埃隆·馬斯克是一個(gè)特別會(huì)花別人的錢的人,。

馬斯克的飄忽不定是出了名的。他對(duì)汽車量產(chǎn)的預(yù)期改了又改,，前一陣他還發(fā)推特稱要將特斯拉私有化,，后來卻又把這話收回去了。業(yè)內(nèi)不做展廳而是做網(wǎng)絡(luò)營銷的汽車廠商,，估計(jì)也就只有特斯拉一家了,。馬斯克只有在一件事情上是堅(jiān)定而執(zhí)著的——籌免費(fèi)的錢。在特斯拉用來生產(chǎn)汽車和電池的錢里,，有很大一部分并非來自于債權(quán)人和股東,，而是來自于自己的狂熱顧客。比如顧客排隊(duì)訂車的訂金,、買車的預(yù)付款,，還有無人駕駛軟件的預(yù)付費(fèi)用等等。

這幾十億美元是特斯拉的一個(gè)隱性優(yōu)勢(shì),。不過最重要的問題是,，接下來幾年,，馬克斯還能否繼續(xù)以現(xiàn)在的效率花別人的錢。如果這筆錢干涸了,，則要想獲得新的資本,，馬斯克必然要付出融資成本，而這也必然會(huì)影響特斯拉遠(yuǎn)期的盈利能力,。

特斯拉的現(xiàn)狀

要評(píng)估特斯拉真正的盈利能力,，有一個(gè)很好的指標(biāo)可以作為參考，這就是經(jīng)濟(jì)增加值（EVA）,。這個(gè)指標(biāo)主要用來衡量股東所投入股本的“資本成本”,，即股東將這筆錢投入到同等風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的其他股票或債券的機(jī)會(huì)成本。特斯拉被詬病的一個(gè)重要原因是它的生產(chǎn)消耗了巨量資本,，這也由于它的工廠和供應(yīng)商網(wǎng)絡(luò)都是“吞金獸”,。EVA是企業(yè)治理咨詢公司ISS創(chuàng)造的一個(gè)指標(biāo)，它的基本原理是：股東要想通過他們投資的股本得到回報(bào),，特斯拉的利潤(rùn)就必須超過最低程度的資本成本,，它也是決定股東的投資是盈是虧的分界線。

根據(jù)EVA公式計(jì)算,，2018年,，特斯拉的稅后運(yùn)營利潤(rùn)是2.25億美元。但在對(duì)資本支出進(jìn)行評(píng)估后,，股東的經(jīng)濟(jì)收益（即EVA）便跌至負(fù)9.88億美元,，相當(dāng)于銷售額的-4.7%。在全球前11大汽車廠商中,，特斯拉的EVA利潤(rùn)僅排在第9位,。唯一一家EVA為正值的車企是日本的斯巴魯。

特斯拉怎樣才能回報(bào)股東

EVA系統(tǒng)可以根據(jù)分析師的共識(shí)性預(yù)期,，預(yù)測(cè)未來幾年的銷售額,、利潤(rùn)率和其它關(guān)鍵數(shù)據(jù)。我們先來看看華爾街對(duì)特斯拉到2021年年底的預(yù)測(cè),，再帶入一個(gè)被忽視的關(guān)鍵因素——特斯拉必須付出多少資本成本,，以及它必須從顧客群中拿到多少“免費(fèi)”資本。目前投資界普遍認(rèn)為,，未來三年,，特斯拉的收益會(huì)非常搶眼。分析師的共識(shí)是,，到2021年,，特斯拉的銷售額將比現(xiàn)在上漲90%，達(dá)到408億美元。

如果特斯拉真的達(dá)到了這個(gè)目標(biāo),，那么它的每車平均成本將大幅下降,。對(duì)于汽車廠商而言，要提高利潤(rùn),，就要通過一個(gè)較高的固定資產(chǎn)基數(shù),，不斷推高產(chǎn)量。去年隨著Model 3產(chǎn)量的極速擴(kuò)大,，特斯拉的產(chǎn)品成本占銷售額的比例從66%飆升至72%,。最早提出EVA理念的ISS公司的一位高級(jí)顧問貝內(nèi)特·斯圖爾特認(rèn)為：“特斯拉的車子加速很平穩(wěn)，但它的業(yè)務(wù)卻并不是這樣,?！?/p>

據(jù)分析師預(yù)測(cè)，到2021年,，特斯拉的產(chǎn)品成本占銷售收入的比例將下沉至67%,。如果它的銷售額真能達(dá)到400億美元，那么特斯拉就可以打通供應(yīng)鏈的“血栓”,，前景十分光明,。另一方面，特斯拉對(duì)經(jīng)常性開支控制得很不錯(cuò),，去年,，它的銷售成本、綜合開銷及行政管理費(fèi)用占銷售收入的比重從20%下降到13%,。由于經(jīng)常有媒體給特斯拉作免費(fèi)宣傳,，因此它每年在廣告營銷上的支出只有區(qū)區(qū)5000萬美元。

特斯拉的盈利取決于能否維持無息資本融資能力

如果沒有所謂的“交易融資”的巨大貢獻(xiàn),，特斯拉的EVA數(shù)據(jù)看起來會(huì)糟糕得多,。特斯拉從其客戶群和其他渠道獲取了大量現(xiàn)金,，這些錢主要是各種產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)的預(yù)付款,。比如光是排隊(duì)購車的顧客就為特斯拉貢獻(xiàn)了24億美元的訂金，由此也可見該品牌的火爆,。另外,，諸如軟件更新、自動(dòng)駕駛功能,、超級(jí)充電網(wǎng)絡(luò)等等也都是要收預(yù)付款的,。另一個(gè)來源是它的車輛回購計(jì)劃。特斯拉會(huì)提前預(yù)估回購成本,，然后作為支出項(xiàng)計(jì)入損益表,。當(dāng)前，特斯拉還不需要拿出現(xiàn)金搞回購，因此這筆錢可以用來采購機(jī)器人,，或者用于庫存資產(chǎn),。

總的來說，去年,，特斯拉使用了80億美元的免費(fèi)資本,。而去年特斯拉的運(yùn)營資本、工廠設(shè)備投資以及研發(fā)支出總計(jì)為244億美元,。也就是說,，去年特斯拉花掉的近三分之一的錢是沒有成本的。而如果這80億美元也是股東和債權(quán)人投的錢,，那它去年的EVA就會(huì)再下降60%,，達(dá)到負(fù)16億美元，相當(dāng)于銷售額的-7.4%,。

因此,，斯圖爾特表示：“特斯拉未來的盈利能力，取決于它能繼續(xù)使用多少免費(fèi)資本,?！闭雇?021年，如果特斯拉能將免費(fèi)資本占總資本的比例保持在30%左右,，則其323億美元的總資本中只有226億美元需要計(jì)算資本支出,。在這種情況下，特斯拉的EVA約為正6億美元左右,，相當(dāng)于銷售額的1.5%,。

特斯拉的盈利之路并不寬綽

即使要達(dá)到這樣的盈利水平也是很不容易的。首先,，特斯拉不太可能一直保持當(dāng)前的免費(fèi)資本比例,。目前，來自于顧客以及其它來源的預(yù)付費(fèi)用已經(jīng)在下降了,，較2015年的100億美元有了較大幅度的縮水,。雖然特斯拉仍然在收取更多的訂金、交車服務(wù)費(fèi)和質(zhì)保費(fèi)用,，但隨著維修回購支出逐年增多,，免費(fèi)資本的收支差距越來越小將成為必然的事實(shí)。如果所謂的“交易融資”占總資本的比重降至10%以下,，僅這一趨勢(shì)就會(huì)讓特斯拉的EVA在2021年下降為零,。

第二大風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，是特斯拉的銷售沒有達(dá)到炙手可熱的地步,，降低每車成本的目標(biāo)也自然無法實(shí)現(xiàn),。不過從特斯拉的市值已經(jīng)被炒到500億美元來看，股東們對(duì)這個(gè)問題似乎并不擔(dān)心。華爾街似乎也沒有人意識(shí)到,，特斯拉之所以能有這樣高的市值,，其實(shí)很大程度上取決于馬斯克使用免費(fèi)資本的能力。但特斯拉的這個(gè)“外掛”很可能無法一直開下去,。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

譯者：樸成奎

Elon Musk is a genius at using other people’s money.

The Tesla founder is notorious for erratic driving, whether it’s changing forecasts for vehicle production, tweeting then retreating about going private, or veering from showroom to web-focused selling. But Musk has stayed perfectly on course in pursuing a golden prize: raising cost-free funding. Musk is getting a huge portion of the cash that Tesla uses to produce cars and batteries not from lenders and shareholders, but from its own fanatically loyal customers in everything from wait-in-line deposits to pre-paid warranties to advances for self-driving software.

Those billions are a stealth advantage for Tesla. The overriding question is whether Musk will be able to keep deploying OPM (other people’s money) at anything like the current rate in the years to come, and if not, whether the necessity of actually “paying” for many billions in new capital will sink any chance for future profitability.

WHERE TESLA STANDS NOW

One of the best measures of Tesla’s true profitability is EVA, or economic value added. The yardstick applies a “capital charge” for the equity that shareholders have invested in the business, a fee equivalent to what they’d gain from equally risky stocks or bonds. Tesla is much criticized for piling on capital to ramp up production, in part to compensate for an creaky network of plants and suppliers. EVA––the methodology is now owned by governance advisory firm ISS––sets a simple benchmark for success: To reward shareholders, Tesla must generate profits over and above the minimum capital charge that sets the dividing line between creating and destroying shareholder value.

In 2018, Tesla posted after-tax operating profits, using the EVA formula, of $225 million. But after assessing a capital charge, its economic earnings for shareholders, its EVA, dropped to a negative $988 million, or -4.7% of sales. Among the world’s 11 largest carmakers, Tesla placed a poor 9th in EVA margin. It’s a tough business: The only manufacturer that delivered positive EVA was Subaru of Japan.

WHAT TESLA MUST DO TO REWARD SHAREHOLDERS

The EVA system forecasts sales, margins and other key numbers for future years, based on analysts’ consensus projections. Let’s look at what Wall Street expects Tesla to achieve by year-end 2021, then layer on the crucial, mostly overlooked element: How much capital it will have to effectively pay for versus the hoard it will keep getting for “free.” The investment community is expecting heroic gains over the next three years. For 2021, the consensus calls for sales to jump 90% to $40.8 billion.

If Tesla hits that mark, it’s likely that costs per vehicle will drop substantially. For carmakers, raising profits is all about driving ever larger volumes through a high fixed cost asset base. Last year, Tesla’s cost-of-goods ballooned from 66% to 72% of sales as it cast caution to the speedway shoulder in a frantic campaign to swell production of the Model 3. “Tesla’s cars accelerate smoothly, its business does not,” says Bennett Stewart, a senior advisor to ISS who pioneered the EVA concept.

Analysts predict that COGS will fall to 67% of revenues by 2021. If sales do reach $40 billion, and Tesla can work out the kinks in its unwieldy supply chain, it stands a decent chance getting there. Another plus: Tesla’s done a good job on overhead, lowering SG&A from 20% to 13% of revenues in the past year. Tesla also generates loads of excitement from free press coverage, so it gets away with spending a minuscule $50 million a year on advertising and promotion.

TESLA’S PROFITABILITY WILL DEPEND ON HOW MUCH FREE FUNDING IT MAINTAINS

Tesla’s EVA numbers would look much worse without a gigantic contribution from what’s called “trade funding.” Tesla is amassing the cash from customers and other sources in half-a-dozen categories, mainly for future services or purchases. Tesla has collected $2.4 billion in deposits from folks waiting in line for their made-to-order vehicles, a tribute to the hotness of the brand. Cash is also flowing in from upfront payments for such to-be-delivered services as software updates, Autopilot features, and access to the supercharger network. Tesla also collects warranty fees built into the price of the car today for repairs due in the future. Another fount: its guaranteed car repurchase program. Tesla estimates what the buybacks will cost in future years, and takes those amounts as an expense on its income statement. For now, it doesn’t have to lay out the cash, so it can channel the funds to buy robots or finance inventories.

All told, Tesla used $8 billion of OPM last year, amounting to around one-third of the entire $24.4 billion in working capital, plants, equipment and that capitalized research spending that EVA puts on the books, used to produce its cars. Had Tesla raised that extra $8 billion from shareholders and creditors, its EVA last year would have been 60% worse at a negative $1.6 billion, or -7.4% of sales.

“Tesla’s future profitability depends on how much OPM it keeps getting to use,” says Stewart. Looking forward to 2021, if Tesla manages to hold the share of total capital constant at around 30%, it would be assessed an EVA charge on only $22.6 billion of its forecast total capital of $32.3 billion. In that instance, Tesla would generate positive EVA of around $600 million, equivalent to 1.5% of sales.

TESLA’S PATH TO PROFITABILITY IS NARROW

Even reaching that modest number will be a stretch. It’s unlikely that Tesla will continue attracting that share of its total capital free of charge. Advances from customers, as well as other sources, are already falling, shrinking from $10 billion in 2015. Still, Tesla is now collecting much more in warrantee fees, service packages for future delivery, and pre-expensed warrantee costs than its putting out in cash. But each year, that gap will shrink as the carmaker lays of funds for repairs and repurchases of cars. If trade funding falls to 10% of total capital, that trend alone would reduce EVA to zero in 2021.

The second big risk is that Tesla fails to keep sales on the ultra-fast track, so that the economies needed to lower costs per vehicle don’t materialize. Consider that shareholders are shrugging off these unknowns by awarding Tesla a market cap of $50 billion. Few on Wall Street recognize that Musk’s skill at using OPM accounts for a big part of that valuation. It’s the supercharger that may not last.