????但這一災(zāi)難性場(chǎng)景并非不可避免,。“其他已退出事實(shí)上共同貨幣區(qū)的國(guó)家沒(méi)有陷入惡性通貨通脹?！背钟邢ＥD國(guó)債的投資公司Greylock Capital的總裁漢斯?休謨斯說(shuō)。阿里布認(rèn)為,，希臘的退出將創(chuàng)造出與冰島,、阿根廷同樣的增長(zhǎng)活力，冰島,、阿根廷都事實(shí)上放棄了高估的貨幣,。

????我認(rèn)為，出現(xiàn)阿里布預(yù)測(cè)的,、相對(duì)樂(lè)觀的情形可能性更大：在恢復(fù)德拉克馬的最初幾天,，很多逃離希臘的歐元儲(chǔ)蓄將回流。希臘產(chǎn)品將極其熱銷,，售價(jià)比一周前歐元換成德拉克馬時(shí)的價(jià)格至少低三分之一,。這種突然的資金流入將支撐德拉克馬。

????很快,，希臘將恢復(fù)加入歐元區(qū)之前的情形：一個(gè)物價(jià)不貴的國(guó)家,。旅游者將取消他們?cè)谕炼涞亩燃伲◣字芮埃炼涞膬r(jià)格在地中海地區(qū)還是很低的）,，改至希臘島嶼游覽,。希臘的番茄、橄欖油和魚產(chǎn)品的出口將增加,，加工品進(jìn)口將下降,，因?yàn)檫@些加工品的價(jià)格相對(duì)于國(guó)內(nèi)制造產(chǎn)品出現(xiàn)了上漲。

????希臘主權(quán)債務(wù)也會(huì)違約,，這是走向復(fù)蘇的另外必要一步,。歐洲央行（European Central Bank）將承受巨大損失,，但私營(yíng)部門的債券持有人早已承受了大部分痛苦?！拔覀冇?0種不同期限的希臘國(guó)債已經(jīng)折價(jià)80%,。”休謨斯說(shuō),，“我認(rèn)為沒(méi)有任何理由再折價(jià),。”

????退出歐元區(qū),，這一令希臘和歐洲領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人都害怕的舉措,，將讓希臘恢復(fù)溫和增長(zhǎng)。但這也會(huì)恢復(fù)希臘在2001年1月1日加入歐元區(qū)前的一些負(fù)面因素,?！拔磥?lái)的問(wèn)題是我們會(huì)看到一個(gè)新希臘，還是一個(gè)舊希臘,，”阿里布說(shuō),。前者將要求希臘政府摒棄壟斷、縮減龐大的公務(wù)員隊(duì)伍,、取消禁止郵輪線路從希臘始發(fā)和終到的反競(jìng)爭(zhēng)法規(guī),。如果希臘生產(chǎn)率落后于鄰國(guó)，它將進(jìn)行更多的進(jìn)口和更少的出口,，降低工人工資和生活水平,。為恢復(fù)其在國(guó)際市場(chǎng)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力，它需要定期將德拉克馬貶值,。

????這就是舊希臘,，不幸的是舊希臘出現(xiàn)的可能性更大。但至少,，希臘擺脫了高估至少50%的歐元的重壓,。歐洲即將讓市場(chǎng)而非政客來(lái)決定其度假服務(wù)和農(nóng)業(yè)物產(chǎn)究竟值多少錢。這很快就會(huì)發(fā)生,。

????譯者：早稻米

????But the disaster scenario isn't inevitable. "Other countries have left what's effectively a common currency zone without suffering hyperinflation," says Hans Humes, president of investment firm Greylock Capital, which holds Greek government bonds. Aliber thinks that Greece's exit will create the same growth dynamic that's recharged Iceland and Argentina, both of whom effectively shed overvalued currencies.

????My view is that the relatively optimistic Aliber forecast is the more likely outcome. Here's how it plays out: In the first few days after the drachma's return, much of the savings that left the country in Euros will come back. Greek goods will be screaming buy, selling for at least one-third less that a week before for people exchanging their Euros for drachma. That sudden inflow will support the drachma.

????Overnight, Greece will once again become what it was in pre-Euro days: an inexpensive country. Tourists will cancel their vacations in Turkey –– which a few weeks ago were the Mediterranean bargain –– and tour the Greek islands instead. Exports of Greek tomatoes, olive oil and fish from its fish farms will expand, and imports of manufactured goods will fall as they rise in price versus domestically made products.

????Greece will also default on its sovereign debt, another necessary step towards recovery. The European Central Bank will suffer big losses, but private bondholders have already taken most of the pain. "We've taken an effective 80% haircut on twenty different maturities of Greek government bonds," says Humes. "I do not see a reason for an additional haircut."

????The move that both Greek and European leaders so dread will restore modest growth. But it will also restore the same negatives that saddled Greece before it entered the Eurozone on January 1st, 2001. "The question for the future is whether we see a new or an old Greece," says Aliber. The former would require that the Greek government junk monopolies, trim the gigantic public workforce, and shed anti-competitive rules that prevent cruise lines from starting and ending trips in Greece. If Greek productivity lags that of its neighbors, it will import more and export less, hobbling wages and the living standards of its workers. To restore its competitiveness on global markets, it will have to keep devaluing the drachma at regular intervals.

????That was the old Greece, and unfortunately, it's the old Greece that's more likely to emerge. But at least will escape the grip of a currency that's at least 50% overvalued. Europe is about to let the market, not politics, decide what price it make its vacation packages and agricultural bounty a great deal again. And it will happen soon.