優(yōu)步的戰(zhàn)略在美國(guó)管用,，原封不動(dòng)地照搬到國(guó)外則未必行,。

優(yōu)步（Uber）最近透露，該公司在中國(guó)市場(chǎng)的虧損額度每年超過10億美元,。這對(duì)于任何一家公司來說都是一筆巨款,，更何況是一家成立不到十年的公司。雖然虧損數(shù)額令人咂舌,，不過,，優(yōu)步卻表示,，它在中國(guó)市場(chǎng)的虧損并沒有什么好擔(dān)心的。

優(yōu)步創(chuàng)始人,、首席執(zhí)行官特拉維斯?卡蘭尼克也表示,，優(yōu)步在中國(guó)的形勢(shì)明顯好于主要本土競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手——滴滴快的。而且他相信,，通過利用其他地區(qū)的盈利向中國(guó)市場(chǎng)提供補(bǔ)貼,，優(yōu)步是能挺過早期在中國(guó)市場(chǎng)的這段艱難歷程的。

我本人則認(rèn)為,，優(yōu)步在中國(guó)的發(fā)展并不樂觀,。我認(rèn)為,，優(yōu)步在中國(guó)的巨虧,，是該公司在全球戰(zhàn)略上存在深層問題的表象，暴露出優(yōu)步在戰(zhàn)略上存在一些嚴(yán)重缺陷,。

當(dāng)企業(yè)在海外擴(kuò)展時(shí),，經(jīng)常會(huì)面臨陌生的文化、政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境,，從而給這套在母國(guó)行之有效的業(yè)務(wù)模式帶來額外的,、不可預(yù)見的壓力。同時(shí),，他們還面臨著更了解當(dāng)?shù)厍闆r的本土競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手,。

沒有一家科技公司比優(yōu)步更劇烈地經(jīng)歷了這些困難。在不到七年的時(shí)間里,，優(yōu)步已經(jīng)從北美擴(kuò)展到了每一片有人居住的大陸上——包括歐洲、亞洲,、南美洲,、非洲和澳洲。有一陣子,，優(yōu)步幾乎是以每天進(jìn)入一個(gè)新城市的速度在擴(kuò)張,。最近，優(yōu)步甚至還在泰國(guó)和印度等地開辟了人力車和摩托車的叫車服務(wù),?？梢哉f，優(yōu)步在產(chǎn)品和地緣上的擴(kuò)展速度是史無前例的,。

那么,，如此迅速的全球擴(kuò)張給優(yōu)步帶來了怎樣的效益？可以說,，效益要比期望低得多,，而困難卻比期望多得多……而且這不僅僅是在中國(guó)市場(chǎng)。讓我們?cè)敿?xì)來看,。

優(yōu)步光是在美國(guó)本土就遇到了不少困難,。優(yōu)步的傳統(tǒng)戰(zhàn)略，是首先迅速攻入一個(gè)新陣地,，把法律和監(jiān)管后果留在以后解決,。優(yōu)步的支持者往往會(huì)稱贊它的創(chuàng)新性,、便捷性、迅速性,、以及（沒有猛增的）價(jià)格，但同時(shí)也有不少批評(píng)者指出,，優(yōu)步的運(yùn)營(yíng)方式應(yīng)該被譴責(zé),，因?yàn)樗慕熊嚪?wù)明顯違反了當(dāng)?shù)氐姆煞ㄒ?guī),。好在優(yōu)步在美國(guó)的很多城市都較好地搞定了當(dāng)?shù)卣秃捅O(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu),。

優(yōu)步首先堅(jiān)稱自己是一家軟件公司，它只是在交通服務(wù)的供應(yīng)者（出租車司機(jī)）與消費(fèi)者（乘客）之間建立了一道聯(lián)系,。因此,，優(yōu)步認(rèn)為應(yīng)該完全由它的承包商（出租車司機(jī)）來承擔(dān)守法合規(guī)的責(zé)任，而不是由優(yōu)步來擔(dān)責(zé),。

比如,，優(yōu)步曾在紐約出庭應(yīng)訴，捍衛(wèi)自己運(yùn)營(yíng)電子叫車服務(wù)的權(quán)力,，與傳統(tǒng)出租車公司進(jìn)行針尖對(duì)麥芒的交鋒,，并且最終獲得勝訴。而且優(yōu)步還在邁阿密,、舊金山和圣路易斯等多座城市進(jìn)行了成功的游說，使這些城市按照其訴求修改了相關(guān)法律,。

但在美國(guó)以外,，優(yōu)步就沒有如此幸運(yùn)了。除了在中國(guó)的虧損被廣泛報(bào)道,，優(yōu)步在歐洲的發(fā)展也舉步維艱,。

這家年輕的科技公司在全球擴(kuò)張的過程中犯了一個(gè)經(jīng)典的錯(cuò)誤：它天真地以為，那套令它在美國(guó)市場(chǎng)成功斬獲龍頭老大地位的業(yè)務(wù)模式和營(yíng)銷模式,，套用到其他國(guó)家也能一樣順利,。它嚴(yán)重低估了在經(jīng)濟(jì),、政治和文化環(huán)境都全然不同的國(guó)家運(yùn)營(yíng)時(shí)可能遭遇的挑戰(zhàn)。

比如,，說到政治環(huán)境的差異,，優(yōu)步那種百無禁忌的“先進(jìn)入，再請(qǐng)求原諒（而不是允許）”的套路,，更適用于英美法系國(guó)家,。在美國(guó)和英國(guó)等英美法系國(guó)家，法律法規(guī)往往更加靈活,，更注重司法解釋,。因此，優(yōu)步在為其業(yè)務(wù)的合法性進(jìn)行辯護(hù)的時(shí)候,，也就能夠取得更好的結(jié)果,。

而在中國(guó)、法國(guó),、德國(guó),、西班牙以及歐洲大部，即所謂的大陸法系國(guó)家里,，優(yōu)步的這種進(jìn)入方式是比較困難的,。大陸法系是在羅馬法的基礎(chǔ)上建立的，主要基于法理,、核心原則和法典,。因此，大陸法系國(guó)家的法律往往更為死板,，司法系統(tǒng)的職能更偏重于對(duì)法律的執(zhí)行而非解讀,。因此，這些國(guó)家對(duì)于優(yōu)步“打法律擦邊球”的運(yùn)營(yíng)方式采取較為反對(duì)的立場(chǎng),，也就是意料之中的事了,。

還有非常重要的一點(diǎn)，就是優(yōu)步并沒有充分認(rèn)識(shí)到美國(guó)與其他國(guó)家在文化上的細(xì)微差異,，因此在這些國(guó)家里沒有得到“民心”。美國(guó)是一個(gè)高度個(gè)人主義的社會(huì),，鼓勵(lì)個(gè)體保持個(gè)性,，追求個(gè)人利益。而在亞洲以及法國(guó),、西班牙等部分歐洲國(guó)家,，對(duì)集體和諧和社會(huì)秩序的重視往往超過個(gè)人成就。這些國(guó)家往往更重視其他人,，更重視人際關(guān)系,、親情和團(tuán)結(jié)友愛,。因此，由于優(yōu)步往往采取激進(jìn)的進(jìn)入策略,，且對(duì)地方當(dāng)局不夠重視,，并且沒有在本地培養(yǎng)出真誠和信任的社會(huì)關(guān)系，因此消費(fèi)者對(duì)其不夠信任,，也就沒有什么好奇怪的了,。

由于錯(cuò)誤解讀了所在國(guó)的政治和文化環(huán)境，加之采取了有瑕疵的全球擴(kuò)張策略,，因而優(yōu)步不僅在中國(guó)虧損了10億美金,，它在很多其他國(guó)家，面對(duì)滴滴快的之類的本土競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手,，也表現(xiàn)出了明顯的劣勢(shì),。比如，它在法國(guó),、德國(guó),、西班牙、荷蘭和比利時(shí)的部分地區(qū)都遭到了“封殺”,，理由是故意無視和違反當(dāng)?shù)胤?，致使司機(jī)和乘客遭遇危險(xiǎn)。而且,，優(yōu)步還在多個(gè)國(guó)家遭到了強(qiáng)烈抵制——多地發(fā)生了針對(duì)優(yōu)步的抗議,、騷亂；優(yōu)步還與激憤的工會(huì)組織發(fā)生了激烈沖突,。此外還有無休止的用戶投訴,。

那么，優(yōu)步如何才能避免這些問題,？

首先,，這家年輕有為的公司應(yīng)該認(rèn)識(shí)到，中國(guó),、印度和歐洲等市場(chǎng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)潛力雖然已經(jīng)成熟,，但它們與美國(guó)有著方方面面的巨大差異。優(yōu)步應(yīng)仔細(xì)檢討自己的政策和策略,，看看它們是否適合各個(gè)所在國(guó),。

其次，不管有多耗費(fèi)時(shí)間,，優(yōu)步都應(yīng)該先向有權(quán)機(jī)構(gòu)爭(zhēng)得運(yùn)營(yíng)許可,，并藉此表達(dá)它對(duì)現(xiàn)有制度和規(guī)矩的尊重，如果這樣的話,，優(yōu)步的運(yùn)營(yíng)可能會(huì)更順利些,。

第三,，優(yōu)步應(yīng)該投入一些時(shí)間與精力，與代表出租車司機(jī)的工會(huì)組織建立良好的關(guān)系,，而不是通過激進(jìn)的進(jìn)入策略,，挑起本地工會(huì)的敵對(duì)反應(yīng)。

另外,，通過合作模式來規(guī)避各國(guó)的獨(dú)有風(fēng)險(xiǎn),，也有助于優(yōu)步免于遭受很多政治和社會(huì)面的抵制，同時(shí)也有助于在文化上親近本地消費(fèi)者群體,。而且這也有助于令優(yōu)步成為本地市場(chǎng)上的一個(gè)更加強(qiáng)大的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者,。

雖然本文的標(biāo)題說的是優(yōu)步在中國(guó)遇到的問題，但優(yōu)步在全球遇到的問題遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)不止于中國(guó),。而且對(duì)于其他正在走全球化道路的企業(yè)來說,，無論規(guī)模大小，無論從事什么行業(yè),，優(yōu)步暴露出的問題存在共性,。這也再次表明，在當(dāng)今全球化的市場(chǎng)中,，充分了解各國(guó)的政治,、文化和經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境，并相應(yīng)地對(duì)企業(yè)的業(yè)務(wù)戰(zhàn)略做出調(diào)整,，具有何等重要的意義,。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

本文作者羅伯特?薩魯曼是紐約大學(xué)斯特恩商學(xué)院國(guó)際管理學(xué)副教授，也是《全球視野：企業(yè)如何避免全球化陷阱》一書的作者,。

譯者：樸成奎

What made the startup successful in the U.S. won’t work elsewhere.

Uber recently revealed that it is losing more than $1 billion per year in China. This is a colossal sum of money for any company, let alone one that has been in business for less than a decade. Despite the eye-popping headline number, Uber claims that its losses in China are nothing to be concerned about. According to its chief executive and founder Travis Kalanick, Uber is in a much better market position than its chief Chinese rival, Didi Kuadi, and he believes Uber can weather its early stumbles there by subsidizing losses with profits from other operations.

I am not so sure I take such a rosy view of Uber’s plight in China. I think they are symptomatic of deeper-seated global strategy problems and that they reveal some serious strategic flaws.

When companies expand abroad, they face unfamiliar cultural, political, and economic environments that put additional, unforeseen pressures on their domestic business models. They also face competitors who understand the local environment far better than they do.

No technology company has experienced these difficulties more acutely than Uber. In fewer than seven years, Uber has managed to expand from North America to every populated continent – Europe, Asia, South America, Africa, and Australia. At one point Uber was entering one new city per day. And if that weren’t enough, Uber recently expanded its offerings in markets like Thailand and India with a rickshaw and motorbike service. That kind of growth in product and geographic scope is unprecedented.

So what does Uber have to show for all of this global expansion? Much less than it had hoped, and much more difficulty than it had anticipated, …and not just in China. Let’s take a closer look.

Uber has faced its fair share of difficulty in the US. Uber’s traditional approach has been to enter quickly and stake a claim to a new territory first, leaving the legal and regulatory ramifications for later. Though proponents laud its innovativeness, convenience, speed, and (non-surge) prices, detractors suggest that Uber is operating in a morally reprehensible way by running an illegal taxi service that clearly violates local regulations. To its credit, Uber has largely been able to placate regulators and politicians in various US cities. For starters, it maintains that it is a software company that merely connects suppliers (taxi drivers) with customers (fares). As such, it argues that the onus of regulatory compliance falls squarely on its contractors (the taxi drivers) and not on Uber. It has prevailed in courts in New York, for example, defending its right to operate an electronic taxi hailing service and compete head-to-head against traditional yellow cabs. It has also convinced politicians in various US cities—e.g., Miami, San Francisco, and St. Louis—to change existing laws in its favor.

But Uber has not been so lucky outside the US. Beyond its well-documented troubles in China, it is also struggling in Europe. The young tech company has committed a classic globalization mistake: it naively assumed that its business model and market approach, which ultimately solidified its market-leading position in the U.S., could translate just as seamlessly to other countries. It severely underestimated the challenges of operating in countries that embody totally different economic, political, and cultural environments.

For example, when it comes to political differences, Uber’s devil-may-care approach of asking for forgiveness (instead of for permission) works better in countries with legal systems based in common law. In common law countries like the US and the UK, laws and regulations are more flexible and subject to judicial interpretation. Uber is therefore afforded greater latitude when arguing the legality of its case in the courts of law. Such an entry approach is difficult, however, in civil law countries like China, France, Germany, Spain, and much of continental Europe. Civil law systems have their foundation in Roman Law and are based on doctrine, core principles, and codified rules. As a result, laws are more rigid and the role of the judicial system is to enforce, rather than interpret, the law. In that sense, an adversarial stance toward Uber’s less-than-by-the-book adherence to the law should have been expected.

Critically, Uber also failed to properly acknowledge the subtle and nuanced cultural differences between the US and foreign countries, thereby failing to win in the court of public opinion. The US has a particularly strong emphasis on individualist principles: individuals are encouraged to take chances to assert their individuality and pursue their individual self-interests. But in Asia, and in European countries like France and Spain, group harmony and societal order are stressed over individual achievement. There is a greater concern for others, a greater emphasis placed on personal relationships, and a greater sense of kinship and solidarity built into each country’s social compact. It is therefore not surprising that local consumers are skeptical of Uber’s aggressive entry tactics, lack of consideration for local authorities, and inability to foster genuine and trusting local relationships.

As a consequence of misreading political and cultural environments and adopting a flawed approach to global expansion, not only is Uber losing more than $1 billion in China, but it is at a distinct disadvantage to local companies like Didi Kuadi in many of the foreign markets it operates. It has been banned from operating in parts of France, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, and Belgium. It has been accused of willfully ignoring and breaking the law, placing both drivers and riders in peril. And its presence in various countries has generated an incredible backlash – protests, riots, clashes with angry labor unions, and an endless litany of customer complaints.

So how could Uber have avoided this mess? First, the young, talented, and well-endowed company should have recognized that China, India, and Europe, though rife with economic potential, differ in meaningful ways from the US. It should have taken a careful look at its practices and policies to consider whether they were appropriate to each specific country. Uber would have fared better asking for permission to operate from the proper authorities and thus conveying its respect for established regulations and institutions, no matter how time consuming it may seem. It also should have invested time in building relationships with the various unions that represent taxi drivers rather than foment hostile reactions with aggressive entry tactics. Harnessing a cooperative approach that aims to anticipate country-specific risks would have helped Uber avoid much of the political – and popular – backlash it received. It would have helped curry cultural favor with the local consumer base. And it would have helped make Uber a more formidable competitor in the local market.

Although the headline was about Uber’s China problem, Uber’s global problems extend well beyond China. Moreover, the tale of Uber is one that is not uncommon for globalizing companies, big or small, new economy or old. And it highlights how important it is, now more than ever, to understand the political, cultural, and economic environments in the global marketplace and to tailor business strategies accordingly.

Robert Salomon is an associate professor of international management at NYU Stern School of Business and author of Global Vision: How Companies Can Overcome the Pitfalls of Globalization.