通用電氣首席執(zhí)行官杰弗里?伊梅爾特曾說中國市場很大,，但很難,。和秘魯、蒙古和澳大利亞等增長型區(qū)域相比,，伊梅爾特認(rèn)為：“這些地區(qū)同樣很大,，但不是那么難,。”無可置疑,，外國公司在華經(jīng)營的黃金時(shí)代已經(jīng)結(jié)束,。

上周，在中國的境外非政府組織受到了有史以來最強(qiáng)烈的沖擊,。將于2017年1月生效的新法律規(guī)定,，所有境外非政府組織都要有一家正式的中國擔(dān)保組織。受影響的組織多達(dá)7000個(gè),，其中包括一些最有名望的機(jī)構(gòu),，比如綠色和平組織、清華-卡內(nèi)基全球政策研究中心,、愛百福,、比爾和梅琳達(dá)?蓋茨基金會(huì)等。許多項(xiàng)目很快就會(huì)被砍掉,，其他一些也將打道回府,。

20世紀(jì)80年代以來，境外非政府組織一直在為中國的發(fā)展需求提供資金,、技術(shù)和專業(yè)人才,。在很長一段時(shí)間里，中國政府對(duì)此態(tài)度不定,，一直游走于懷疑和容忍之間,。這讓許多觀察人士相信社會(huì)進(jìn)步不可避免。他們的思路是,，隨著世界的聯(lián)系程度達(dá)到前所未有的水平,，它就會(huì)變得更加平坦。然而,，此番對(duì)境外非政府組織的加強(qiáng)監(jiān)管充分表明,，情況也許恰恰相反。對(duì)企業(yè)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人和跨公司負(fù)責(zé)人來說,，這說明他們需要重新評(píng)估自己的中國策略,。

上述限制條件出現(xiàn)后，沒有哪位CEO會(huì)打算向冷漠的中國政府解釋自己公司的經(jīng)營政策,。勞動(dòng)力成本上升已經(jīng)造成許多公司向東南亞轉(zhuǎn)移,，比如越南、柬埔寨和孟加拉國,。原因很簡單,，它們希望控制對(duì)中國工廠的過度依賴。外國品牌發(fā)現(xiàn)自己不時(shí)地成為咄咄逼人的中國消費(fèi)者的靶子——沃爾瑪被指銷售假驢肉，肯德基所用雞肉抗生素超標(biāo),，釣魚島問題激起反日情緒造成豐田汽車銷售暴跌,。美國商會(huì)今年的問卷調(diào)查表明，75%的會(huì)員公司覺得現(xiàn)在自己在中國已經(jīng)不那么受歡迎了,。

當(dāng)然,，中國6-7%的增長率仍非常高，就算和2002-2008年間的飛速發(fā)展時(shí)期（平均增速為12%）相比也是如此,。在基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施,、人才和發(fā)展?jié)摿Ψ矫娑歼_(dá)到此種水平的地區(qū)寥寥無幾；也沒有哪家《財(cái)富》500強(qiáng)企業(yè)承擔(dān)得起忽視中國的后果,。但在如此之多的因素共同影響下,，企業(yè)進(jìn)入市場的方法必須有所變化，而不是天真地在中國淘金,。

在華經(jīng)營的整體成本越來越高,，這一點(diǎn)已經(jīng)很明了，高層需要對(duì)中國勞心費(fèi)力的程度也超過以往,。以伊梅爾特為例,，他每年至少來中國兩次，每次都會(huì)在GE研究中心逗留幾天,，會(huì)晤政府官員,，了解中國最新的行止法規(guī)，并按中國的目標(biāo)來調(diào)整GE的安排,。這些措施成本不菲,，都需要時(shí)間和金錢。因此,，企業(yè)進(jìn)入中國市場的努力必須要在中國講得通,，而且對(duì)其他市場也要有實(shí)質(zhì)意義。

我們看到,，企業(yè)已經(jīng)把在中國的行動(dòng)作為整個(gè)新興市場策略的一部分,。舉例來說，諾華公司,、葛蘭素史克以及強(qiáng)生都已在中國設(shè)立了先進(jìn)的研究實(shí)驗(yàn)室。生物和化學(xué)高級(jí)人才比比皆是以及大規(guī)模稅收減免的傳統(tǒng)優(yōu)勢(shì)仍在,，而且這些研究中心都把精力集中在發(fā)展中國家常見的疾病上,。受氣候、飲食習(xí)慣,、生活水平以及生活方式影響,，各個(gè)地區(qū)的病患情況都不相同，中國則特別適于開發(fā)肝炎、結(jié)核病,、胃癌和肝癌治療藥物,。

GE醫(yī)療保健業(yè)務(wù)更進(jìn)一步。它以中國為基地,，開發(fā)出了手機(jī)大小的超聲診斷儀,。這種儀器定價(jià)1.5萬美元（約9.75萬元人民幣），比GE的高端超聲診斷儀便宜15%,。這樣的便攜設(shè)備在農(nóng)村醫(yī)療機(jī)構(gòu)非常有用,，那里的醫(yī)生要直接做出診斷，比如肝腫大,、膽囊腫大以及胃部異常,。在美國，這種手持設(shè)備也找到了新的應(yīng)用途徑,，而且不會(huì)影響現(xiàn)有高端儀器在大醫(yī)院的銷售,，那就是在全科醫(yī)生和護(hù)理人員進(jìn)行預(yù)檢時(shí)發(fā)揮作用。

能調(diào)動(dòng)全世界最優(yōu)質(zhì)資源的能力才是跨國公司的真正優(yōu)勢(shì),。

在中國取得成功當(dāng)然很重要,，但前提是這也有助于在其他地區(qū)獲得成功。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

霍華德?于是洛桑國際管理發(fā)展學(xué)院戰(zhàn)略管理和創(chuàng)新系教授,，專攻技術(shù)創(chuàng)新,、戰(zhàn)略轉(zhuǎn)型和管理調(diào)整。2015年,，工商管理類資訊網(wǎng)站Poets & Quants將于教授評(píng)為全球40位40歲以下最佳教授之一,。他在哈佛商學(xué)院獲得博士學(xué)位。

譯者：Charlie

審校：詹妮

General Electric CEO Jeffrey Immelt once described China as big, but hard. Compared to other growth regions, such as Peru, Mongolia, and Australia, Immelt conceded, “These places are equally big, but they are not quite as hard.” There is no disputing that the golden age of foreign companies doing business in China is over.

Last week saw the most sweeping crackdown on foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in China yet. The new law, to be effective by January 2017, requires all foreign NGOs to have an official Chinese sponsor. None would be allowed to raise funds in China nor conduct any political activities. A staggering 7,000 foreign groups will be affected, including some of the most venerable names: Greenpeace, the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, The Bethel Foundation, The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and others. Many programs will soon be curtailed, and others simply sent home packing.

Since the 1980s, foreign NGOs have been contributing money, technology, and expertise to address China’s development needs. For a long while, Beijing exhibited mixed responses to this, from suspicion to tolerance. That led many observers to believe that societal progress was inevitable. As the world becomes evermore interconnected, it will become flatter, the thinking goes. Yet, the latest toughened stance on foreign NGOs is a good reminder that the exact opposite might be happening. For business leaders and heads of multinationals, it is a call to reassess their China strategy.

With the latest clampdown on NGOs added into the mix, no CEO wants to have to explain his or her company’s policies about corporate dealings with unsympathetic Chinese authorities. Rising labor costs have caused many a company to flock to Southeast Asia—from Vietnam to Cambodia or Bangladesh—for a simple reason: They want to limit their overwhelming reliance on factories in China. At times, foreign brands find themselves under fire by belligerent local consumers: Walmart China was accused of selling donkey meat, KFC chicken was laden with excessive antibiotics, and Toyota sales tumbled when anti-Japan sentiment flared up over the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. A survey by the American Chamber of Commerce this year showed that 75% of member companies in China felt that they were less welcome now.

To be sure, China’s growth rate of 6% to 7% is still very high, even when compared to its heady era between 2002 to 2008, which averaged 12%. Few places offer the same level of infrastructure, talent, and growth potential all at the same time; and no Fortune 500 company can afford to ignore the Middle Kingdom quite yet. But with so many strings attached, companies’ go-to-market approach must be more nuanced than a na?ve hunt for big fortune in China.

It is a known fact that the overall cost of China is getting higher, and the demand for attention from top management there is becoming evermore taxing. Immelt, for example, goes to China at least twice a year, spending a few days at GE’s GE -0.83% research center, mingling with government leaders, understanding China’s latest do’s and don’ts, and aligning GE’s agenda with China’s ambition. These efforts don’t come cheap. They require time and money. Companies’ efforts to access the Chinese market must therefore make sense in the country, but also be relevant for other markets.

Already, we have seen companies frame their efforts in China as part of wider strategy focused on emerging markets in general. Novartis NVS -0.28% , GlaxoSmithKline GSK 0.17% , and Johnson & Johnson JNJ 0.59% , for example, have all set up advanced research laboratories in China. The conventional advantages—like the abundance of biology and chemistry PhDs and generous tax concessions—still apply, but these centers are focusing on diseases commonly found in developing nations. Because of the climate, dietary habits, living standards, and lifestyle, diseases vary across regions, and China is particularly suitable for developing treatment for hepatitis and tuberculosis, as well as gastric and liver cancer.

GE Healthcare went further. Using China as a base, it developed a compact ultrasound machine about the size of a mobile phone. Priced at $15,000—less than 15% of GE’s high-end ultrasound machines—the pocket-size device proves highly useful in rural medical centers where it was deployed by doctors for straightforward application, such as detecting enlarged livers, gallbladders, and stomach abnormalities. The handheld device has since found new applications in its home market back in the U.S.—not to cannibalize existing sales of high-end equipment in large hospitals, but to capture new applications among general practitioners and paramedics when providing pre-screening services.

The ability to extract the very best all over the world is in fact the true advantage of being a multinational.

Winning in China makes sense, but only if it also helps win elsewhere.

Howard Yu is professor of strategic management and innovation at IMD. He specializes in technological innovation, strategic transformation and change management. In 2015 Professor Yu was featured in Poets & Quants as one of the Best 40 Under 40 Professors. He received his doctoral degree at Harvard Business School.