse for its inaction on Lehman is that central banks should be the lender of last resort to banks that are in a liquidity crunch, but are still solvent. That is, the Fed should lend money to any bank that has collateral to offer. When defending his decision to not intervene with Lehman, Bernanke has claimed that he could not offer anything because the bank was insolvent:

????Lehman Brothers was in itself probably too big to fail, in the sense that its failure had enormous negative impacts on the global financial system ... But there we were helpless, because it was essentially an insolvent firm.

????But the difference between a firm being insolvent and illiquid isn't cut-and-dried, and it hinges on how you value a bunch of inscrutable assets. Based on the opinions of Federal Reserve Open Market Committee members revealed in the recently released minutes, the decision to let Lehman fail seems to have much more to do with an ideological aversion to government intervention than anything else. Here's St. Louis Fed President James Bullard on Sept. 16, the day after the Lehman bankruptcy:

????My policy preference is to maintain the federal funds rate target at the current level and to wait for some time to assess the impact of the Lehman bankruptcy filing, if any, on the national economy ... By denying funding to Lehman suitors, the Fed has begun to reestablish the idea that markets should not expect help at each difficult juncture. Changing rates today would confuse that important signal and take out much of the positive part out of the previous decision.

????Hindsight is 20/20, of course, but it is stunning that Fed members thought that the Lehman bankruptcy could conceivably have no effect on the economy. Notice as well that Bullard paints the decision to not save Lehman as not one of necessity but of choice.

????Boston Fed President Eric Rosengren was perhaps the most insightful member of the Fed Board in 2008, as he was one of the few in favor of lowering interest rates as early as September, and questions the wisdom of the decision to let Lehman fail:

????I think it's too soon to know whether what we did with Lehman is right. Given that the Treasury didn't want to put money in, what happened was that we had no choice. But we took a calculated bet. If we have a run on the money market funds or if the nongovernment tri-party repo market shuts down, that bet may not look nearly so good.

????Rosengren's statement is a bit murky here. He calls letting Lehman fail a "calculated bet" but then says that the Fed had "no choice." This waffling has the whiff of justification, however. In e-mailsunearthed by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, we can see that the Fed was clearly considering a $200 billion loan to help keep Lehman afloat. These emails called that approach "a gamble" that might be worth taking.

????But the Fed never took it, and it appears they did so at least partly for ideological reasons. This is all the more confusing because the federal government had spent the last 30 years intervening in crises to prevent destructive financial system meltdowns. In light of this, economist Alan Meltzer has called the decision "one of the worst blunders in Federal Reserve history." Five years later, the recently released transcripts give us no reason to disagree with Meltzer's assessment.