????身居上海,，大多數(shù)時(shí)候，每到夜晚,，我都會(huì)聽(tīng)到消費(fèi)者新聞與財(cái)經(jīng)頻道（CNBC）里那些遠(yuǎn)在美國(guó)的,、面目模糊的專家們絮叨著中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的天就要塌了，于是我很快便會(huì)睡眼惺忪,。我已經(jīng)開(kāi)始習(xí)慣這些有線電視網(wǎng)的愚昧無(wú)知,，要不然肯定早就發(fā)瘋了。在對(duì)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)超級(jí)擔(dān)憂的當(dāng)下（提醒一句,，這種擔(dān)憂合情合理,，畢竟歐美經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)仍在不斷升級(jí)），我們不妨深吸一口氣,，將目前中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩置于一定背景下來(lái)看待,。

????過(guò)去一年中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的放緩是有必要的。前十年大多數(shù)時(shí)候,，中國(guó)的實(shí)際GDP增速都保持在10%以上,，引發(fā)了普遍的通貨膨脹和經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)的嚴(yán)重扭曲（過(guò)度依賴固定資產(chǎn)投資作為經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)動(dòng)力）。為此,，政府收緊了政策,，特別嚴(yán)加調(diào)控住宅市場(chǎng)。住宅建設(shè)過(guò)熱,，但絕大多數(shù)中國(guó)人還是買不起房,，從而導(dǎo)致社會(huì)矛盾升級(jí)。（建設(shè)過(guò)熱和房?jī)r(jià)過(guò)高顯然是一對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)悖論,，我們稍后將做解釋,。）

????宏觀調(diào)控政策已經(jīng)奏效,，效果或許甚至有點(diǎn)超出政府的預(yù)想，因?yàn)楹苊黠@,，今年前兩個(gè)季度中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增速正在快速放緩,。3月份，中國(guó)國(guó)務(wù)院總理溫家寶正式將2012年的官方GDP增長(zhǎng)目標(biāo)調(diào)低到了7.5%,，但就算達(dá)到這個(gè)目標(biāo)都還需要點(diǎn)運(yùn)氣,。中國(guó)近來(lái)的工業(yè)產(chǎn)值、用電量等數(shù)據(jù)都非常差,。全球大宗商品價(jià)格下跌，從煤炭,、鐵礦石到原油的庫(kù)存都在不斷攀升,，顯然都與中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的放緩緊密相關(guān)。受中國(guó)需求推動(dòng)的大宗商品市場(chǎng)長(zhǎng)達(dá)十年的牛市正在接近尾聲,。

????造成中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩的部分原因是歐洲危機(jī)——經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家委婉地稱其“經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退”,，但老實(shí)說(shuō)，希臘,、西班牙等國(guó)的情況已經(jīng)比大蕭條好不了多少,。歐洲是中國(guó)最大的貿(mào)易伙伴國(guó)，歐洲危機(jī)加深,，中國(guó)自然不能全身而退,。同時(shí)，美國(guó)是中國(guó)第二大貿(mào)易伙伴國(guó),，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)疲弱自然也無(wú)益于中國(guó),。

????中國(guó)政府主導(dǎo)的這輪經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩?fù)耆斜匾『泌s上了外部需求疲弱,，所以結(jié)果自然不太美妙,。特別是那些相信中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)將永遠(yuǎn)保持10%的年增長(zhǎng)、持續(xù)進(jìn)行相應(yīng)產(chǎn)能擴(kuò)張的公司,。預(yù)計(jì)中國(guó)業(yè)務(wù)比重高的跨國(guó)公司業(yè)績(jī)不及預(yù)期的情況將越來(lái)越多,。

????不過(guò)，話雖如此,，也不能夸大當(dāng)前中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的放緩,。中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)沒(méi)有出現(xiàn)自由落體式的下滑。它面臨的宏觀問(wèn)題也遠(yuǎn)不及歐美眼前的問(wèn)題,。要知道,，首先，將中國(guó)歸為“出口型”經(jīng)濟(jì)已不再準(zhǔn)確,，因此外部需求的沖擊可能有限,。中國(guó)的經(jīng)常項(xiàng)目順差在國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)中的比率已略低于3%,，遠(yuǎn)低于八年前的10%。發(fā)達(dá)世界上演的經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)已經(jīng)波及中國(guó),，但還沒(méi)有嚴(yán)重到扼殺中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的增長(zhǎng)勢(shì)頭,。

????Some of the last words I hear before nodding off to sleep most nights here in Shanghai are uttered by a pasty-faced guy in the United States, nattering on CNBC about how the sky is falling (economically speaking) in China. I've become somewhat inured to the inanities of cable television -- you'd go insane if it were otherwise -- but in these days of hyper-concern about the global economy (quite legitimate concern mind you, given the unfolding debacles in Europe and the United States), it's useful for everyone to take a deep breath and put China's current slowdown in some context.

????China's economy for the past year has been slowing out of necessity. Its consistent 10%-plus real GDP growth rates for most of the past decade had contributed to a broad inflation, as well as severe distortions in the economy's composition (a significant over reliance on fixed asset investment as the driver of growth). The government tightened policy as a result, and put shackles in particular on the residential housing market, which was at once overbuilt and still unaffordable for the vast majority of Chinese, thus contributing to social tensions here. (Overbuiltand overpriced is, to be sure, an economic oxymoron, but we'll leave the explanation for that for later.)

????The tightening measures worked, arguably a bit more than the government intended, as it became clear in the first two quarters of this year that China was decelerating rapidly. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in March officially lowered the government's growth target for 2012 to 7.5%, and that should be considered a target that Beijing will be lucky to hit this year. The data these days -- industrial production, electricity consumption -- are weak, and the global slump in commodity prices, with inventories piling up in everything from coal to iron ore to crude oil, is obviously closely tied to macro weakness in China. It's the unwinding of the decade-long, China-driven bull market in commodities that is now over.

????Part of the China slow-down is driven by the disaster in Europe -- what polite economists call a "recession," but which is, let's face it, nothing less than a depression in countries like Greece and Spain. Europe is China's biggest trading partner, and China is plainly not immune to its deepening pain. The U.S. is China's second-largest trading partner, and its weakening economy is obviously not helping China's growth, either.

????So a government-led deceleration, which was necessary, now has weakness in external demand added to it, and the result is not pretty. That's particularly true for companies the world over that convinced themselves that China would grow at 10% per year forever, and scaled up capacity accordingly. Expect earnings disappointments from multinationals everywhere with big China businesses to increase.

????But, having said all that, it's critical not to exaggerate the current weakness. China is not in free fall. The macro issues it confronts pale in comparison with those now front and center in Europe and the U.S. Remember, first, that China can no longer accurately be characterized as an "export led" economy, so the damage the outside world can do is limited. Beijing's current account surplus as a share of its economy is now slightly less than 3%. That's down from 10% eight years ago. The unfolding economic debacle in the developed world is wounding China, but not killing it.