????盡管奧朗德治理法國經(jīng)濟(jì)的方案十分模糊,，而且在某些情況下缺乏可信度，但是他能拉到選票的原因不僅在于他反對薩科齊,，而且還因?yàn)樗罅π麚P(yáng)歐洲經(jīng)濟(jì)增長,。在某些方面,，他對時(shí)機(jī)的把握恰到好處。去年秋天歐元區(qū)危機(jī)于發(fā)時(shí),，法,、德應(yīng)對危機(jī)的措施就是推行一攬子緊縮方案；但是支出削減進(jìn)一步削弱了多個(gè)歐洲國家的增長態(tài)勢,，因此要求出臺強(qiáng)有力的刺激方案的呼聲越來越高,。奧朗德希望借此東風(fēng)將自己推上經(jīng)濟(jì)增長冠軍的寶座。為實(shí)現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo),，他想到了三個(gè)辦法,，其中之一——利用歐洲投資銀行（European Investment Bank）的資金來促進(jìn)增長——也幾乎得到了歐盟領(lǐng)導(dǎo)、包括德國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的一致支持,。

????奧朗德另外兩個(gè)辦法對于德國來說就更不是什么好消息了,。首先，它希望發(fā)行歐洲債券,，“不是為了集中債務(wù)，而是為了給工業(yè)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項(xiàng)目融資”,。默克爾的問題在于,，如果歐洲所有國家的債務(wù)成為了歐元區(qū)的債務(wù)，那么德國最終將更為直接地為希臘和西班牙經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)買單,。多數(shù)觀察人士認(rèn)為,，如果歐盟要從貨幣聯(lián)盟向更深層次的聯(lián)盟發(fā)展，這一幕遲早會發(fā)生,。然而問題并不在于發(fā)生的可能性,，而是在于發(fā)生的時(shí)間。任何一個(gè)德國政客,，包括面臨2013年大選的默克爾,，都不愿意在財(cái)政監(jiān)管和平衡到位之前討論這個(gè)話題。但是鑒于全歐日益高漲的民族主義情緒,，實(shí)施財(cái)政監(jiān)管的可能性越來越小,。因此盡管奧朗德可以通過正面施壓來迫使默克爾更為積極地去尋求啟動歐洲債券的方式（智囊團(tuán)和各成員國央行已經(jīng)提出了建議），但他難以憑一己之力實(shí)現(xiàn)這個(gè)目標(biāo),。默克爾守著財(cái)大氣粗的德國,，掌握了全部的主動。

????奧朗德還希望歐洲央行（ECB）像去年冬天一樣將借貸對象由銀行直接拓寬至政府,。這個(gè)目標(biāo)有著與歐洲債券相似的作用,，即緩解歐洲多個(gè)病入膏肓的經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)體的債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)。然而,，這一做法的危險(xiǎn)在于,，它必然會為歐洲央行烙上政治印跡,。歐洲央行董事會成員在多次講話中都拿出了擋箭牌，稱歐盟立法曾明確規(guī)定不允許歐洲央行救助政府,。但是羸弱的歐洲市場表明,，歐洲央行的銀行救助行動也未能解決歐元區(qū)危機(jī)背后的結(jié)構(gòu)性經(jīng)濟(jì)問題。雖然歐洲領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人可以修改對歐洲央行的授權(quán),，而且這正符合奧朗德的心意,，但是德國一直在全球的矚目之下依然對這一問題避而不談——主要原因還在于與當(dāng)前形勢密切相關(guān)的德國內(nèi)部政治問題。

????繼任伊始,，奧朗德必然專注于“面子工程”,，藉此而來的熱點(diǎn)口號也會層出不窮——而且他也有可能反對德國關(guān)于統(tǒng)領(lǐng)貨幣聯(lián)盟組織的人選，即德國財(cái)政部長沃爾夫?qū)?朔伊布勒,。但是以下幾點(diǎn)可以讓市場放寬心,。第一，希臘最近的大選產(chǎn)生了多位反歐盟的政客,，而這使得默克爾和奧朗德至少在拓展歐盟這一議題上站在一條戰(zhàn)線上,。第二，奧朗德也會因?yàn)閲鴥?nèi)的家事而忙得不可開交——例如極右翼反移民勢力的抬頭,，高失業(yè)率（尤其是法國青年的失業(yè)問題）,，以及商界對債務(wù)評級下調(diào)事件的強(qiáng)烈反對。緊鑼密鼓的日程會讓他無暇與默克爾之間發(fā)生不必要的摩擦,。就最樂觀的一面來看,，奧朗德對德國緊縮政策的反對甚至可能會轉(zhuǎn)化成有效的妥協(xié)，而德國仍將占據(jù)上風(fēng),。

????譯者：翔

????Despite Hollande's ambiguous and, in some cases, dubious plans for managing the French economy, he was elected not just as an anti-Sarkozy vote, but because he talks a lot about European growth. In some ways, his timing couldn't be better. When the eurozone crisis broke last fall, the Franco-German crisis response was to push through an austerity package; but spending cuts have further undermined growth in several European economies, prompting a clamor for a more stimulative approach. Hollande hopes to seize the moment and frame himself as a champion of growth. He has three ideas for how to do this, one of which -- tapping the funds of the European Investment Bank to promote growth -- is supported almost unanimously by EU leaders, including those in Germany.

????Hollande's other two ideas are more unpalatable to Germany. First, he wants to create Eurobonds, "not to pool debts but to finance industrial infrastructure projects." Merkel's problem with this is that if all national debt becomes eurozone debt, Germany will essentially pay in a more direct way for Greek and Spanish economic woes. Most observers agree that this is what ultimately needs to happen if the European Union achieves its goal of becoming more than just a currency union. The question is not if, but when. No German politician, including Merkel, who faces reelection in 2013, wants to talk about the subject without other fiscal checks and balances in place. But additional fiscal checks seem increasingly unlikely, given nationalistic sentiments rising across Europe. So while Hollande might be able to put positive pressure on Merkel to be more aggressive in figuring out the various avenues with which to pursue Eurobonds (already think tanks and central banks are putting forth proposals), he can't create them alone. Merkel, with Germany's deep pockets, still holds all the cards.

????Hollande also wants the ECB to go beyond lending to banks, as it did last winter, and to lend directly to governments. The goal, similar to that of the Eurobonds, would be to ease the debt burdens of sick European economies. The danger is that such a move would inevitably force politics onto the ECB. In various speeches, ECB board members fall back on the idea that EU legislation clearly rules out the ECB's bailout of governments. But as Europe's weak markets have shown, the ECB's bank bailouts haven't addressed the structural economic problems behind the eurozone crisis. Though Europe's leaders could revise the ECB's mandate, as Hollande desires, the world has watched Germany skitter around this option -- in large part due to its own domestic political concerns that remain fully relevant today.

????In the beginning of his presidency, Hollande will be determined to "save face," which will likely lead to a lot of hot rhetoric -- and he may yet block Germany's pick to lead the group that runs the currency union, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble. But markets should also be reassured on a few counts. First, after Greece's recent election, which resulted in more anti-European politicians, Merkel and Hollande are at least on the same side of the broader European debate. Second, Hollande will have his hands full at home -- with the rise of the anti-immigrant extreme right, and high unemployment, particularly among France's youth, and with a business community vigorously opposed to more debt downgrades. This crowded agenda will continuously divert him from picking unnecessary fights with Merkel. At best, Hollande's opposition to German austerity could even be channeled into productive compromises, with Germany still having the upper hand.