12月6日，帶著手銬和腳鏈的前大眾工程師奧利弗·施密特被帶到了底特律聯(lián)邦法院,。他穿著一件血紅色的套頭衫,，與往常一樣剃著光頭，他深陷的雙眼似乎在問,，我為什么會落到這個地步,？就在坐在第二排的施密特妻子強忍著不讓眼淚流下來時，美國地方法官肖恩·科克斯宣布判處施密特7年監(jiān)禁,，如果放在施密特的祖國德國，這將是有史以來最為嚴(yán)厲的白領(lǐng)犯罪判罰之一,。

施密特因其在大眾“柴油門”丑聞而受到懲罰,，該丑聞是歷史上最明目張膽的企業(yè)欺詐之一。然而他的宣判并沒有什么凈化作用,，在科克斯法官看來尤為如此，他有時對做出這一判決感到很痛苦,。他對施密特懷有歉意地說道,，有時候,，他的工作要求他監(jiān)禁那些“犯有重大決策錯誤的好人”。

所有人都知道,，施密特只是一個從犯,，而他的判決只是幫某人頂罪而已?？瓶怂狗ü俅搜葬槍Φ氖堑聡哪承┤耍麄兂隽嗣绹鴻z察官的審查權(quán)限,，因為德國通常不會將其公民引渡至歐盟境外的地方受審,。最為重要的是，底特律法院也因馬丁·文德恩這位幕后人的缺席而感到困擾,。這位大眾首席執(zhí)行官的任職期限貫穿欺詐事件的始末,。雖然他的名字在法庭上僅提到過兩次，但他的陰云卻始終籠罩著整個聽證會,。

丑聞的大概內(nèi)容大家都很清楚,。在近10年的時間中，從2006年-2015年9月,，大眾確定了其一系列車型的美國銷售策略,，旨在讓公司超越對手豐田，成為全球排名第一的汽車制造商,，結(jié)果卻成了一場騙局,。這些車被冠以“清潔柴油”車型的美名,。公司大眾、奧迪和保時捷品牌在美國共銷售了約58萬輛這類轎車,、SUV和跨界車,。借助鋪天蓋地的宣傳攻勢，包括超級碗廣告,，大眾營造了一個環(huán)保主義夢想：自家的車輛既有高性能,，也具備出色的油耗和排放指標(biāo)，它是如此之環(huán)保,，完全可以與豐田普銳斯這類混合動力車相媲美,。

但這只不過是由軟件構(gòu)筑的泡影罷了。根據(jù)設(shè)置,，大眾柴油車的尾氣控制設(shè)備會在車輛脫離監(jiān)管方測試臺時自動關(guān)閉,，此時，排氣管會向大氣中排放兩種超過法定濃度的兩種氮氧化合物（統(tǒng)稱NOx）,，可引發(fā)霧霾,、呼吸道疾病和夭折。

最初,，大眾堅決認(rèn)為造假行為源于公司的一群素質(zhì)低劣的工程師,。但一段時間之后，公司不動聲色地放棄了這一主張,，轉(zhuǎn)而專注于保護(hù)一小部分高管,。這一犯罪行為最初的情形可能是：少數(shù)工程師害怕向焦慮的高管承認(rèn)，自己已經(jīng)無法在實現(xiàn)公司目標(biāo)的同時滿足法律的要求,。

在過去兩年中,，美國和德國檢方一直都在追蹤那些知曉這一密謀的人士，而且已經(jīng)查出了40多名涉案人員,，這些人員至少來自于4個城市,，分屬于三個大眾品牌以及汽車技術(shù)供應(yīng)商羅伯特博世。一些司法部門的官員正試圖推行一項可能具有轟動效應(yīng)的新舉措,，即起訴大眾前任首席執(zhí)行官,。然而，這類舉措基本上沒有什么實質(zhì)性的意義,，因為美國與德國之間沒有達(dá)成引渡協(xié)議,，但它會釋放這樣一個信號：這一欺詐行為的性質(zhì)十分惡劣，而且源自于大眾的高層,。

同時,，它也會凸顯兩個不同地區(qū)在懲罰方面的巨大反差。美國當(dāng)局對大眾在美銷售的58萬輛造假柴油車做出的罰款、處罰和賠償共計達(dá)到了250億美元,。在歐洲,，雖然大眾銷售了800萬輛問題柴油車，但卻沒有收到任何國家的政府所開出的罰單,。

毫無疑問,，奧利弗·施密特是有罪的。他承認(rèn)參與了事實真相的掩蓋,。然而，他與幕后主謀還有很大的差距,。施密特聲稱，自己直到2015年6月才知曉軟件作弊一事,，然而3個月后,，這一長達(dá)十年的陰謀便畫上了句號。不過,，他承認(rèn)自己曾在2013年“懷疑”過此事,。

48歲的施密特多年來一直是大眾與美國環(huán)保當(dāng)局的主要聯(lián)系人。他最近才升遷公司的中層管理人員（年薪約17萬美金）,，也就是在這個時候參與了真相的掩蓋,。他的一切都說明他將成為一位與車打交道的商人。他出生于大眾占主導(dǎo)地位的下薩克森州,，大眾60萬名員工當(dāng)中有11萬在那里工作,。施密特于1997年退伍之后便直接加入了大眾。其律師向法官轉(zhuǎn)交了50封私人信件,，這些信件都將其描述為一位忠誠,、關(guān)愛他人的兒子、兄弟,、丈夫,、叔叔和朋友?？瓶怂狗ü俦硎?，“我從來沒有看到過這么多的證明信,?！睋?jù)信中描述，他在業(yè)余時間喜歡收集以前的軌道賽車套裝,，并重新組裝經(jīng)典的大眾甲殼蟲。在施密特2010年結(jié)婚時,，他和妻子（妻子是一名汽車工程師）在朋友邁阿密的大眾經(jīng)銷店展示廳中舉行了婚禮,。施密特是一位異常忠誠的人，一生都獻(xiàn)給了大眾,。

科克斯法官在聽證會上解釋說,，施密特的判決旨在進(jìn)一步加強“一般性威懾力”。換句話說來說,，其目的在于給其他的企業(yè)高管提個醒：聽從非法的命令不能作為開脫的理由,。顯然，這一判決也體現(xiàn)了法官的無奈,。

施密特承認(rèn)自己有罪,，科克斯法官對他說，“這一判決是為了震懾高管和董事會”,?？瓶怂怪傅氖俏牡露鳎笳卟粌H在2007年便開始擔(dān)任首席執(zhí)行官（直到2015年才因丑聞辭職）,，同時還是公司管理委員會的主席,。施密特律師和檢察官認(rèn)可的眾多證據(jù)顯示，施密特和另一名員工曾在2015年7月27日向文德恩和其他高管做過匯報,。

文德恩是一位臭名昭著的微觀管理者,。他因攜帶測微計而出名，這樣,，他便可以按照百分之一毫米的精確度來測量大眾的零部件和公差,。同時，他在執(zhí)行紀(jì)律方面達(dá)到了專橫無理的地步,。當(dāng)時,，他也是德國薪資最高的首席執(zhí)行官，去年的收入達(dá)到了1860萬美元,，是施密特的100倍,。

施密特和一名同事被叫到文德恩眼前，以幫助解決這一危機,。美國監(jiān)管當(dāng)局已采取激進(jìn)的舉措,，禁止銷售大眾2016年柴油車車型。由于這一舉措對于公司的美國戰(zhàn)略有著至關(guān)重要的影響,，這位首席執(zhí)行官希望施密特解釋到底都發(fā)生了什么事情,。施密特回答道，加州空氣資源委員會和美國環(huán)保局發(fā)現(xiàn)了一個嚴(yán)重的異常情況：大眾的清潔柴油車在實驗室中符合NOx的排放標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，但一旦到了公路上,，車輛尾氣中NOx的濃度最高可超出法律上限40倍,。出于對大眾一年多以來回避問題和妨礙調(diào)查的不滿，監(jiān)管當(dāng)局決定禁止銷售大眾2016年柴油車型,，直到大眾找到解決之道,。

2015年7月與文德恩的會議對法律訴訟所稱的不當(dāng)行為進(jìn)行了詳細(xì)的分析。施密特的判決備忘錄寫道,，“一名未遭到指控的同謀提供了有關(guān)作弊裝置的一些技術(shù)信息,。”（“作弊裝置”一詞指的是讓大眾柴油車在排放測試中作弊的軟件,。）施密特曾警告與會人員,，“如果監(jiān)管當(dāng)局發(fā)現(xiàn)了這一作弊行為，可能會給公司帶來嚴(yán)重的后果”,。在FBI探員向施密特發(fā)起訴訟的書面陳述中寫道,，施密特在其演示中的一頁幻燈片中提到了這一令人不安的可能后果——“指控？”

檢察官本杰明·辛格在判決時對科克斯法官說,，施密特和其同事以準(zhǔn)確無誤的語言向參會人員解釋了大眾一直在作弊以及公司如何作弊。（檢察官和施密特的律師大衛(wèi)·杜莫切爾拒絕接受采訪,。）

如果人們相信檢察官和施密特在說真話,，也就是文德恩在會面時確實得知了大眾作弊的信息，那么這位首席執(zhí)行官所采取的后續(xù)行動看起來有欲蓋彌彰的嫌疑,。文德恩并未下令通知當(dāng)局有關(guān)大眾作弊的事情,，或發(fā)起調(diào)查以弄清事實真相。

反而,，他交給了施密特一個任務(wù)：勸說美國監(jiān)管方允許銷售大眾2016年柴油車型,。

施密特的判決備忘錄寫道，文德恩“授命施密特先生與他在美國期間結(jié)識的加州空氣資源委員會高級別官員進(jìn)行非正式會面,?！盕BI探員在其書面陳述中寫道，“大眾高管并沒有建議向美國監(jiān)管方披露作弊裝置,，而是授權(quán)繼續(xù)隱瞞真相,。”,。

施密特的備忘錄稱,，在出發(fā)前往美國之前，施密特就“與加州空氣資源委員會會面期間打算使用的說辭征求了意見并獲得批準(zhǔn)”,。備忘錄中寫道,，這一說辭至少得到了文德恩以下四名高管的批準(zhǔn)，而且“施密特先生得到指示，不得向美國方面透露作弊裝置的信息或存在任何有意的作弊行為,?！?

2015年8月，施密特從德國飛到密歇根,，并用謊言連續(xù)蒙騙了兩名加州空氣資源委員會官員,。他通過郵件向德國老板和其他10名“高級別人員”匯報了“進(jìn)展詳情”，并表示“他一直都在使用——按照施密特自己的話來說——大眾所選擇的謊言和騙術(shù),?！保瑱z察官辛格說道,。

最終,，另一名已無法容忍這種欺騙行徑的大眾工程師拋棄了這些說辭，并于8月19日的一次會面中向加州空氣資源委員會交代了事實真相,。大眾的一名總監(jiān)于9月3日正式向監(jiān)管方承認(rèn)使用了作弊裝置,，隨后，美國環(huán)保局和加州空氣資源委員會迫使大眾于2015年9月18日向公眾披露了真相,。

文德恩于5日后離任,，稱自己對“過去幾天”所發(fā)生的事情感到“震驚”，并表示他“本人對這些不當(dāng)行為一無所知,?！惫颈O(jiān)事委員會同一日宣布其沒有過錯，并稱文德恩“對于操縱排放數(shù)據(jù)一事毫不知情,?！痹?017年1月的德國國會聽證會上，文德恩堅決表示,，自己在丑聞公之于眾之前從未聽說過“作弊裝置”一詞,。他在當(dāng)天的四個場合中曾拒絕回答議員的問題，理由是德國檢方正在對其進(jìn)行刑事調(diào)查,。

到目前為止,，施密特在底特律的判決是這位前首席執(zhí)行官與美國刑事司法距離最近的一次接觸。在這一陰謀曝光27個月之后,，文德恩仍未在美國或德國受到任何罪名指控,。（他的美國律師拒絕就此文置評）

他以后會嗎？是否會有比施密特位置更高的高管來承擔(dān)這一重罪,？

這些問題的答案仍不甚明朗,。據(jù)兩名知情人士透露，雖然美國檢方希望起訴文德恩,，但并未收到司法部高官的批準(zhǔn),。

這看起來似乎是邁出了巨大的一步,。然而事實在于，在美國對文德恩或其他大眾高管的起訴正在逐漸失去其實際意義,，原因很簡單,，檢方無法接觸到本案的大多數(shù)關(guān)鍵人物。文德恩自丑聞爆發(fā)之后就再未踏入美國一步,，而且在施密特獲得重刑之后,，他也不大可能在近期前往美國。

在美國受到指控的8名工程師中,，只有施密特和詹姆士·梁（這名非總監(jiān)級人員在去年8月被判處40個月的監(jiān)禁）,，而實際上在美國，只有一名人員——奧迪引擎開發(fā)總監(jiān)扎切歐·帕米歐——恰好是一名可以引渡的意大利籍人士,。

這意味著司法焦點將轉(zhuǎn)移至德國,。在那里，的確有三組檢方正在醞釀開展合適的行動,。 代表下薩克森州（母公司VW AG和其大眾品牌乘用車部門總部所在地）的布倫瑞克當(dāng)局表示,，他們正在就與柴油門相關(guān)的造假案件調(diào)查39名人士，其中一名涉嫌阻礙司法調(diào)查,，三明涉嫌金融市場操控（在這一案件中意味著未能及時向股東披露這一即將爆發(fā)的危機）,。在慕尼黑，巴伐利亞檢方正在調(diào)查大眾奧迪部門（總部位于英戈爾施塔特）13名人士,，他們涉嫌欺詐和虛假廣告,。在斯圖加特，三名高管因涉嫌市場操控而正在接受調(diào)查,。

兩次市場操縱調(diào)查主要針對文德恩和三名大眾現(xiàn)任資深高管。例如,，布倫瑞克檢方正在調(diào)查監(jiān)管理事會董事長漢斯·珀奇（在丑聞爆發(fā)之前擔(dān)任首席財務(wù)官）以及現(xiàn)任大眾品牌經(jīng)理赫伯特·戴斯,，而斯圖加特當(dāng)局在調(diào)查珀奇和現(xiàn)任首席執(zhí)行官馬希爾斯·穆勒。（大眾拒絕就本文公開置評,，而是提供了一份書面聲明,，并聲稱其高管完全遵守披露法。）

然而,，調(diào)查的進(jìn)展異常緩慢,。目前僅有兩名德國人被逮捕。一位是帕米歐,，另一位是沃爾夫?qū)す?，曾先后?dān)任奧迪、大眾和保時捷的高級主管,。德國檢方并未確認(rèn)已扣留個人的身份以及指控罪名,，但該辦公室稱,，慕尼黑檢方的關(guān)注點在于欺詐和虛假廣告。

在德國,，刑事訴訟并不多見,，定罪或長期監(jiān)禁就更少見了。該國的法律設(shè)置了很多巨大的障礙,。首先,，公司不存在刑事責(zé)任。沒有法律禁止犯罪預(yù)謀,，沒有相關(guān)的清潔空氣刑法,，也沒有針對欺騙監(jiān)管方或調(diào)查人員的法律。（柏林自由大學(xué)法學(xué)教授卡斯滕·孟森稱,，后者實際上受到德國沉默權(quán)強有力的保護(hù),。）檢方獎勵和將犯罪者轉(zhuǎn)化為公訴方證人的手段要弱于其同僚美國檢方，而且即便刑法的部分內(nèi)容有這方面的規(guī)定——可逮捕欺騙其他人的個人,，但也不適用于本案中所出現(xiàn)的企業(yè)密謀,。

這兩個國家的公司和其客戶所面臨的結(jié)果是迥然不同的。在美國,，司法體系很快給出了結(jié)果,。在嚴(yán)厲的企業(yè)刑事制裁、靈活嚴(yán)苛的刑法和精簡的消費者集體訴訟程序面前,，大眾很快低下了頭,。在9個月內(nèi)（法律界的超高速），大眾同意就涉案的2.0排量轎車向消費者以及聯(lián)邦和州相關(guān)部門支付約150億美元的民事賠償和補償,，而且隨著該案件的涉及范圍擴(kuò)大至3.0排量的車輛,，再加上刑事罰款和處罰，總金額已躥升至250多億美元,。大眾已經(jīng)回購和修理了大部分涉案車輛,，而且客戶也因此獲得了每輛車數(shù)千美元的賠償，用于彌補其各類損失,，包括欺騙和轉(zhuǎn)售價值的降低,。面對陰謀、欺詐,、制造虛假聲明和妨礙司法的聯(lián)邦刑事訴訟,，大眾于4月承認(rèn)有罪。

大眾委托Jones Day律師事務(wù)所開展了一項調(diào)查,，涉及700多個采訪,，并搜集了1億多份文件，大眾為美國檢方提供了隨意獲取這一調(diào)查結(jié)果的權(quán)限,。（大眾稱,，這一調(diào)查仍在開展當(dāng)中,。）大眾還幫助恢復(fù)了供法庭使用的數(shù)千頁的文件，這些文件在陰謀泄漏前夕被眾多大眾雇員所刪除,。作為交換,，美國檢方對大眾的配合表示首肯，免去了20%的刑事罰金,，但即便在減少之后,，這一數(shù)字依然高達(dá)28億美元。

在加拿大,，公司也支付了賠償,，包括針對1月份剛剛抵達(dá)的3.0升車輛所支付的2.9億美元。在韓國,，大眾也付出了慘痛的代價,，公司不僅支付了天額罰金，其當(dāng)?shù)氐拇蟊姾蛫W迪官員也遭到了刑事訴訟,，其中一名被判處18個月監(jiān)禁,，如今正在服刑。

然而在德國和歐洲,，事情卻完全不一樣,。大眾沒有向任何客戶支付賠償。在公司的決策之地以及決策者所在地德國,，大眾沒有受到任何刑事或行政罰款或處罰,。

On Dec. 6, former Volkswagen engineer Oliver Schmidt was led into a federal courtroom in Detroit in handcuffs and leg irons. He was wearing a blood-red jumpsuit, his head shaved, as it always is, and his deep-set eyes seemed to ask, how did I get here? As Schmidt’s wife tried to suppress tears in a second-row pew, U.S. District Judge Sean Cox sentenced him to what, had it been imposed in Schmidt’s native Germany, would rank among the harshest white-collar sentences ever meted out: seven years in prison.

Schmidt was being punished for his role in VW’s “Dieselgate” scandal, one of the most audacious corporate frauds in history. Yet his sentence brought no catharsis, least of all to Judge Cox, who at times seemed pained while imposing it. Sometimes, he told Schmidt apologetically, his job requires him to imprison “good people just making very, very bad decisions.”

Schmidt was a henchman, everyone understood, and his sentence, a stand-in. Judge Cox was addressing a set of people in Germany who are beyond the reach of U.S. prosecutors because Germany does not ordinarily extradite its nationals beyond European Union frontiers. Above all, the Detroit courtroom was haunted by the shadow of an individual who was absent: Martin Winterkorn, who was VW’s CEO during almost all of the fraud. His name was uttered only twice, yet his aura loomed over the entire hearing.

The outlines of the scandal are well known. For nearly a decade, from 2006 to September 2015, Volkswagen anchored its U.S. sales strategy — aimed at vaulting the company past Toyota to become the world’s number one carmaker — on a breed of cars that turned out to be a hoax. They were touted as “Clean Diesel” vehicles. About 580,000 such sedans, SUVs, and crossovers were sold in the U.S. under the company’s VW, Audi, and Porsche marques. With great fanfare, including Super Bowl commercials, the company flacked an environmentalist’s dream: high performance cars that managed to achieve excellent fuel economy and emissions so squeaky clean as to rival those of electric hybrids like the Toyota Prius.

It was all a software-conjured mirage. The exhaust control equipment in the VW diesels was programmed to shut off as soon as the cars rolled off the regulators’ test beds, at which point the tail pipes spewed illegal levels of two types of nitrogen oxides (referred to collectively as NOx) into the atmosphere, causing smog, respiratory disease, and premature death.

At first, Volkswagen insisted the fraud was pulled off by a group of rogue engineers. But over time the company has quietly backed away from that claim, increasingly focusing on protecting a small cadre of top officials. The crime may well have started among a relatively small number of engineers afraid to admit to feared top executives that they couldn’t reconcile the company’s goals and the law’s demands.

Over the past two years, prosecutors in the United States and Germany have been tracing who was aware of the scheme and have identified more than 40 people involved, spread out across at least four cities and working for three VW brands as well as automotive technology supplier Robert Bosch. In a new, potentially explosive move, some Justice Department officials are pushing to indict Volkswagen’s former CEO. Such a step would be largely symbolic — the U.S. has no extradition treaty with Germany — but it would send a message that the misconduct was egregious and directed from the top.

And it would highlight a stark contrast in punishment. U.S. authorities have extracted $25 billion in fines, penalties and restitution from VW for the 580,000 tainted diesels it sold in the U.S. In Europe, where the company sold 8 million tainted diesels, VW has not paid a single Euro in government penalties.

There’s no doubt that Oliver Schmidt was guilty. He admitted that he’d been part of a cover-up. Yet he was far from the mastermind. Schmidt claimed not to have learned of the cheating till June 2015, just three months before the decade-long conspiracy ended, though he admitted that he “suspected” it in 2013.

Schmidt, 48, was an engineer who for several years was VW’s main point of contact with U.S. environmental regulators. He had only recently been promoted to a midlevel officer (making about $170,000 a year) when he got involved in the cover-up. Everything about him exuded a car-oriented company man. Born in Lower Saxony, the VW-dominated state where about 110,000 of the company’s 600,000 employees work, Schmidt came to the company in 1997, straight out of military service. About 50 personal letters submitted through his attorney — “I don’t think I’ve ever seen as many,” Judge Cox observed — extolled him as a loyal and loving son, brother, husband, uncle, and friend. In his spare time, the letters recounted, Schmidt enjoyed collecting old slot-car racing sets and restoring classic VW Beetles. When Schmidt got married, in 2010, he and his wife (herself an automotive engineer) held the ceremony in the showroom of a friend’s Volkswagen dealership in Miami. Schmidt was an all-too-loyal, VW lifer.

His punishment was designed to further “general deterrence,” Judge Cox explained at the hearing. In other words, the point was to send a message to other corporate officials that following illegal orders is no defense. It doubtless reflected frustration as well.

Schmidt had committed his crime, Judge Cox told him, “to impress … senior management and the board.” He was talking about Winterkorn, who was not only CEO from 2007 till the scandal brought him down in 2015, but also chairman of the company’s management board. Schmidt and a second employee had made presentations to Winterkorn and other senior officials at a meeting on July 27, 2015, according to versions of the facts endorsed by both Schmidt’s counsel and the prosecutors.

Winterkorn was a notorious micromanager — he was known for carrying a micrometer with him, so he could personally measure VW parts and tolerances down to the hundredth of a millimeter — and an imperious martinet. He was also then the highest paid CEO in Germany, having made $18.6 million the previous year, more than 100 times Schmidt’s pay.

Schmidt and a colleague had been summoned before Winterkorn to help solve a crisis. U.S. regulators had taken the drastic action of refusing to permit the sale of VW’s model year 2016 diesels — so crucial to its U.S. strategy — and the CEO wanted Schmidt to explain what was going on. As Schmidt would lay out, regulators with the California Air Resources Board (CARB) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency had discovered a serious anomaly: VW Clean Diesels complied with NOx-emissions standards when tested in the lab, but then discharged up to 40 times the legal limit when driven on a road. Dissatisfied with more than a year of evasions and stonewalling, the regulators had decided to bar VW’s 2016 diesels from the U.S. until they got better answers.

The July 2015 meeting with Winterkorn delved into detail about the company’s misbehavior, legal filings allege. “An unindicted co-conspirator presented certain technical aspects of the defeat device,” according to Schmidt’s sentencing memo. (“Defeat device” is the phrase used to describe the software that enabled VW diesels to fool emissions tests.) Schmidt warned attendees of “the potential severe consequences to VW if regulators discovered the cheating.” A slide in his presentation raised a disturbing prospect — “Indictment?” — according to the FBI agent’s affidavit that initiated the charges against Schmidt.

Schmidt and his colleague explained to the group “in unmistakable terms that Volkswagen had been cheating, how they were cheating,” prosecutor Benjamin Singer told Judge Cox at the sentencing. (The prosecutors and Schmidt’s attorney, David DuMouchel, declined to be interviewed.)

If one believes the prosecutors and Schmidt — that Winterkorn was unmistakably informed of the cheating at the meeting — the CEO’s response to that information looked suspiciously like a cover-up. Winterkorn did not direct his subordinates to notify authorities about the cheating or launch an investigation to determine exactly what had happened.

Instead, he sent Schmidt on a mission to persuade U.S. regulators to allow the sale of 2016 VWs.

Winterkorn “directed Mr. Schmidt to seek an informal meeting with a senior-ranking CARB official he knew from his time in the U.S.,” according to Schmidt’s sentencing memo. “Rather than advocate for disclosure of the defeat device to U.S. regulators,” the FBI agent alleged in his affidavit, “VW executive management authorized its continued concealment.”

Before leaving on his mission, Schmidt “sought and obtained approval for the ‘storyline’ he intended to convey during his meeting with CARB,” Schmidt’s memo asserted. The script was approved by at least four senior VW officials below Winterkorn, according to the memo, which added, “Mr. Schmidt was instructed not to disclose the defeat device or any intentional cheating.”

In August 2015, Schmidt flew from Germany to Michigan, where he successively lied to two CARB officials. He emailed “detailed updates” to his boss in Germany and ten other “senior people,” conveying that “he was following the script of deception and deceit that VW, with Schmidt’s input, had chosen,” prosecutor Singer stated.

Finally, a different VW engineer, unable to stomach the deceit any longer, went off-script and confessed to CARB during a meeting on August 19. A VW supervisor formally conceded use of the defeat device to regulators on September 3, and the EPA and CARB made VW’s confession public on Sept. 18, 2015.

Winterkorn stepped down five days later, asserting that he was “stunned” by the events of “the past few days,” adding that he was “not aware of any wrongdoing on my part.” The company’s supervisory board exonerated him the same day, stating that he “had no knowledge of the manipulation of emissions data.” In testimony before the German Parliament in January 2017, Winterkorn insisted he had never even heard the phrase “defeat device” until the scandal erupted publicly. On four occasions that day he declined to answer legislators’ questions, citing ongoing criminal inquiries by German prosecutors.

So far, the Schmidt sentencing in Detroit is the ex-CEO’s closest brush with American criminal justice. Twenty-seven months after the conspiracy was exposed, Winterkorn has not been charged with any offense in either the United States or Germany. (His U.S. counsel declined comment for this article.)

Will he ever be? Will anyone higher up the ladder than Oliver Schmidt ever answer for this remarkable crime?

The answers to those questions remain very unclear. U.S. prosecutors want to indict Winterkorn, but have not yet received approval from the brass at the Department of Justice, according to two sources familiar with the process.

That would seem like a huge step. Yet in truth, a U.S. indictment of Winterkorn or other top VW figures is increasingly becoming moot simply because the prosecutors can’t gain access to most of the key figures in the case. Winterkorn hasn’t set foot in the U.S. since the scandal broke and, after Schmidt’s crushing sentence, is not likely to do so anytime soon.

Among the eight VW engineers charged in the U.S., only Schmidt and James Liang, a non-supervisor sentenced to 40 months this past August, are actually in the U.S., and only one other — an Audi engine development supervisor, Zaccheo Giovanni Pamio, who happens to be an Italian national — is extraditable.

That means the judicial focus is shifting to Germany. There, three sets of prosecutors are certainly going through the proper motions. The authorities in Braunschweig — acting for the state of Lower Saxony, where both the parent company, VW AG, and its VW brand passenger car unit are based — say they are investigating 39 individuals for fraud in connection with Dieselgate, one for obstruction of justice, and three for financial market manipulation (which in this instance would mean the failure to promptly disclose the gestating crisis to shareholders). In Munich, Bavarian prosecutors are looking at 13 individuals at VW’s Audi unit, based in Ingolstadt, for fraud and false advertising. And in Stuttgart, three executives are under scrutiny for market manipulation.

The two market manipulation inquiries focus on Winterkorn and three very senior current VW officials. The Braunschweig prosecutors, for instance, are looking at supervisory board chairman Hans Dieter P?tsch (who was CFO when the scandal broke) and current VW brand manager Herbert Diess, while the Stuttgart authorities are scrutinizing P?tsch and current CEO Matthias Müller. (VW declined to comment on the record for this article other than to provide a written statement in which it asserted that its executives fully complied with disclosure laws.)

Yet progress is strikingly slow. There have been only two German arrests so far. One was of Pamio; the other was of Wolfgang Hatz, a senior supervisor at, successively, Audi, VW, and Porsche. German prosecutors do not confirm the identities of detained individuals or what they’re charged with, but the Munich probe is focusing on fraud and false advertising, the office says.

We may not see many criminal prosecutions in Germany, let alone convictions or lengthy sentences. The country’s law presents many serious hurdles. There’s no criminal liability for corporations, for starters. There’s no statute barring a criminal conspiracy, no relevant criminal clean air law, and no law against lying to regulators or investigators. (The latter is actually protected by the robust German right to silence, according to Carsten Momsen, a law professor at Berlin’s Free University.) Prosecutors’ tools to reward and turn perpetrators into state witnesses are weaker than those wielded by their American counterparts. And some of the criminal laws that do exist — written to catch individuals who swindle other individuals — may be ill-suited to capturing the corporate machinations that happened in this case.

The result is breathtakingly different outcomes for both the company and its customers in the two countries. In the U.S., the system has delivered swift consequences. Facing harsh corporate criminal sanctions, flexible and draconian criminal laws, and streamlined consumer class-action procedures, Volkswagen quickly capitulated. Within nine months — breakneck speed in the legal realm — it agreed to pay roughly $15 billion in civil compensation and restitution to consumers and federal and state authorities for the 2.0-liter cars involved, and the sum has since crept up to more than $25 billion, as deals were reached for the 3.0-liter cars, and for criminal fines and penalties. Volkswagen has bought back or fixed most of the offending vehicles, and customers have received thousands of dollars per car in compensation for a variety of losses, including the deception itself and diminished resale value. The company pleaded guilty in April to federal criminal charges of conspiracy, fraud, making false statements and obstruction of justice.

VW gave U.S. prosecutors liberal access to the fruits of an investigation it commissioned by the Jones Day law firm, which conducted more than 700 interviews and collected more than 100 million documents. (The inquiry is ongoing, according to VW.) VW also helped recover forensically thousands of pages of documents that had been deleted by scores of VW employees in the final days of the conspiracy. In return, U.S. prosecutors gave the company credit for cooperation, slicing 20% from its criminal fine, which came to $2.8 billion even after the reduction.

In Canada, too, the company has paid compensation, including a $290 million deal for 3.0-liter cars just reached in January. And in South Korea, Volkswagen also paid dearly, receiving record fines and seeing eight local VW and Audi officials charged criminally, with one now serving an 18-month prison term.

Yet in Germany and Europe, it’s been a totally different story. There, VW has not offered compensation to any customer. In Germany, where the key decisions were made and all the decision makers reside, no criminal or administrative fines or penalties have yet been imposed.

大眾的“配合”給美國檢方留下了極其深刻的印象，但卻只限于美國境內(nèi),。例如,，大眾并未向德國檢方遞交Jones Day的資料,。公司去年4月稱,，發(fā)布Jones Day調(diào)查結(jié)果總結(jié)報告將違背其一再做出的承諾。大眾稱,，面向公眾發(fā)布的聲明中附帶了認(rèn)罪答辯,，而且已經(jīng)揭示調(diào)查的重大發(fā)現(xiàn)，但任何進(jìn)一步的聲明將破壞正在進(jìn)行的調(diào)查或與其答辯協(xié)議相沖突,。然而,，這份只有30頁,、字間距為兩倍行距的認(rèn)罪協(xié)商文件并未提及任何人的姓名（檢方文件一般都會提及），可謂是異常謹(jǐn)慎,。例如,，該文件僅用一句話描述了2015年7月27日的會見，而該會見在施密特起訴案中至關(guān)重要,。（文件說,，召開了一場會議，但是沒有描述討論的內(nèi)容或高管是否出席,。）

即便德國執(zhí)法機關(guān)采取了強有力的舉措,，該案到目前為止一直都面臨著重重阻礙。去年3月,，慕尼黑當(dāng)局搜查了Jone Day的德國辦事處,，并收繳了公司有關(guān)大眾調(diào)查的資料。但聯(lián)邦憲法法庭在Jones Day的要求下臨時阻礙了其查閱文件,，同時慕尼黑當(dāng)局則忙于解決律師客戶特權(quán)和受調(diào)查雇員隱私權(quán)等問題,。莫森教授指出，德國法院的判例法在這些問題上出現(xiàn)了重大分歧,。

“作弊裝置”在美國和歐洲的定義是相同的,。不管怎么樣，大眾認(rèn)為這一軟件在北美之外是合法的,。德國聯(lián)邦汽車交通局（又稱KBA）——因其對柴油監(jiān)管政策的不嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)而臭名昭著——于2015年拒絕承認(rèn)大眾的上述理論,。

大眾還堅持認(rèn)為，非美國客戶并未受到侵害,。鑒于美國之外地區(qū)寬松的NOx濃度限制,，大眾認(rèn)為，大多數(shù)轎車可以通過簡單的軟件調(diào)整來徹底解決這一問題,。然而,，令很多工程師難以想象的是，大眾何以在不降低燃油經(jīng)濟(jì)性和破壞排放控制裝備壽命的前提下,，僅靠軟件來解決NOx排放問題,，而這些問題正是導(dǎo)致大眾進(jìn)行作弊的誘因。德國聯(lián)邦汽車交通局和其他德國監(jiān)管方已批準(zhǔn)對軟件進(jìn)行調(diào)整,，但并未發(fā)布能夠說明汽車召回效果的任何測試結(jié)果,。國際清潔運輸理事會的尤安?伯納德認(rèn)為，“大眾無法在不替換硬件的前提下解決NOx排放問題,?！蔽鞲ゼ醽喆髮W(xué)曾于2014年委托該理事會開展調(diào)查，首次曝光了大眾使用作弊裝置的事件,。

海外原告律師正在就柴油門事件在歐洲起訴大眾,。但是,，與刑事部門一樣，他們面臨著一系列障礙,。依據(jù)歐盟規(guī)定,，購買了涉案車輛的800萬歐盟客戶在理論上可以在大眾總部所在地下薩克森州起訴大眾。但德國沒有消費者集體訴訟一說,。此外,，原告所擁有的發(fā)現(xiàn)權(quán)非常有限,，律師也拿不到勝訴酬金,，而且發(fā)起訴訟的原告還得承擔(dān)風(fēng)險：如果敗訴,，他們不僅得支付自身的法律費用,，還得承擔(dān)被告的一部分費用,。

誠然,，大眾并非是無罪。它也可能會收到來自于德國檢方或聯(lián)邦金融監(jiān)管局（類似于美國證券交易委員會）開出的數(shù)億歐元罰單,。

兩組原告——大眾股東和大眾柴油車車主——正試圖克服這些障礙,，發(fā)起民事訴訟,。其中更有威懾力的莫過于德國股東,，他們稱大眾未能披露這一正在發(fā)酵的丑聞。原告律師將使用“模型”訴訟機制，這是一種僅適用于股東訴訟案件的類集體訴訟,，計劃于9月在布倫施威格地區(qū)高等法院開庭。但這一流程預(yù)計將耗費數(shù)年的時間,，而且最終獲得的賠償金額可能只能占到索賠額度的一小部分（索賠額95億歐元,，約合112億美元），這取決于法庭如何對大眾危機披露時間是否過晚進(jìn)行定性,。與此同時,，一種創(chuàng)新的“團(tuán)體訴訟”已于去年11月在布倫施威格展開，它代表了德國消費者團(tuán)體——15347名大眾柴油車車主移交了其索賠主張,，由美國律所Hausfeld柏林辦事處發(fā)起,。

說到公平，考慮到歐洲和美國之間政治,、社會和監(jiān)管環(huán)境的巨大差異,，大眾可能更容易為自己在海外的不配合行為找到說辭。自丑聞爆發(fā)之后,，進(jìn)一步的測試顯示,，柴油排放造假是歐洲普遍存在的問題。2016年12月,，歐盟委員會開始調(diào)查德國監(jiān)管當(dāng)局和其他6個歐盟成員國是否放松了對柴油排放的監(jiān)管力度,。雖然與其他大多數(shù)案例相比，大眾的作弊方式更加露骨,，但其柴油車在美國之外地區(qū)的NOx排放量并不比其對手高,。此外，寶馬,、菲亞特克萊斯勒,、戴姆勒（奔馳制造商）、PSA（標(biāo)志和雪鐵龍制造商）以及雷諾尼桑在過去一年中均因潛在的柴油車排放不達(dá)標(biāo)問題而遭到了德國或法國當(dāng)局的調(diào)查,。

很明顯,，雖然大眾的所作所為非常過分，但即便是在美國,，大眾也并非是個例,。5月，美國司法部起訴菲亞特克萊斯勒在10.4萬輛2014-16年的Jeep Grand Cherokees車型以及1500輛道奇Ram皮卡（美國最暢銷的柴油皮卡）上安裝了作弊裝置,。（菲亞特克萊斯勒拒絕承認(rèn)存在這一不當(dāng)行為,，并正在進(jìn)行和解談判。）

在歐洲，尤其是德國,，工業(yè),、勞工甚至環(huán)保政策都更加支持柴油車的生產(chǎn)。監(jiān)管力度并不大,，違規(guī)的懲罰也很輕,，而且為了讓本國汽車制造商能夠與鄰國競爭，國家監(jiān)管方也不愿為其設(shè)立障礙,，因為他們認(rèn)為鄰國監(jiān)管方在這一方面也是睜一只眼閉一只眼,。

然而，柴油門250億美元的罰金改變了歐洲的政治格局,。丑聞讓人們開始關(guān)注一個蓄積已久的健康問題,，而且這個問題的罪魁禍?zhǔn)讓嶋H上并不止大眾一家企業(yè)，而是整個柴油車行業(yè)以及滋養(yǎng)和保護(hù)這一產(chǎn)業(yè)的政治文化,。例如,，歐洲政府報告顯示，每年有7.2萬名歐洲居民因NOx排放而喪生,。

2月份,，萊比錫行政法院將對名為德國環(huán)保行動倡議組織所提起的訴訟做出審判，最終可能會導(dǎo)致德國70個城市出現(xiàn)柴油車禁令,。柴油車銷量如預(yù)料那樣出現(xiàn)了大幅下滑,。12月，大眾首席執(zhí)行官馬希爾斯·穆勒在接受一家報紙采訪時指出,，歐洲廢除長期執(zhí)行的柴油行業(yè)主要稅收補貼的時候到了,。此語一出，一片嘩然,。

歐洲和美國之間監(jiān)管,、環(huán)保和文化差異正在縮小。但是,，正是由于·施密特跌入了深淵,。這么看來，施密特為此付出慘痛代價的事實存在一定的不公正性,。然而,，如果所有的后果都由他一人來承擔(dān)，那么事情將變得更加不公平,。

在丑聞爆發(fā)之后,，柴油門事件的大致情形很快浮出水面。自那之后,，刑事,、民事和媒體調(diào)查所搜集和提交（或泄露）的證據(jù)一點一點地積累起來,，更加清晰地揭露了大眾陰謀廣泛的覆蓋面。當(dāng)人們在掌握了這些信息之后再審視公司的過往行為時會發(fā)現(xiàn),，公司的高層必然已經(jīng)知曉此事,，而且其背后也不斷折射出首席執(zhí)行官文德恩的影子。

2006年,，大眾發(fā)起了一項策略,，試圖通過營銷更加清潔的柴油車，重振當(dāng)時停滯不前的美國銷售業(yè)績,。這一策略所面臨的挑戰(zhàn)在于,，柴油引擎的NOx排放量比汽油引擎大，而且美國NOx法規(guī)要比歐洲嚴(yán)格的多,，僅為歐洲排放標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的六分之一,。大多數(shù)減少NOx排放量的方法都會降低燃油經(jīng)濟(jì)性,，或需要頻繁的保養(yǎng),。（從環(huán)保上來看，歐洲專注于降低溫室氣體,，包括二氧化碳,。柴油因其卓越的燃油經(jīng)濟(jì)性，能夠非常好地降低碳排放,。但柴油車還會產(chǎn)生能夠引起霧霾的NOx,。正是因為洛杉磯歷史上的霧霾問題，加州空氣資源委員會和美國環(huán)保署的監(jiān)管人員長期以來一直對NOx所帶來的健康危害比歐洲方面更為敏感,。）

大眾的美國策略出自首席執(zhí)行官畢睿德之手,，而且在文德恩2007年1月接替了他的位置之后得以延續(xù)。2008年初,，文德恩宣布了一個10年期計劃,，要求在2018年之前讓公司的美國銷量翻三番，從而讓其超過通用和豐田,，成為世界領(lǐng)先的汽車制造商,。這一計劃在2015年中期之前獲得了成功，其關(guān)鍵點便是清潔柴油車,。

VW’s “cooperation,” which so impressed American prosecutors, hasn’t extended beyond U.S. borders. Volkswagen has not shared the Jones Day materials with German prosecutors, for instance. And last April, the company revealed that it would be breaking its repeated promise to issue a report summarizing the results of the Jones Day inquiry. VW said the public statement of facts that accompanied its guilty plea revealed the inquiry’s key findings, and that any further announcement would risk undermining ongoing investigations or conflicting with its plea agreement. But the plea bargain document is just 30 double-spaced pages, identifies nobody by name, and, as prosecutorial documents often do, plays its cards close to the vest. It includes only one sentence, for instance, about the July 27, 2015, meeting that was so central to the Schmidt prosecution. (It states that a meeting took place, but gives no hint of what was discussed or that senior executives were present.)

Even when German law enforcement has taken aggressive action, it has been stymied so far. Last March Munich authorities raided Jones Day’s German offices and seized materials from the firm’s VW investigation. But the Federal Constitutional Court has temporarily blocked their examination, at Jones Day’s request, while it sorts out issues of attorney-client privilege and the privacy rights of interviewed employees. German court precedents are deeply divided on these questions, according to professor Momsen.

The definitions of “defeat device” in the U.S. and E.U. are nearly identical. Nevertheless, VW contends the software was lawful outside North America. Germany’s Federal Motor Transport Authority, or KBA — notoriously lax in its diesel oversight policies — rejected this theory in December 2015.

The company has also insisted non-American customers suffered no injury. Because of more lenient NOx limits abroad, it maintains, most of those cars could be fully addressed with simple software fixes. Yet many engineers can’t fathom how software alone could possibly repair a NOx problem without correspondingly reducing fuel economy and undermining the durability of the emissions control equipment — the very problems that led VW to cheat in the first place. The KBA and other national regulators have approved these fixes, but haven’t released any test results shedding light on what the recalls achieved. “VW could not do miracles regarding NOx emissions without replacing the hardware,” argues Yoann Bernard of the International Council on Clean Transportation, which commissioned the 2014 study by West Virginia University that first revealed VW’s use of a defeat device.

Plaintiffs lawyers abroad are suing VW over the affected diesels there. But, like the criminal authorities, they are hampered by a slew of handicaps. Under E.U. rules, all 8 million E.U. customers who bought Dieselgate cars could theoretically sue in Lower Saxony, where VW AG is based. But in Germany there are no consumer class actions. In addition, plaintiffs have very limited discovery rights; lawyers are prohibited from accepting contingency fees; and plaintiffs who sue run the risk that if they lose, they will have to pay not just their own legal fees, but a portion of their adversary’s, as well.

To be sure, VW isn’t yet in the clear. It may yet be hit with penalties worth hundreds of millions of euros, imposed by German state prosecutors or by the BaFin, the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (something like the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission).

And two groups of plaintiffs — VW shareholders, and owners of VW diesels — are attempting to overcome the obstacles to civil litigation. The bigger threat comes from German shareholders, who allege that VW failed to disclose the budding scandal. Plaintiffs lawyers are using a “model” litigation mechanism, a class action analog available only for shareholder suits, which is scheduled to begin in September in the Higher Regional Court of Braunschweig. But that procedure is expected to take years and the amount recovered may be a fraction of the huge sums sought (€9.5 billion, or $11.2 billion), depending on how early or late the court concludes VW should have disclosed the crisis. At the same time, an innovative “group action” was filed in Braunschweig in November on behalf of a German consumer group — to whom 15,347 VW diesel owners had assigned their claims — by the Berlin office of the American law firm, Hausfeld.

In fairness, Volkswagen’s obstructive stance abroad may be more defensible when one considers the vast divide between the political, social, and regulatory milieus in Europe and the U.S. Since the scandal broke, further testing has made clear that cheating on diesel emissions was endemic across Europe. In December 2016 the European Commission began investigating whether regulatory authorities in Germany and six other E.U. nations have been lax in their oversight of diesel emissions. Though VW’s cheating was, in most instances, more brazen in methodology, its diesels’ NOx emissions outside the U.S. appear to have been no worse than their competitors’. Moreover, BMW, Fiat Chrysler Automobiles, Daimler (maker of Mercedes), PSA (maker of Peugeots and Citro?ns), and Renault-Nissan have all come under scrutiny over the past year by either German or French authorities for possible diesel emissions irregularities. (The manufacturers deny wrongdoing.)

Even in the U.S., it’s become clear, VW’s conduct — though still the most egregious — was not unique. In May the Justice Department sued Fiat Chrysler for having allegedly placed a species of defeat device on 104,000 model year 2014-16 Jeep Grand Cherokees and Dodge Ram 1500 pickups, the most popular diesel pickup sold in America. (FCA, which denies wrongdoing, is in settlement negotiations.)

European and, especially, German industrial, labor, and even environmental policy favored the production of diesel cars. Regulatory oversight was slight, penalties for violations were trifling, and national regulators were disinclined to handicap their home country’s carmakers vis-à-vis those of neighboring countries, whose regulators were presumed to be winking at the same gamesmanship.

Dieselgate’s $25 billion consequences in the U.S. have transformed the political landscape in Europe, however. The scandal has drawn attention to a long simmering public health issue that, it turns out, was not caused by Volkswagen alone, but rather by the diesel car industry and the political culture that nurtured and protected it. For example, a European government report has found that 72,000 EU residents die prematurely each year because of NOx emissions.

In February the Administrative Law Court in Leipzig will decide a case brought by an advocacy group called Environmental Action Germany that could eventually result in diesel car bans in as many as 70 German cities. Diesel auto sales are dropping precipitously in anticipation, and in December VW CEO Matthias Müller shocked the automotive world by suggesting in a newspaper interview that the time had come for Europe to abandon key tax subsidies that have long supported the diesel industry.

The regulatory, environmental, and cultural gap between the E.U. and the U.S. is closing. But it was that chasm that spawned Dieselgate, and that chasm that Oliver Schmidt toppled into. So there is some injustice in the fact that Schmidt will pay so dearly. Yet there will be even greater injustice if he is the only one to do so.

The key contours of the Dieselgate affair emerged soon after the scandal broke. Since then the slowly accumulating evidence amassed and presented (or leaked) from criminal, civil, and media investigations have only made the breadth of VW’s conspiracy clearer. Examining the chronology of the company’s behavior in light of that information leaves little doubt that knowledge of the wrongdoing reached high up the ranks, repeatedly coming within a whisker of CEO Winterkorn himself.

In 2006, Volkswagen initiated a strategy to revive its then-moribund U.S. sales by marketing a clean diesel car. The challenge was that diesels produce more NOx than gasoline engines, and American NOx regulations were far more stringent than Europe’s — permitting only about one-sixth of what Europe then allowed. Most ways of cleaning NOx reduced fuel economy, harmed performance, took up space, increased cost, or required frequent servicing. (Environmentally, Europe had focused on reducing greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide. Diesels, due to their excellent fuel economy, were great at reducing carbon emissions. But diesels also produced NOx, which causes smog. Because of the history of smog problems in Los Angeles, regulators from CARB and the EPA had long been more sensitive to the health dangers posed by NOx than their European counterparts.)

VW’s U.S. strategy was born under then-CEO Bernd Pischetsrieder, and continued when Winterkorn replaced him in January 2007. In early 2008, Winterkorn announced a 10-year plan which called for tripling the company’s U.S. sales by 2018, enabling it to surpass General Motors and Toyota to become the world’s leading automaker. Clean Diesel was the linchpin of the plan, which, by mid-2015, had succeeded.