上個(gè)月,，美國(guó)貿(mào)易代表處發(fā)布了一份報(bào)告，用20頁(yè)的篇幅濃墨重彩地描述了中美貿(mào)易問(wèn)題,。其中,，貿(mào)易秘密的竊取、山寨,、知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)不力,、網(wǎng)絡(luò)隱私問(wèn)題、以打壓美國(guó)產(chǎn)品為代價(jià)推廣本國(guó)產(chǎn)品的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策,、補(bǔ)貼問(wèn)題,、歧視性的產(chǎn)品標(biāo)準(zhǔn)、傾銷過(guò)剩產(chǎn)能,，以及限制購(gòu)買美國(guó)服務(wù)的渠道等問(wèn)題,，都是美國(guó)政府在中美貿(mào)易上最關(guān)心的問(wèn)題。

這份報(bào)告的出爐并不令人意外,，因?yàn)橹袊?guó)的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策與規(guī)劃不可避免地會(huì)影響到美國(guó)企業(yè)與工人,，無(wú)論現(xiàn)在和以后都是如此，尤其是在中國(guó)認(rèn)為具有戰(zhàn)略意義的一些產(chǎn)業(yè)上,，其中又以信息技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)為代表,。此外，能源效率與環(huán)境技術(shù),、生物科技,、高端設(shè)備制造、新材料和非傳統(tǒng)能源車輛等產(chǎn)業(yè)也是中美貿(mào)易交鋒的焦點(diǎn),。

任何對(duì)中美貿(mào)易問(wèn)題感興趣的人,，都應(yīng)該閱讀一下美國(guó)貿(mào)易代表處的這份洋洋灑灑的《中國(guó)履行世貿(mào)組織規(guī)定情況報(bào)告》，這也是美國(guó)連續(xù)第15年針對(duì)中國(guó)履行WTO義務(wù)情況發(fā)布報(bào)告了,。該報(bào)告指出,，美國(guó)已經(jīng)針對(duì)中國(guó)提起了20次違反WTO規(guī)則的訴訟，比對(duì)任何其他WTO成員國(guó)都超出了一倍以上,。

看到如此冗長(zhǎng)的指責(zé)和抱怨,，難怪在上周海湖莊園的“習(xí)特會(huì)”前，特朗普要針對(duì)貿(mào)易問(wèn)題發(fā)表一份義正言辭的推文了。

雖然“習(xí)特會(huì)”并未宣布任何重大成果,，不過(guò)中美領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人都對(duì)此次會(huì)面感到樂(lè)觀,，特朗普還表示，此次與習(xí)近平的會(huì)面取得了“重大進(jìn)展”,。

預(yù)計(jì)在接下來(lái)的100天里,，中美之間會(huì)迅速啟動(dòng)一系列旨在縮減美國(guó)對(duì)華貿(mào)易赤字的談判。我們現(xiàn)在尚不清楚這些談判將解決哪些問(wèn)題,，但雙方的建設(shè)性對(duì)話至少會(huì)推動(dòng)美國(guó)最關(guān)心的部分議題取得進(jìn)展,。

美國(guó)談判代表要做的第一件事，就是為中美雙邊對(duì)話設(shè)定優(yōu)先議題,。近年來(lái),，中國(guó)政府瞄準(zhǔn)其產(chǎn)業(yè)政策目標(biāo)制訂了一系列措施和規(guī)劃，這些措施也給中美貿(mào)易帶來(lái)了一些問(wèn)題,，然而多年來(lái)的中美雙邊談判只是在這些問(wèn)題上取得了部分成果,。在接下來(lái)的100天里，中美雙方必須設(shè)定明確的目標(biāo)和跟進(jìn)路徑,。在中美貿(mào)易問(wèn)題上,，能夠迅速得到解決的問(wèn)題可能少之又少。美國(guó)要想在貿(mào)易談判上取得成功,，起碼要明白它希望中方對(duì)哪些政策措施做出改變,，并且要為此付出鍥而不舍地努力，以推動(dòng)這些改變的實(shí)現(xiàn),。

第二,，美國(guó)要想方設(shè)法保持在亞洲的重要地位。近年來(lái),，中國(guó)通過(guò)成立亞洲基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資銀行等手段,，在亞洲的基建領(lǐng)域非常活躍,。與此同時(shí),，中國(guó)也在通過(guò)輻射多個(gè)層面的“一帶一路”戰(zhàn)略擴(kuò)大其經(jīng)濟(jì)文化影響。另外,，中國(guó)還通過(guò)由其主導(dǎo)的區(qū)域全面經(jīng)濟(jì)伙伴關(guān)系（RCEP）及其貿(mào)易優(yōu)勢(shì),，推動(dòng)亞太地區(qū)建立自由貿(mào)易區(qū)。而美國(guó)在亞洲尚無(wú)明顯的經(jīng)濟(jì)戰(zhàn)略,。

美國(guó)曾經(jīng)通過(guò)泛太平洋伙伴關(guān)系（TPP）,，與亞太地區(qū)的11個(gè)國(guó)家和地區(qū)就經(jīng)貿(mào)與投資問(wèn)題達(dá)成過(guò)共識(shí)，但這已經(jīng)是過(guò)去的事情了,。隨著美國(guó)退出TPP,，作為亞太各國(guó)最重要的貿(mào)易伙伴的中國(guó)很可能將取而代之，成為亞洲貿(mào)易規(guī)則的制定者,。盡管中國(guó)國(guó)家主席習(xí)近平曾在今年年初的達(dá)沃斯論壇上呼吁自由貿(mào)易,，但中國(guó)現(xiàn)行的貿(mào)易政策與做法離真正的自由市場(chǎng)還有很大差距。

特朗普政府需要認(rèn)真思考的是,，美國(guó)如何才能與前TPP伙伴和有意加入TPP的其他國(guó)家重新建立互動(dòng),，在自由市場(chǎng)的框架下勾勒出亞太經(jīng)貿(mào)合作的新藍(lán)圖。只有如此,，美國(guó)才有希望重塑對(duì)亞太經(jīng)濟(jì)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位,。

如果說(shuō)有哪些做法是美國(guó)在對(duì)華貿(mào)易談判中需要避免的，那就是不要因?yàn)橄胱屩袊?guó)在安全和外交政策事務(wù)上負(fù)起更多責(zé)任,，就對(duì)中國(guó)操縱貿(mào)易的做法睜一只眼閉一只眼,。從特朗普本周發(fā)布的推特上（“如果中國(guó)協(xié)助解決朝鮮問(wèn)題，就能與美國(guó)簽定更有利的貿(mào)易協(xié)定”）可以看出,，這種可能是確實(shí)存在的,。

貿(mào)易和朝核問(wèn)題是不應(yīng)該攪在一起的。中國(guó)之所以應(yīng)該約束平壤,，是因?yàn)槌r無(wú)核化也符合中國(guó)自身的安全需求,。而美國(guó)拿自己的商業(yè)利益做交易是毫無(wú)道理的。如果美國(guó)的產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)在中國(guó)市場(chǎng)上有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力,，那么它們應(yīng)該受到中國(guó)的歡迎,，而不是成為拉攏中國(guó)解決朝鮮問(wèn)題的犧牲品。另外美國(guó)也不應(yīng)毫無(wú)怨言地接受在中國(guó)的不當(dāng)產(chǎn)業(yè)政策下生產(chǎn)并出口的大量產(chǎn)品,，因?yàn)檫@不僅會(huì)損害美國(guó)的相關(guān)產(chǎn)業(yè),，也會(huì)導(dǎo)致美國(guó)大量工人的失業(yè)。

勿庸置疑,，隨著朝鮮持續(xù)研發(fā)能打到美國(guó)本土的遠(yuǎn)程彈道導(dǎo)彈以及核彈頭,，美國(guó)的國(guó)家安全及盟友的安全都受到了巨大威脅。但除了朝鮮問(wèn)題之外,，美國(guó)還有另一個(gè)生死攸關(guān)的重大國(guó)家利益,，那就是要保持一個(gè)強(qiáng)大的工業(yè)基礎(chǔ)。無(wú)論是現(xiàn)在還是未來(lái),，這樣一個(gè)強(qiáng)大的工業(yè)基礎(chǔ)都是保障美國(guó)國(guó)家安全的基石,。將美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的命運(yùn)交由另一個(gè)國(guó)家的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策來(lái)操控，這無(wú)論如何是不可接受的,。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

譯者：樸成奎

本文作者Alan Wolff是法律事務(wù)所Dentons LLP的高級(jí)法律顧問(wèn),。在共和黨和民主黨執(zhí)政期間，他都曾任美國(guó)政府的高級(jí)貿(mào)易談判代表,。

U.S. concerns include theft of trade secrets, counterfeiting, inadequate protection of intellectual property, online piracy, industrial policies that promote domestic goods at the expense of U.S. products, subsidies, discriminatory product standards, the dumping of excess capacity, and restricted access for American services, according to a report that the US Trade Representative released last month, which included a 20 page chapter detailing America’s trade problems with China.

The report is not surprising, since China’s industrial policy measures and plans adversely affect American companies and workers now and will do so in the future, especially for industries China considers strategic, especially in information technology, but also including energy efficient and environmental technologies, biotechnology, high-end equipment manufacturing, new materials, and non-traditional energy vehicles.

Anyone interested in America’s trade relations with China should also read the lengthy 15th annual USTR Report on China's Compliance with the rules of the World Trade Organization . It notes that the U.S. has brought 20 WTO cases against China — more than double the cases brought against any other WTO member country.

Given the litany of well-documented complaints, it was no surprise that President Trump tweeted a stern message last month before meeting China’s, Xi Jinping, at Mar-A-Lago on last week.

Although there was no substantive outcome announced from the meeting, both leaders were very positive about it, with Trump saying that “tremendous progress” has been made.

China and the US are expected to engage in a series of speeded-up talks on trade over the next 100 days aimed at reducing the U.S. trade deficit with China. It is unclear what those talks will address, but constructive engagement holds at least some potential for progress on issues of concern.

The first thing U.S. negotiators must do is set priorities for the bilateral talks. The Chinese government has announced numerous measures in pursuit of its industrial policy objectives. Years of bilateral discussions have yielded only partial results regarding the problems that its policies create for U.S. trade. Specific goals need to be set during the 100-day process, with clear paths forward for follow-up. There may be very few quick fixes. The only way that the United States can succeed in this effort is to be well-informed about the policies and measures it wants to see changed and to engage in an unflagging effort to obtain those changes.

Second, the U.S. has to find a way to remain relevant in Asia. China is very active in financing infrastructure in the region through its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB); it is extending its economic and cultural influence through its multifaceted One Belt One Road initiative, a conceptual framework for reaching out from China over land and water to build infrastructure and strengthen trading relationships; and is seeking trade advantages through its leadership in a 16-nation negotiation for a free trade area, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The U.S. has no apparent economic strategy of its own for Asia.

The U.S. and 11 other countries had reached a consensus in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that included updated rules designed to cover the region’s trade and investment, but that is now gone. With U.S. withdrawal from TPP, the rules for trade in Asia are likely to be set instead by China, the dominant economic partner in the region. Despite Chinese Premier Xi Jinping’s liberal trade sentiments expressed at Davos earlier this year, China’s current policies and measures are all too often far from being free-market oriented.

The Trump Administration needs to consider how it can re-engage with its former TPP partners, and other nations that had expressed an interest in joining TPP, to offer an alternative vision that is market-based. The means has to be found to have American economic leadership restored in the region.

What should not be done is for the U.S. to turn a blind eye to trade-distorting practices in order to induce China to act as a responsible stakeholder on security and foreign policy issues. This is a current issue because of the President’s tweet this week:

These two issues should not be linked. China should be motivated to rein in Pyongyang to serve its own security needs. Trading off U.S. commercial interests makes no sense. If the U.S. has competitive goods and services, they should be welcomed by China, and not sacrificed to get China’s cooperation with respect to North Korea. Nor should the U.S. accept without complaint products created through misdirected industrial policies shipped to the United States in quantities that cause injury to U.S. industries and resulting in substantial loss of U.S. jobs.

No one can doubt that U.S. national security is at risk with North Korea continuing on its path to develop longer-range missiles that can reach the United States, as well as our allies, with nuclear warheads. But this country also has a vital national interest in maintaining a strong industrial base. This is essential to serve America’s national security now and in the future. Having the shape of the U.S. economy determined by others’ industrial policies is not acceptable.

Alan Wolff is a Senior Counsel at the law firm Dentons LLP. He is a former senior trade negotiator in Republican and Democratic administrations.